Working Outline of Motion Challenging Constitutionality of the Entire Recodification of the Texas “Transportation” Code via SB 971.

  1. Unconstitutional Judicial Alteration of Well-Established Law on the Proper Meaning and Use of Terms of Art, Thus, Unconstitutionally Affecting Legislative Purpose and Intent While Unlawfully Expanding the Scope of Legislation.

    1. The term “transportation”1 is a legal “term of art” having a specific meaning within the specific context of “transportation” related professions and occupations, and is not directly related to the actions and activities of the general public acting in their private common law capacities and activities.

      The online version of the Oxford English Dictionary defines “term of art” this way:

      A word or phrase that has a precise, specialized meaning within a particular field or profession. 2 (Emphasis added).

      While the online version of West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, Edition 2, defines the phrase in this way:

      A word or phrase that has special meaning in a particular context. 3 (Emphasis added).

      West’s Encyclopedia of American Law then goes on to provide us with some clarity as to exactly why this differentiation of language is important to know and fully understand, as it is the precise avenue by which the perversion/corruption of our understanding of our common language use has taken place.

      A term of art is a word or phrase that has a particular meaning. Terms of art abound in the law. For example, the phrase double jeopardy can be used in common parlance to describe any situation that poses two risks. In the law, Double Jeopardy refers specifically to an impermissible second trial of a defendant for the same offense that gave rise to the first trial.

      The classification of a word or phrase as a term of art can have legal consequences. In Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 112 S. Ct. 711, 116 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1992), Shirley M. Molzof brought suit against the federal government after her husband, Robert E. Molzof, suffered irreversible brain damage while under the care of government hospital workers. The federal government conceded liability, and the parties tried the issue of damages before the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. Molzof had brought the claim as executor of her husband’s estate under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) (28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 [1988]), which prohibits the assessment of Punitive Damages against the federal government. The court granted recovery to Molzof for her husband’s injuries that resulted from the Negligence of federal employees, but it denied recovery for future medical expenses and for loss of enjoyment of life. According to the court, such damages were punitive damages, which could not be recovered against the federal government.

      The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the trial court, but the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. According to the Court, punitive damages is a legal term of art that has a widely accepted common-law meaning under state law. Congress was aware of this meaning at the time it passed the FTCA. Under traditional common-law principles, punitive damages are designed to punish a party. Since damages for future medical expenses and for loss of enjoyment of life were meant to compensate Molzof rather than punish the government, the Court reversed the decision and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit.

      When we are interacting with it in any way, the legal system constantly and subversively presumes and construes our every use of language as being the same as its own legal terms of art rather than the real common English meaning and usage. The primary reason that there is any misunderstanding at all about this fact is because those operating professionally within the system are constantly telling the rest of us that, unless the law creates a specific definition for a given term or phrase, then, they too are always using regular English words and sentences in their everyday common and ordinary meaning and context, rather than legal terms and phrases of art having an entirely legal meaning and context.

      But this is a lie, because they have neither the authority nor any legitimate purpose for addressing or dealing with any one of we the People except in the context of, and in relationship to, some breach of law or legal duty and any related legal process associated therewith. This is the entire reason that the system of law has developed its own language, as well as law-related dictionaries containing the definitions of its legal terms and phrases. These legal dictionaries are positive proof that a term or phrase of art actually means something different when used in relation to law, which is the only way that our public servants and the courts can use it, than it does in the common English manner that we the People use that identical word or phrase every day.

      Further proof of this point is found in the reading of Secs. 311.011, 311.016, 311.021, 312.001, 312.002, and 312.005, Texas Government Code:


      GOVERNMENT CODE
      TITLE 3. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
      SUBTITLE B. LEGISLATION
      CHAPTER 311. CODE CONSTRUCTION ACT
      SUBCHAPTER B. CONSTRUCTION OF WORDS AND PHRASES
      Sec. 311.011. COMMON AND TECHNICAL USAGE OF WORDS.
      (a) Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.
      (b) Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.

      Sec. 311.016. “MAY,” “SHALL,” “MUST,” ETC. The following constructions apply unless the context in which the word or phrase appears necessarily requires a different construction or unless a different construction is expressly provided by statute:
      (1) “May” creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power.
      (2) Shallimposes a duty.
      (3) “Must” creates or recognizes a condition precedent.
      (4) “Is entitled tocreates or recognizes a right.

      (5) “May not” imposes a prohibition and is synonymous with “shall not.”
      (6) “Is not entitled to” negates a right.
      (7) “Is not required to” negates a duty or condition precedent.

      Sec. 311.021. INTENTION IN ENACTMENT OF STATUTES. In enacting a statute, it is presumed that:
      (1) compliance with the constitutions of this state and the United States is intended;
      (2) the entire statute is intended to be effective;
      (3) a just and reasonable result is intended;

      (4) a result feasible of execution is intended; and
      (5) public interest is favored over any private interest.

      GOVERNMENT CODE
      TITLE 3. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
      SUBTITLE B. LEGISLATION
      CHAPTER 312. CONSTRUCTION OF LAWS
      SUBCHAPTER A. CONSTRUCTION RULES FOR CIVIL STATUTES
      Sec. 312.001. APPLICATION. This subchapter applies to the construction of all civil statutes.
      Sec. 312.002. MEANING OF WORDS.
      (a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), words shall be given their ordinary meaning.
      (b) If a word is connected with and used with reference to a particular trade or subject matter or is used as a word of art, the word shall have the meaning given by experts in the particular trade, subject matter, or art.
      Sec. 312.005. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. In interpreting a statute, a court shall diligently attempt to ascertain legislative intent and shall consider at all times the old law, the evil, and the remedy.
      (Emphasis added).
    2. Section 311.011(a) is neither vague nor ambiguous when it places a legal duty upon all branches of government to read and apply every statute in every code in its proper context, which, in the case of the Texas “Transportation” Code, is the context of “transportation” and its legal meaning and usage as term of art related solely to a profession or occupation. So sayeth the Legislature in the Caption/Title of SB 971(“SB 971”), the legislative Bill responsible for the alleged recodification of Vernon’s statutory scheme into the current Texas “Transportation” Code scheme.

    3. Sections 311.011(b) and 312.002(b) make it very clear that Texas courts cannot lawfully refuse to recognize that the Legislature of the State of Texas must be presumed to have already known and understood the proper historical legal meaning of “transportation” as a legal “term of art.” And that, when the legislature allegedly recodified Vernon’s pre-existing statutes relating to “transportation” into a singular regulatory code having the same specific name as the legislative subject matter, they both knew and intended to regulate the activities and use of objects relating to a particular class of profession or occupation and not the general public.

      For any Texas court at any level to try and use judicial interpretation to disingenuously conclude and rule otherwise, which would be a direct violation of the court’s legal duties as imposed by Secs. 311.011(b) and 312.002(b), is nothing short of judicial hubris and an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative authority in violation of the separation of powers clause of Article 2, Texas Constitution.

    4. Sections 311.011(b) and 312.002(b) also make it very clear that Texas courts are not free to use judicial interpretation to simply alter the historical and legal meaning of the term “transportation” to suit their own desired agenda or some predisposed outcome to one or more particular cases involving particular facts that are inherently legally dependent upon the term’s common historical legal meaning and usage. Thus, any judicial alteration by interpretation would unconstitutionally and unlawfully result in the fundamental alteration of the intent and purpose of such legislation in lieu of that specifically stated and intended by the Legislature.

  2. Unconstitutional Enactment Through Multiple Facets of Legislative Fraud.

    1. The Caption/Title of Senate Bill 971 contains an unconstitutional and fraudulent Caption/Title declaration. The Caption/Title reads, “AN ACT relating to the adoption of a nonsubstantive revision of statutes relating to transportation, including conforming amendments, repeals, and penalties”. (Emphasis added).

    2. The Caption/Title of SB 971 is fraudulent because the recodification does, in fact, contain numerous substantive changes throughout the Bill that completely alters or eliminates one or more pre-SB 971 legislative objects that existed at the time of the recodification, thus, substantially altering the pre-existing statutes in ways that creates entirely new legislative objects while eliminating others. How are such alterations to the pre-existing statutes not the exact opposite of nonsubstantive?

    3. This fraudulent Caption/Title violates both the Public’s right to have not only proper notice of the subject matter of any proposed legislation, but also the legislations specific purpose and intent, and, therefore, is a direct violation of the specific prohibitions, spirit, and intent, of the provisions of Art. 3, Secs. 32 and 35, Texas Constitution.

    4. One example of a substantive change is SB 971’s complete removal of all references to the pre-existing standard forms of “transportation” related licenses, which are the “commercial operator’s,” “operator’s,” and “chauffer’s” licenses.4 There are no other forms of license in the original Vernon’s defined for the purpose of “operating” a “commercial/ motor/ vehicle”. Each of these original forms of license was completely removed from SB 971 without benefit of any legislative act repealing them. The ‘nonsubstantive’ revision of SB 971 then completely replaced those original forms of license with several entirely new overbroad and vaguely defined forms of license under the singular reference of “driver’s license.”

      The major issue with the newly formed “transportation” related “driver’s license” defined by Sec. 521.003 of SB 971, is that the license forms it identifies as its component parts were originally the temporary versions of the original types of licenses that SB 971 actually deleted all mention of.5 A person could receive a “temporary license” form of a “commercial operator’s” or “operator’s” license, but not just a “temporary license”. The same thing applies to the “instruction permit.” It is commonly called the “learner’s permit,” and it is the temporary predecessor to obtaining either an actual “commercial operator’s,” “operator’s,” or “chauffer’s” license once the actual written and “driving” test has been completed and passed.

      Thus, the “new” forms of license unconstitutionally created by SB 971 under the singular reference of “driver’s license,” are not and cannot be standalone permanent forms of a valid license, and there is no other form of license identified in the entirety of SB 971 as being a statutorily defined and recognized form of “driver’s license”.

      However, there are several Texas court rulings on this specific point that have never been overturned, and that make it abundantly clear that Texas law does not recognize any form of license defined as a “driver’s license,” but, rather, only the three original forms of license6. The court addressed the fact that a person could not be charged with not having a form of license that that law did not officially recognize within its language.

      The removal of those previously existing and statutorily separate forms of license, and the substitution of three very different and unrelated forms of “temporary” licenses under the new singular reference of (“driver’s license”), each with completely different statutory requirements for obtaining its particular form, would most certainly have to be viewed as a substantive change.

    5. Another example of substantive change to original legislative intent and purpose is the knowing and willful removal of previously existing statutory language specifically limiting mandatory “vehicle registration” to only those “vehicles” owned by the State. Thus, presenting to the general public an entirely fraudulent and previously non-existent impression of the actual legal application and intent of the legislation, which is, that the statutes now require the registration of all privately owned automobiles as “vehicles” for regulated use as “motor vehicles” within the subject matter context of “transportation”.

    6. Yet another example of substantive change to original legislative intent and purpose is the knowing and willful removal of previously existing statutory language that clearly identified the commercial nature of specific statutory objects by explicit reference or definition, making yet another substantive change. A specific example being the alteration of the definition of “light truck,” in the 2011 version of Sec. 502.001(9), Texas “Transportation” Code, when originally read, “”Light truck” means a commercial motor vehicle that has a manufacturer’s rated carrying capacity of one ton or less,” but now reads, “

    7. Unconstitutional judicial expansion of subject matter applicability beyond the limited scope of “transportation” and its historical commercial nature and meaning as being an occupation involving the commercial use of the highways as a place of business for private profit or gain, would also constitute a substantive change.

    8. Unconstitutional alteration and expansion of original subject matter and legislative purpose of the original enactment by the constitutionally prohibited method of mere statutory amendment and/or revision pursuant Art. 3, Sec. 36, Texas Constitution, would further constitute substantive change.

    9. The 1986 constitutional amendment of Art. 3, Sec. 35(c), is unconstitutional in itself, and is mentioned solely because it potentially bears direct application to the issue of SB 971’s constitutionally insufficient and fraudulent title. The 1986 amendment of Art. 3, Sec. 35(c), added subsections (b) and (c). Subsection (c) contains language purporting to declare the amendment itself to be unconstitutionally retroactive in its effect, which it does by declaring that any prior or later enactments that might be found to have constitutionally insufficient or invalid captions are to simply be retroactively declared to be constitutionally valid, which is in direct violation of both Art. 1, Sec. 16, Bill of Rights, Texas Constitution, and Art. 3, Sec. 35(a), Texas Constitution.

    10. Respondent has not and does not knowingly and willingly waive the fundamental protections afforded by the provisions of Art. 1, Sec. 16, Bill of Rights, Texas Constitution, or any other provision therein. Especially those where the People of Texas specifically prohibited the enactment of retroactive laws, much less retroactive constitutional amendments that propose to provide otherwise unconstitutional and conflicting powers to any department of government that would presumptively authorize any such deprivation of protected individual rights. As the Texas Constitution is merely the watchful arbiter, and not the originating source of Respondent’s ability to fully exercise his fundamental and protected rights, a constitutional amendment may not be presumed to have the authority to violate any one or more of them simply because it was enacted. Especially when it was enacted in violation of other constitutional provisions and prohibitions, and, most likely, without the required full Public disclosure of the true legislative purpose and intent in seeking the amendment in the first place.

  3. Improper Emergency Clause.

    1. Article 3, Sec. 32, Texas Constitution, requires that every legislative bill be read on the floor of each house and open discussion held thereon before the enactment can have any valid force and effect of law.

    2. Allowances for the Legislative suspension of the procedural rules is provided for in only two specific provisions of the Texas Constitution.

    3. Constitutionally authorized circumstances and conditions for seeking suspension of procedural rules pertaining to appropriation bills.

      1. The language of the declared emergency clause within SB 971 is consistent only with the suspension of the otherwise mandatory procedural rules relating to appropriations bills enacted under provisions within specific sections of Art. 3, Sec. 49 (all inclusive), Texas Constitution, and for reasons explained in subsection D(3) of this section, is not applicable in any way to the proper suspension of procedural rules for the purpose of enacting general legislative bills.

    4. Constitutionally authorized circumstances and conditions for seeking suspension of procedural rules, and the required procedure for actual suspension in relation to any general legislative bills.

      1. Amended language of Art. 3, Sec. 32, Texas Constitution, is not an authorization unto itself to suspend procedural rules, but only adds a specific ratio requirement to any vote relating to the suspension provisions found in Art. 3, Sec. 62, Texas Constitution, which is titled “CONTINUITY OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS; SUSPENSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURAL RULES.” (“Emphasis added”).

      2. The provisions of Art. 3, Sec. 62, Texas Constitution, is the only section of the Texas Constitution that makes specific reference to the constitutionally required pre-suspension circumstances and conditions, and also the specific procedure required to be followed by the Governor, the Speakers of each House of the Texas Legislature, and the respective members thereof, before there can be any constitutionally proper suspension of any of the specifically identified and listed procedural rules when enacting general legislation.

      3. Any judicial reading or interpretation ruling that the legislature may declare an emergency suspension of procedural rules for any reason they may deem necessary would render the provisions of Art. 3, Sec. 62, Texas Constitution completely void and meaningless surplusage having no force and effect upon the required method of suspension of said rules, thus creating an entirely unconstitutional repeal of portions of the Texas Constitution by oligarchical judicial fiat.

      4. Therefore, any arguments put forth by the state or the courts asserting that the legislature may use any reason it chooses to invoke an emergency suspension of the constitutionally required procedural rules governing the enacting of legislation, or may use just any form of emergency clause they choose to declare said emergency, is itself invalid and unconstitutional.

  4. Unconstitutional Executive and Judicial Expansion of Legislative Intent, Purpose and Scope of the Legislation.

    1. Unconstitutional expansion of legislative subject matter.

    2. Unconstitutional Judicial Expansion of Legislative Intent

    3. Unconstitutional interpretation of statutes as being completely independent of the subject matter context of the legislation as a whole, thus furthering the unconstitutionally of the executive and judicial department’s reading and interpretation by converting the object of the statute into isolated legislative subjects unto themselves.

  5. Unlawful Suspension of Multiple Constitutional Protections, Prohibitions and Provisions.

    1. Constitutional requirements and prohibitions cannot be waived, violated, or presumed ineffective simply by making an application for some benefit or privilege, or by contracting or consenting to waive such requirements.

    2. Neither creation nor acceptance of any “Certificate of Title” or “License” instrument can create a nexus where any of the provisions of the Texas Constitution, or the Bill of Rights contained therein, becomes void and of no effect.

    3. Voluntary registration of an automobile for the purpose of enrolling in state provided services relating to “theft prevention and recovery” cannot create a nexus where any of the provisions of the Texas Constitution, or the Bill of Rights contained therein, becomes void and of no effect.

    4. An opinion by any court that purports to remove the subject matter context of “transportation” from the adjudication of the facts and evidence of a “transportation” related offense is not simply harmless error or an innocent misinterpretation of the statutes in general. It is a knowing and willful unconstitutional attempt to judicially legislate from the bench.
      This is plainly evidenced by the content of the opinion wherever it repeatedly goes so far as to completely ignore or fundamentally recharacterize and/or alter the original legislative subject matter context, purpose, and intent of SB 971’s recodification of previously existing enactments. Which is, as SB 971 clearly infers within its caption, that all of the previously existing legislation as found within Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes (“Vernon’s”), and the intended result of the recodification of Vernon’s into a singular reorganized and renumbered code, relates solely to the subject matter context of “transportation”.

    5. Such an opinion by a court would further act unconstitutionally by judicially altering the contextual character and nature of the original legislation, changing it from a collection of statutes applicable to a specific subject and context designed and intended to regulate a specific class of legal “persons” that are engaging in a specific contextually related activity, into a constitutionally and legislatively unintended collection of general laws applicable to every individual member of the public at large.

    6. Such an opinion would also serve to fundamentally alter and/or totally ignore and discard long-standing legal interpretations, subject matter expert opinions, and all relevant recognized professional and occupational standards of usage and meaning relating to the particularized subject matter context that defines “transportation” as a legal term of art encompassing only that specific class of activities involving the use of “commercial/ motor/ vehicles” upon the highways for commercial purposes intended to generate private profit or gain.

    7. To apply any title, definition, section, or provision of the Texas “Transportation” Code to any activity or individual that is acting in their private common law capacity, outside of the specific subject matter context of “transportation,” is an unconstitutional executive and judicial expansion and misapplication of the legislative intent and purpose of the statutes codified within the “Transportation” Code.

    8. The failure of a trial court to make it mandatory that the State must allege the element of “transportation” within the charging instrument relating to any alleged offense codified within the Texas “Transportation” Code, and then prove that specific primary element at trial by showing admissible substantive evidence that the accused individual was actively engaging in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense, invariably creates multiple unconstitutional instances where the accused individual’s right to due process are directly violated. To wit:

      1. In the first instance, due process is denied because the investigating/arresting officer neither reasonably has nor can reasonably develop any form of reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that a private non-commercial automobile is actively engaged in any activity encompassed within the subject matter context of “transportation” simply by looking at it alongside one or two other statutory elements pertinent to some perceived or concocted offense that is itself completely dependent upon that primary fact element already demonstrably existing.

        In which case, if there is no specific set of articulable facts known to an officer that would lead him/her to believe first and foremost that “transportation” is actually being engaged in, then no reasonable suspicion or probable exists to believe that any contextually related “transportation” offense was or is being committed, making the initial warrantless stop completely unconstitutional and illegal.

      2. In the second instance, due process is denied by multiple agents of the State whose unconstitutional and wholly presumptive and unsubstantiated presumption and allegation that in personam jurisdiction over the accused individual actually exists under the jurisdictional umbrella of the Texas “Transportation” Code, and that s/he breached some known legal duty codified therein.

        The unconstitutional unrebuttable presumption being that, an individual who was acting entirely within their private common law capacity, and who did not violate any common law requirement to exercise due care so as to avoid causing an unjust harm to another person or private property, and who was not and is not acting in the legal capacity of any legal “person” defined within and regulated by the Texas “Transportation” Code, is actually subject to, and could actually breach a legal duty associated with, the specific subject matter context of “transportation” as encompassed by said Code.

      3. In the third instance, due process is denied by the prosecution’s failure to both allege and prove the existence of “transportation” as the primary element of any “transportation” related offense, as this invariably creates an unconstitutional unrebuttable presumption of guilt of the primary essential element of any ‘criminal’ allegation involving “transportation”.

        Every accused individual is simply presumed guilty of that relevant and essential primary fact element when accused of any “transportation” related offense. An offense that is entirely dependent upon both the subject matter context of “transportation,” and proof that the individual was actually engaged in some specifically identifiable act within the subject matter context of “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense.

        This unconstitutional presumption of guilt in relation to the primary fact element of the allegation is then used to fraudulently reinforce the State’s equally false and unsubstantiated presumption and assertion that in personam jurisdiction over the accused individual actually exists.

      4. In the fourth instance, an unrebuttable presumption of this nature denies the fundamental requirement that an accused individual is entitled to be presumed innocent of every single element of an alleged offense, not just those that the State cares to allege or considers the easiest to offer evidentiary proof in support of.

        The constitutionally protected right of substantive and procedural due process requires that the State be made to prove every single fact element of the allegation being made against an individual. These unrebuttable presumptions of legal and substantive fact are unconstitutional precisely because they act in direct contradiction of these rights.

      5. In the fifth instance, an unrebuttable presumption of this nature fails to provide proper, sufficient, and timely notice of every specific element of the charge being made against the individual, thus depriving them of an affirmative defense that is naturally inherent in the statutes and their controlling subject matter context. Specifically, that accused individual was not engaged in the regulated subject matter activity of “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense, and, therefore, could not have breached any known legal duty associated therewith and codified within the Texas “Transportation” Code.

      6. In the sixth instance, an unrebuttable presumption of this nature unconstitutionally relieves the prosecution of having to submit lawfully obtained admissible evidence proving every individual element of the allegation to a jury or to a magistrate in a bench trial, of which “transportation” is the primary essential element, with all other elements being subjectively and contextually dependent thereon.

      7. In the seventh instance, an unrebuttable presumption of this nature unconstitutionally relieves the prosecution of having to prove that the warrantless seizure of any evidence proving the individual was actually engaged in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense was constitutionally proper by being based upon articulable facts that would serve to establish probable cause to believe that the accused individual was actually engaged in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense.

        Absent any specific articulable facts that would provide probable cause to believe the contextual existence of “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense and the officer’s initial contact, the warrantless seizure and arrest of the individual by the officer is inherently unconstitutional, and any ‘evidence’ found or seized under the auspices of such an arrest is to be considered inadmissible under the “fruit of the poison tree” doctrine.

      8. In the eighth instance, an unrebuttable presumption of this nature unconstitutionally relieves the State of its burden to prove probable cause and obtain an appealable probable cause determination order stating that the facts and evidence provided to the issuing magistrate supported the judicial determination that the accused individual actually was engaged in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense and was also most likely guilty of all other essential elements of the alleged offense.

        The facts and evidence supporting a finding of probable cause to believe that the accused individual was actively engaged in some “transportation” related activity is imperative to establishing the necessary belief that any and all of the other essential elements of some specific “transportation” related offense could even possibly be true, as there is no other legal subject matter context in which offenses relating to “transportation” may be read, understood, and applied. Therefore, if there is no “transportation” context, there can be no “transportation” related offense, which means that there are no factual elements of such an offense upon which to base a finding of probable cause.

      9. In the ninth instance, an unrebuttable presumption of this nature unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to the individual by requiring him/her to prove that s/he is not guilty of that specific primary element because s/he was not engaged in the regulated subject matter activity of “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense, and, thus, could not have breached any known legal duty so as to result in the commission of an offense under the context of the Texas “Transportation” Code.

      10. In the tenth instance, an unrebuttable presumption of this nature unconstitutionally separates the underlying statutes and objects within the “transportation” code into individual subjects that are then treated by the executive and judicial branches of government as being completely independent of the subject matter context of the enacting legislation.

        By unconstitutionally converting the subordinate objects of the Texas “Transportation” Code in completely legislation independent subjects, the State, via local prosecutors and every level of court, are completely free to prosecute and adjudicate them as isolated offenses with no legal context beyond themselves and having no relevant relationship or dependency upon the specific legislatively defined subject matter context of “transportation,” which is not only a direct violation of the clearly stated subject matter within the caption of SB 971, but also of Art. 3, Sec. 35(a), Texas Constitution.

  6. The Executive and Judicial Branches of Texas Government Are Guilty of Knowingly and Willingly Conspiring and Colluding to Engage in an Ongoing Criminal Enterprise for the Specific Purpose of Perpetrating Fraud Through Numerous and Constitutionally Egregious Deprivations of Individual Rights Under Color of Law.

    1. The Executive Departments Criminal and Civil Liability Exposed.

      1. The officers and employees of the executive department of Texas government knowingly and willfully fail or intentionally miseducate and misinform local and state law enforcement personnel on the specific legal meaning and limitations of “transportation” that would serve to establish the necessary legal parameters for properly applying and enforcing the Texas “Transportation” Code.

      2. Demonstrative evidence of this fact can be easily verified, and the assertion thus proven, by even the most superficial reading of any police incident report involving the allegation of virtually any “transportation” related offense.

      3. No documentation proving that the arrested individual was ever notified of their fundamentally protected right to counsel and to remain silent, or was ever given any meaningful opportunity to exercise those rights in every possible self-protective manner without threat, duress, or coercion perpetrated by any officer on the scene.

      4. No documentation proving that the right of the arrested individual to be free from any unreasonable search and seizure was ever recognized or considered by the arresting officer, despite the officer’s complete lack of any facts or evidence providing probable cause to believe that the arrested individual was ever engaged in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense.

      5. No documentation proving that the arrested individual was ever notified or given any meaningful opportunity to exercise their fundamentally protected right to counsel and remain silent in every relevant and self-protective manner.

      6. Invariably, you will find the following legal deficiencies and due process violations contained within the police records:

        1. No mention of any investigative questions intended toward discovering whether or not the accused individual was ever actually engaging in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense.

        2. No mention of any evidence having been discovered proving the accused individual was ever actually engaging in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense.
          Admissible forms of evidence proving the existence of the context of “transportation” can exist in only one or more of four specific forms:

          1. Commercial log book showing that the accused individual was “on the clock” at the time of the alleged offense.

          2. Passenger manifest proving a business related activity, and the actual presence of some other individual named therein as having engaged the accused individual for the purpose of being “transported” from one place to another by him/her for compensation or hire.

          3. Bill of lading proving a business related activity, and the actual presence of some property or goods named therein as being in the custody and possession of the accused individual for the purpose of being “transported” from one place to another by him/her for compensation or hire.

          4. A voluntarily signed confession that the accused individual was actively engaged in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense.

        3. Even if such evidence is shown to have been presented at trial, there will be no evidence admitted into the record proving that the search and seizure of that evidence was lawfully valid as it would be the fruit of a presumptively unlawful warrantless arrest. Which means that the evidence is inherently inadmissible absent supporting evidence of a lawful arrest, search, and seizure of same, which can be proven only by a properly issued warrant or signed order of probable cause.

    2. The Judicial Departments Criminal and Civil Liability Exposed.
      1. The officers and employees of the judicial department of Texas government knowingly and willfully fail or intentionally miseducate and misinform local and state executive law enforcement officers, judicial personnel, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, on the specific legal meaning and limitations of “transportation” that would otherwise serve to establish the necessary legal parameters for properly applying and adjudicating all Texas “Transportation” Code offenses.

      2. Demonstrative evidence of this fact can be easily verified, and the assertion thus proven, by even the most superficial reading of any court record involving the prosecution and adjudication of virtually any “transportation” related offense.

      3. No documentation proving that the arrested individual was ever notified of their fundamentally protected right to counsel and to remain silent, or was ever given any meaningful opportunity to exercise those rights in every possible self-protective manner without threat, duress, or coercion perpetrated by any officer on the scene.

      4. No documentation proving that the right of the arrested individual to be free from any unreasonable search and seizure was ever recognized or considered by the arresting officer, despite the officer’s complete lack of any facts or evidence providing probable cause to believe that the arrested individual was ever engaged in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense.

      5. No documentation proving that the arrested individual was ever notified or given any meaningful opportunity to exercise their fundamentally protected right to counsel and remain silent in every relevant and self-protective manner.

      6. Invariably, you will find the following legal deficiencies in admissible and substantive evidence and numerous un/related due process violations contained within the court record:

        1. No mention of any investigative questions intended toward discovering whether or not the accused individual was ever actually engaging in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense.

        2. No mention of any evidence having been discovered proving the accused individual was ever actually engaging in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense.

          Admissible forms of evidence proving the existence of the context of “transportation” can exist in only one or more of four specific forms:

          1. Commercial log book showing that the accused individual was “on the clock” at the time of the alleged offense.

          2. Passenger manifest proving a business related activity, and the actual presence of some other individual named therein as having engaged the accused individual for the purpose of being “transported” from one place to another by him/her for compensation or hire.

          3. Bill of lading proving a business related activity, and the actual presence of some property or goods named therein as being in the custody and possession of the accused individual for the purpose of being “transported” from one place to another by him/her for compensation or hire.

          4. A voluntarily signed confession that the accused individual was actively engaged in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense.

        3. Even if such evidence is shown to have been presented at trial, there will be no evidence admitted into the record proving that the search and seizure of that evidence was lawfully valid as it would be the fruit of a presumptively unlawful warrantless arrest. Which means that the evidence is inherently inadmissible absent supporting evidence of a lawful arrest, search, and seizure of same, which can be proven only by a properly issued warrant or signed order of probable cause.

        4. No appealable determination of probable cause or supporting order, which, if existing, would then serve to prove that an unlawful ex parte evidentiary proceeding took place where someone presented facts and evidence relevant to the material facts of the case without notice and opportunity of any kind being provided to the accused individual to present and oppose any facts or evidence being submitted against them.

        5. No order of appointed counsel despite there also being no knowing and voluntary signed waiver of counsel.

        6. No signed waiver of a verified complaint as required by Art. 27.14(d), Code of Criminal Procedure.

        7. Documents with dates and time that prove there were numerous proceedings in the prosecution despite there being no verified complaint and/or proper charging instrument in the form of an indictment or information having ever been filed with the court prior to such proceedings.

        8. Failure to file a proper criminal complaint and charging instrument prevents the starting of the speedy trial clock and, thus, allows the preliminary procedures of the prosecution to be completed without speedy trial protections being afforded to the Accused, which violates the rights of the accused to a speedy trial determination.
          Which also means that, each and every one of those proceedings was conducted entirely without the court having even the prima facie appearance of proper jurisdiction.

        9. A factually and facially insufficient criminal complaint.

        10. No proper charging instrument in the form of an indictment or information properly invoking the subject matter and in personam jurisdiction of the court.

        11. No actual evidence of either the subject matter or in personam jurisdiction of the court having ever been constitutionally and legally invoked.

        12. No actual admissible evidence proving every element of the alleged offense.

        13. Affiant on criminal complaint against the accused is a clerk of the court adjudicating the case, and as such, is for all intents and purposes, an acting agent of the judge adjudicating the case, creating an agency problem where the court is both the accuser and the trier of fact.

        14. The clerk of the court is also an official custodian of the court record, within the same court, and in the same case, where the clerk is also acting as the criminal accuser and affiant, an employee of the adjudicating court, and as an agent of the judge adjudicating the case.


1See Interstate Commerce Com’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 14 S.Ct. 1125, 38 L.Ed. 1047; Also Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition (1996), Page 1469.

2Oxford Living Dictionaries, English “Term of Art.” Retrieved February 4 2017 from https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/term_of_art.

3West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. S.v. “Term of Art.” Retrieved February 4 2017 from http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Term+of+Art.

4The only forms of license defined in Vernon’s for the “operation of a “commercial/ motor/ vehicle” are the “commercial operator’s,” “operator’s,” and “chauffer’s” licenses.

5The only forms of license defined in SB 971’s recodification are the “temporary,” “instruction permit,” and “occupational” licenses, which were originally nothing more than the temporary forms of the original types of licenses previously mentioned.

6See Footnote 3 for these forms of licenses.

English Language Words versus Legal “Terms of Art” – The Corruption of an Entire System of Language by the Legal Profession.

Words. Can you even imagine the state of your life, or our society, if we didn’t have words? Whether spoken or written, we could not have gotten where we are today without words. We use them to describe and define so much of our world, even to sometimes provide a voice to our innermost thoughts and ideas. As humans, we use words to add dimension to our thoughts, to convey our ideas, to communicate with one another, and to further our learning and mutual understanding of so many things. At least, most of us use them for that purpose.

But, there are those among us that have always sought to use our complex language of words in ways intended to provide themselves with some advantage over those less educated in the intricacies of our language and may not fully understand the meaning of the words and phrases used to implement it. These individuals of evil or self-serving intent, a class of people we commonly refer to as “grifters,” devised methods of writing and speaking that was geared toward intentionally deceiving particular individuals, or the masses in general, when weaving and pursuing some scheme to eventually separate the targeted individual or group from their hard-earned money, the majority of which was sure to wind up in the grifter’s pocket.

The most common vernacular for such persons are “con men” or “con artists.” The tradecraft of such individuals is not difficult to understand. They are nothing more than thieves, i.e. common criminals. But, unlike robbers and thugs, they rarely use force or weapons as the preferred tool by which they ply their trade. Instead, they use charm, wit, and words to facilitate thievery upon their intended victim(s) by fraud and deception.

Despite popular opinion to the contrary, however, these types of con men haven’t disappeared, or even legally wiped out. Oh no. They still exist today, and in much larger numbers than ever before, and operate much more publicly than before. Which makes it clear to us that they have simply gotten much better at organizing and plying their trade, while becoming much less noticeable as a criminal element than they used to be. In fact, they have actually managed to legitimize themselves and their entire profession by turning their practice of fraud and deception into an actual socially acceptable and highly lucrative form of ‘legitimate’ business.

No, today, such deceitful and deceptive individuals are more commonly known by a far more prolific and nefarious singular name, attorneys. Which means that it is imperative that you fully understand that there are no bigger, better organized, and more “legal” crime syndicates on the planet than those of the National and State Bar Associations. The members of these associations have an actual license to lie, cheat, and steal in the name of “The State” and its totally corrupted form of “law” and “justice,” that truly serves no one but themselves.

What you are going to see in this book is an attempt to precisely explain how this is all designed and setup to carry out the very same plan of fraud and theft that the con men of yesteryear were so well known and notorious for. Only now, those con men are in total control of the very system that was once used to protect the public by hunting them down and prosecuting them for their actions. But, those days are now long gone.  Read on and see for yourself just how true that actually is.

 

Dealing with a Condescending Prosecutor or Judge.

Whenever a prosecutor or judge is actually arrogant enough to make the statement “I’m not going to argue the semantics of the law with you,” consider, and remind him or her that the law itself, including the statute(s) that s/he is trying to use against you, is actually comprised of nothing but legal semantics.

Remember, our American laws are not written in common everyday English, but, rather, they are written in a language known to a particular few as legalese. Legalese itself is not merely constructed of words and sentences, but is a particularized and meticulously crafted language unto itself. It is a language made up entirely of carefully chosen and defined terms and phrases that look and sound exactly like those with which you are normally readily familiar, but, they actually have an altered or alternative legal meaning and context. Which is to say, they are the legal semantics.  These terms and phrases are also known by another name, terms/phrases of art., which we will discuss in more detail momentarily.

The American Heritage Dictionary online defines legalese thusly:

le·gal·ese  (lē′gə-lēz´, -lēs´) [1]

n.

The specialized or technical language of the legal profession, especially when considered to be complex or abstruse.

The Collins English Dictionary online provides us with the Webster’s New World College Dictionary’s more expanded, and rather clarifying, definition of the term:

le·gal·ese  (lē′gə-lēz´, -lēs´) [2]

n.

The conventional language of legal forms, documents, etc., involving special vocabulary and formulations, often thought of as abstruse and incomprehensible to the layman.  (Emphasis added).

In this definition, you can see where legalese is both known, and intended, to be incomprehensible to the layman, i.e. the non-attorney, thus, giving the legal profession a monopoly control, use, and understanding of its own language, which it uses to the utter detriment of all those who themselves fail to become adequately fluent in the language.

You see, the very explanation of legalese itself is an example of legal semantics in operation. For lack of a better suited and simplified explanation of the issue as to what legalese is, just remember the following; legal semantics is the simultaneous process of altering the common language meaning of words and sentences, thereby converting them into the legalese format of terms and phrases, and then applying an alternative legal meaning and context rather than the normal common meaning and context, regardless of the fact that the terms and phrases you see and hear may look, sound, and are spelled, the same way that you normally recognize and are familiar with.

In which case, the only proper response to such a statement from ANY attorney would be:

I know you won’t argue with me about it, because you are legally and linguistically incompetent to do so, and would lose that debate within a matter of minutes if you tried. Therefore, I suggest that you just stand over there quietly and remember why it is better to keep your mouth closed and be thought a fool rather than to open it and remove all doubt.

 

Terms/Phrases of Art.

So, what exactly is a term/phrase of art, and why is it important to recognize the difference between such terms and phrases when compared to the common English usage of similar appearing and sounding language?

The online version of the Oxford English Dictionary defines “term of art” this way:

A word or phrase that has a precise, specialized meaning within a particular field or profession. [3]      (Emphasis added).

While the online version of West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, Edition 2, defines the phrase in this way:

A word or phrase that has special meaning in a particular context. [4]   (Emphasis added).

West’s Encyclopedia of American Law then goes on to provide us with some clarity as to exactly why this differentiation of language is important to know and fully understand, as it is the precise avenue by which the perversion/corruption of our understanding of our common language use has taken place.

A term of art is a word or phrase that has a particular meaning. Terms of art abound in the law. For example, the phrase double jeopardy can be used in common parlance to describe any situation that poses two risks. In the law, Double Jeopardy refers specifically to an impermissible second trial of a defendant for the same offense that gave rise to the first trial.

The classification of a word or phrase as a term of art can have legal consequences. In Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 112 S. Ct. 711, 116 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1992), Shirley M. Molzof brought suit against the federal government after her husband, Robert E. Molzof, suffered irreversible brain damage while under the care of government hospital workers. The federal government conceded liability, and the parties tried the issue of damages before the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. Molzof had brought the claim as executor of her husband’s estate under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) (28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 [1988]), which prohibits the assessment of Punitive Damages against the federal government. The court granted recovery to Molzof for her husband’s injuries that resulted from the Negligence of federal employees, but it denied recovery for future medical expenses and for loss of enjoyment of life. According to the court, such damages were punitive damages, which could not be recovered against the federal government.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the trial court, but the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. According to the Court, punitive damages is a legal term of art that has a widely accepted common-law meaning under state law. Congress was aware of this meaning at the time it passed the FTCA. Under traditional common-law principles, punitive damages are designed to punish a party. Since damages for future medical expenses and for loss of enjoyment of life were meant to compensate Molzof rather than punish the government, the Court reversed the decision and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit.

The legal system constantly and subversively construes our every use of language as being legal terms of art rather than the real common meaning and usage. The primary reason that there is any misunderstanding at all about this fact is because those professionally operating within the system are constantly telling the rest of us that, unless the law creates a specific definition for a given term or phrase, then, they too are always using regular English words and sentences in their everyday common and ordinary meaning and context, rather than legal terms and phrases of art having an entirely legal meaning and context.

However, we know, and can logically prove, that this claim is totally false. We know it is false because, unless there is an actual legal issue, they have no reason to be communicating with us at all. In other words, whenever an attorney or judge makes the statement that they are construing a term or phrase in its common and ordinary meaning and context, they actually mean its common and ordinary meaning and context in relation to law, not common English.

Therefore, whenever they communicate with us, regardless of their purported reason, they are still using legalese terms and phrases, not common English words and sentences. Which, in turn, means they are actually always communicating with us using only the common legal meaning and context as commonly defined by a particular term or phrases legal usage, not its common everyday English usage. The governmental and legal systems simply cannot communicate with us in any other way or language, as the only language and context they know and understand is that of the law itself, i.e. legalese. Which makes the terms and phrases of legalese within the law the only means by which they can communicate and interact with us at all.

For those people that want to fight every single court battle as if it were a contractual agreement and obligation involving waiver and mutual consent, this understanding is paramount to achieving any level of actual success in resolving whatever issue(s) they are bringing to your door. Why do I say this is true and necessary? Well, consider this example:

How do you enter into a contractual negotiation with someone else, and how exactly do you define and satisfy the necessary terms of that contract as far as offer, acceptance, and meeting of the minds?

How do you know exactly what is being offered and exchanged, and contractually required, if not by the terms of the contract itself?

How do you know what the other party is promising to offer, do, or deliver to you in return for your consideration, and what must that consideration be comprised of, federal reserve notes, gold or silver, or a bushel of potatoes every week for ten years?

Now, what if none of the parties attempting to enter into this contract spoke the same language, and couldn’t communicate in any way so as to directly understand one-another? Before you could move forward with establishing the contract, you would need either an interpreter, or, you would both need to learn one or the other’s language, correct?

So, if you are going to argue that the system is trying to contract with you, don’t you think it beneficial to be able to understand the language so as to comprehend precisely what the offer is, as well as the potential penalty for either party if they fail to fulfill their individual part(s) of the agreement? Wouldn’t that same understanding also be useful in exposing and renegotiating or refusing the unfavorable or unacceptable terms or unconscionability of the agreement as offered?

Personally, I think it would be tantamount, as compulsory contracts are nothing new when it comes to governmental coercion and corruption of the rule of law. But, unless they want to start an outright civil war, they are not quite ready and willing to abandon any and all semblance of complying with certain rules and requirements of certain contractual agreements as they relate to substantive and procedural due process.

Be aware, I am not saying that contractual arguments are the arguments to make in many of these cases that we are forcibly compelled to endure and get through, but, it is a good example of how to think about what is actually happening in relation to lawful and legal process and procedural requirements, as they are also specific contractually obligating terms already agreed upon by the very construct of government and the creation of the laws that contain them. Making a violation of those laws by those within the system a very big deal, even though it may not look or feel like it at the time.

[1] The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth Edition. Retrieved February 4 2017 from https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=legalese.

[2] Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 4th Edition. Copyright © 2010. Retrieved February 4 2017 from https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/legalese.

[3] Oxford Living Dictionaries, English  “Term of Art.” Retrieved February 4 2017 from https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/term_of_art.

[4] West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. S.v. “Term of Art.” Retrieved February 4 2017 from http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Term+of+Art.

How to Control [and Legally Embarrass] a Bad Judge – Episode 1

When you have a prosecutor and a judge conspiring and acting to further a case despite a lack of jurisdiction, especially when that lack of jurisdiction is based upon an insufficient complaint and charging instrument or lack of admissible evidence by which to prove ALL of the necessary elements of the alleged offense(s), just how are you supposed to deal with it?

Such little circus sideshows are usually played out by the judge and prosecutor in a tag-team performance during the motions hearing, which is where the judge will most certainly attempt to deny your motions without ANY legal basis or rebuttal relevant to a single thing in your motion(s). What the judge is failing to provide in this denial is what we call the necessary “findings of fact and conclusions of law” that provide the supporting legal grounds for the denial. Neither of which they actually ever have in such cases.  This is why you should ALWAYS file a supporting “Motion to Reconsider,” or, in certain circumstances, a “Motion for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,” with any other actual motion that you file that results in an appealable negative order, ruling, or judgement.  DO NOT put either of these motion requests into the same motion that initiated the action order, as they will be automatically denied when the actual motion itself is denied.

Now, once you make ANY form of argument that the statutes are being legally misapplied to you and your private activities, you are most likely going to prompt the prosecutor or judge to say something like “Are you saying the code/ statutes/ laws don’t apply to you?” At this point the prosecution is going to chime in and supply some totally irrelevant and idiotic example claiming that some five-to-ten year-old child will suddenly be able to take off in mommy and daddy’s car any time they want because licenses aren’t really required. An example which is not only moronically stupid on its face, but also has absolutely NOTHING to do with the facts and evidence of the case before the court.

The prosecutor’s little forays into fantasy land, along with their side trip to ridiculous park, will be fully sanctioned by the judge if you fail to object properly. However, these little stories are NOT testimony per se, as this is only a motions hearing, but they ARE completely ludicrous fabrications and are not at all relevant to the facts and case before the court. So, when you object to this moronic commentary DON’T say stupid Patrinut shit like “I object, s/he’s testifying and misstating the facts judge!” Instead, stick to the commentaries total lack of relevance and the prosecutor’s dumb-assery for having made it as your basis for making the objection:

OBJECTION!  How badly the prosecutor would allow their child to behave if these statutes never actually applied to the Accused or the general public is completely irrelevant to the matter before the court, and serves no legitimate purpose other than demonstrating that the prosecutor should probably be sterilized and not allowed to care for children in general. That idiotic example of coulda’ shoulda’ woulda’ is not the law, it cannot be substituted for the law, and it has nothing to do with the actual law and facts before this court.  Therefore, I move that if the prosecutor wishes to engage in the fabrication of delusional and irrelevant fantasies that s/he resign and either write fiction books or run for public office in the legislature. Otherwise, I move that the prosecutor be instructed to stick exclusively to the facts and evidence relevant to this matter rather than their red herring theories on ‘possibility’.

Take note, as there was no actual admissible and countermanding evidence and/or any legal brief(s) filed by the prosecution alleging any opposing statutes, facts, or law that serve to rebut those contained in your own motion(s), the judge and the prosecutor have no legal leg to stand on for denying them, especially with the judge acting biasedly for the prosecution by simply denying them without legal grounds. Their imaginary “what if” example scenarios are NOT the law, nor are they the basis of the law. Just as they are NOT evidence of anything whatsoever, other than as an example of a vivid and totally irrelevant imagination.

So, one possible response to a judge that makes such an obviously prejudicial and biased statement of this nature would be:

Judge, I believe the burden of proving that the specific regulatory statutes at issue in this matter actually DO apply to the Accused rests upon the Prosecution, rather than upon the Accused to prove that they do not. It’s called “the presumption of innocence.” I would move the court to look it up in the Code of Criminal Procedure under Arts. 2.01, 2.03(b), 11.43, 35.17.2, and 38.03.

Furthermore, the prosecution has failed to allege even a single fact in the complaint and/or charging instrument that the Accused was actively engaging in some form of commercial “transportation” activity upon the highway, which is the ONLY way that these specific regulatory statutes legally CAN apply. On these grounds I move that the court take judicial notice of Article 38.03 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads:

Art. 38.03. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.

All persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  The fact that he has been arrested, confined, or indicted for, or otherwise charged with, the offense gives rise to no inference of guilt at his trial.

Further still, SB 971 as enacted by the 74th Legislature in 1995, which is the enactment that created the entire “transportation” code in its current recodified form, including the various statutes at issue in this matter, regulates a specific type of business or business related activity, that of “transportation.” An activity in which the Accused was NOT and never has been engaged, the allegation and proof of which is an essential  required fact element that the prosecution cannot presume to be true or legally prove due to a lack of admissible evidence relating to and proving said activity.

The prosecution is duty-bound to set forth EVERY element that is required to be proven at trial IN the complaint AND the charging instrument, AND must prove EVERY element at trial with ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE, not hypothetical and overly ridiculous red herring arguments and contrived situations that have no relevance or bearing upon the facts of the case.

Finally, neither this court nor the prosecution may simply presume ANY required fact element of an alleged offense to be true, as that subverts the right of the Accused to the presumption of innocence of EVERY element of an alleged offense, which is fatal error, being a clear violation of the Accused’s right of due process and all. There can be no reasonable legal debate as to whether or not the act of “transportation” is a necessary fact element of the alleged offense considering that it is the specifically stated subject matter of the very legislation that created the recodified “transportation” code and the statutes therein.

There is no such fact element alleged in the complaint and charging instrument, and the state has no admissible evidence that would serve as proof of that necessary element. This lack of admissible evidence also proves that the arresting officer could not possibly have had any articulable facts or evidence supporting reasonable suspicion or probable cause, thus making the warrantless detention, seizure and arrest of the Accused completely unlawful in the first instance. Which, in turn, makes it more than clear that the state is attempting to unlawfully apply the “transportation” code and its regulatory statutes to a completely unrelated subject matter activity to which it simply and legally does NOT and CANNOT apply as said activity is entirely OUTSIDE of the code’s subject matter jurisdiction and application.

Therefore, the state has no case, as the prosecution simply cannot prove that these statutes apply without first proving that the Accused was engaged in the regulated activity of “transportation.” Which is legally impossible to do using only a law enforcement officer’s personal or professional opinion during testimony absent other admissible substantive evidence supporting that conclusion, as the officer is not qualified to make such legal determinations and conclusions and then offer them as factual opinion and evidence through testimony at trial.

Whereby, on these legal and constitutional grounds, I move for your immediate disqualification for bias, prejudice, judicial incompetence, and multiple violations of state law, the rules of procedure, the rules of evidence, the rules of judicial and professional conduct, and criminal offenses constituting felony violations of Abuse of Official Capacity and Official Oppression under Sections 39.02 and 39.03 Penal Code.

In other words, ‘judge,’ fuck you, fuck the prosecutor, and fuck the rest of the dirty wharf rats whose asses and nut sacks you both kiss every day to hold onto your corrupt lying-ass jobs.

“It’s Only a Few Bad Apples…”

As you all should be aware of by now if you listen to the radio show at all, I have been working on a felony “Evading Arrest or Detention” case for the last several weeks. And if you have been listening for the last few years, then you are also aware that many of the facts and arguments I make on certain subjects have never been litigated or argued in the State of Texas Courts in a manner that addresses all of the in pari materia statutes on the particular subject. Which means that there is little to no “case law” relating to the specific argument.

The document that is posted here is a Motion to Quash Indictment that has been filed in the 63rd Judicial District Court in Terrell County Texas. I am posting it here with the full knowledge and consent of the individual that is being accused in the matter. I am also providing the actual MS Word documents for the four pleadings that I wrote for this case in links at the bottom. That way you won’t have to copy the web page and then try to massage it back into a formatted Word document if you find anything in it you might be able to use.

The Motion to Quash is quite long, but it had to be in order to cover all of the unconstitutional and illegal acts being perpetrated by the federal and local public officials in the matter so as to railroad this man into a prison sentence just to finally get rid of him. And if you can read this document and not get pissed off, then you are what is inherently wrong with America today, because it exposes the outright in-your-face corruption of the judicial process and system that runs all the way to the very top criminal court in Texas, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. And there is no one to blame for this sort of corruption but the self-serving attorneys themselves.

I am also going to link in copies of several of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals own case opinions that proves that the Court has been and is actively engaging in and sanctioning statewide criminal violations of Texas law by every lower court and prosecutor in the entire state. And that the sanctioning of these violations is done with the specific intent of denying every individual accused of a crime in their right to substantive and procedural due process. In other words, I believe that I have proven the entire judicial department of the State of Texas to be engaging in organized criminal activity that goes above and beyond even that which we have known or suspected, and they were kind enough to provide the evidence against themselves in their own opinions.

This leaves us having to ask, just when is this bullshit going to be enough to make we the People stand up, charge, convict, and hang every damned attorney and judge in the entire country from the nearest horizontal object strong to hold them aloft until all of their kicking and squirming ceases? Think about the following statements really really hard; is there anything, and I mean anything, that has gone wrong with the course and history of this country, any incident, any disaster, any war, any terrorist governmental attack, unconstitutional law, or violation of individual rights, during its entire existence, that was not conceived, implemented, or justified by some attorney or attorney wanna’be?

Think about that. The founding fathers despised attorneys, even though many of them were attorneys. It was a bunch of Pharisee lawyers that had Jesus condemned to death. Then we had ‘Honest’ Abe Lincoln orchestrating the civil war. The prohibition era and the ‘legal’ alcohol poisoning murders of over 10,000 Americans was overseen by President Woodrow Wilson when the federal government laced all alcohol products with a poisonous recipe of chemicals that included “4 parts methanol (wood alcohol), 2.25 parts pyridine bases, 0.5 parts benzene to 100 parts ethyl alcohol” and, as TIME magazine noted, “Three ordinary drinks of this may cause blindness.” (In case you didn’t guess, the alternative phrasing “drinking that stuff will make you go blind” also isn’t just a figure of speech.). Harry S. Truman oversaw the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and he went to law school to be an attorney, but never completed the degree after he won reelection as presiding county judge, even though he was informed by the state bar that he was already qualified to join the bar due to his prior court experience. Lyndon B. Johnson, the leading contender in the conspiracy to kill then President John F. Kennedy, went to law school, but never finished either — presumably because he could not have possibly passed the [pretend] ethics portion of the education. And that theme continues on through today with the Clintons and Obamas. This ‘profession’ is literally stealing everything from us, one step and piece at a time, and it must be stopped. But only we can do it. And we cannot do it by keeping our heads in the sand in the hope that the attorneys will simply pass us by because we choose to ignore their presence.

Remember, everything that Hitler did to the people of Europe and to our fighting men was ‘legal’ by the terms of the German-attorney made and enacted laws. And attorneys are doing the same things here, they have just set up a way to remove the middleman.

Like I said, the document is long, but it is an attempt to cover every possible exit and loophole that the corrupt individuals within the courts and judicial system might seek to squeeze their rat-like personages through so as to deprive an innocent man of not only his liberty, but also the few remaining months of his life with his family and friends.

So READ this, and don’t just think or wonder about it, DO something. SAY something. SCREAM something, at someone, anyone, everyone, that we are sick and tired of this kind of thing being done not only to us, but in our own name, by a bunch of corrupt self-serving communist-state loving sycophants!!

It is time to choose. Do you want FREEDOM, or freedumb?

 




CAUSE NO(s). 742
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
Plaintiff, §
v. § TERRELL COUNTY, TEXAS
§
Jan Patrick Baker, § 63rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Defendant in Error. § DUNS number: 006848369
§

Respondent’s Special Appearance and
Motion to Quash and Dismiss the Indictment – 2nd Amended

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW Jan Patrick Baker, appearing specially and not generally, in his common law capacity and of common right as one of the People of Texas and Defendant in Error (“Baker”) in the above styled and numbered cause and files this Motion to Quash and Dismiss the Indictment against him, and for cause would show the Court as follows:

I.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT

Baker stands charged by a one (1) count indictment, however, the body of the Indictment instrument alleges no specific offense or class of offense under any specific code, nor any specific details comprising the necessary elements of an offense, therefore, Baker can only guess as to what specific charge and classification is being made against him based solely upon other conflicting documents in his possession and relative to the matter that may or may not have any force of law as to determining or providing him with proper Notice of the specific classification of charge that is actually being made against him. In which case, Baker’s best guess as to what the State is accusing him of is EVADING ARREST OR DETENTION, pursuant to Section 38.04(b)(2)(A), Texas Penal Code, a third (3rd) degree felony. The indictment alleges that “on or about” the 13th day of March, 2015, the Defendant:

[did then and there intentionally flee from Russell Weatherby, a person the defendant knew was a peace officer, to wit: a Texas Department of Public Safety-Highway Patrol Division Trooper attempting to lawfully arrest or detain the said JAN PATRICK BAKER, and JAN PATRICK BAKER did then and there use a vehicle while the said JAN PATRICK BAKER was in flight]. (Emphasis added).

II.
LEGAL OVERVIEW

All citizens accused of any crime have the right to adequate notice of the specific charges under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and article 1, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution.1 These constitutional guarantees require a defendant to be given notice of the “nature and cause” of the accusation against him so that he may prepare a defense, and plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of further prosecutions for the same offense.2 The requirement of notice “with sufficient clarity and detail” is designed to “enable the defendant to anticipate the State’s evidence and prepare a proper defense to it.” 3 “[T] he accused is not required to anticipate any and all variant facts the State might hypothetically seek to establish.” 4


1In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948); Moff v. State, 154 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Garcia v. State, 981 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

2Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-764 (1962); Garcia v. State, 981 S.W.2d at 686 (Meyers, J., concurring); Moore v. State, 473 S.W.3d 523, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).

3Garcia 12. State, 981 S.W.2d at 685 (citing Eastep v. State, 941 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).

4Brasfield v. State, 600 S.W.2d 288, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), overruled on other grounds by Janecka v. State, 739 S.W.2d 813, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Drumm v. State, 560 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure implements and supplements these constitutional requirements and provides guidelines by which to measure the sufficiency of an indictment. For instance, under Article 21.03, “[e]verything should be stated in an indictment which is necessary to be proved.” Article 21.04 requires that the “certainty required in an indictment is such as will enable the accused to plead the judgment that may be given upon it as a bar of any prosecution for the same offense.”5 And Article 21.11 states that “[a]n indictment shall be deemed sufficient which charges the commission of the offense in ordinary and concise language in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is meant, and with that degree of certainty that will give the defendant notice of the particular offense with which he is charged… .”

Under Article 27.08 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, exceptions to the substance of an indictment can be raised where “it does not appear therefrom that an offense against the law was committed by the defendant” and “it contains matter which is a legal defense or bar to the prosecution” (emphasis added). Defects of form can be raised under Article 27.09 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, although a defect of form should not render an indictment insufficient unless it “prejudice[s] the substantial rights of the defendant.” See Article 21.19. Defects of substance and form can result in a dismissal of an indictment or require an amendment of the indictment. See, e.g., Articles 28.07 and 28.09 to 28.11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The issue of “[w]hether an indictment fails to charge an offense at all is an entirely different issue from whether the indictment fails to provide adequate notice.”6


5This statutory requirement of “certainty” is “distinct from, and independent of, the constitutional requirement of adequate notice.” Garcia v. State, 981 S.W.2d at 685 n.3 (citing G. Dix & R. Dawson, Texas Criminal Practice and Procedure § 20.104 (1995); 2 W. Lafave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 19.2(b) at 445-446 (1984).

6Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Olurebi v. State, 870 S.W.2d 58, 62 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

III.
LEGAL GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

Baker objects to the lack of a proper verified criminal complaint, which was required to be filed prior to the prosecutor seeking an indictment.

Baker objects to the lack of a proper Information, which was required to be filed prior to the prosecutor seeking an indictment.

Baker objects to both the form and the substance of the indictment.

Baker believes that, besides being retaliatory and baseless, the Indictment is factually insufficient in that “it does not appear therefrom that an offense against the law was committed by the defendant” and “it contains matter which is a legal defense or bar to the prosecution,” (emphasis added), thus, it fails to allege an offense under Article 27.08 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

III-A.
No Properly Verified and Filed Criminal Complaint
and Information Invalidates the Indictment.

Baker is being made to answer for an infamous crime of which no one has properly accused him of committing. Therefore, the State of Texas is unlawfully and illegally restricting him at his liberty and seeking to prosecute him without authority or jurisdiction.

Baker was charged by indictment only, succeeded solely by a warrant of arrest issued from the Office of the District Court Clerk. However, there is no proper statement of probable cause or verified Complaint in the court record to support the issuance of any warrant or to provide a prosecutor with the necessary authority to create and file the required Information with any court having jurisdiction, much less with a grand jury, and which Information is also missing from the court record. “[i]t is fundamental that the name of the complaining witness is a necessary requisite to a valid indictment or information.EX PARTE BOB LEWIS, 1976.TX.41549; 544 S.W.2d 430, (12/22/76) (emphasis added). Absent a valid Complaint there is no complaining witness against Baker for the purpose of filing an information or seeking an indictment.

The prosecution has stated that the Affidavit for Warrantless Arrest made by Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) Highway Patrol Division Trooper Russell Weatherby (“Trooper Weatherby”) before Justice of the Peace for Precincts 1 & 2, Corina Arredondo (“J.P. Arredondo”) serves as the Complaint in this matter. However, Baker believes that instrument has a severe legal deficiency of form and substance that invalidates it both as a proper probable cause statement for a warrant and as a proper Complaint. The statement of probable cause for the warrant does not list a single substantive fact setting forth any of the required elements in support of the charge being made against Baker. It lists only the statute that was allegedly violated and nothing more, which means the warrant is basically blank and devoid of any factual assertions whatsoever supporting probable cause as well as in the specifics and manner in which it fails to “[s]tate the time and place of the commission of the offense, as definitely as can be done by the affiant” (emphasis added). There are no specific details as to the time and place of the alleged offense stated within the affidavit for warrantless arrest, which is what D.A. Hernandez states is being used as the required Complaint. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 21.03 requires that “As a general rule, any element that must be proved should be stated in an indictment. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.03 (Vernon 1989); Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 338 (Tex Crim.App.1995); Ex parte Elliott, 746 S.W.2d 762, 764 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). This rule applies to an information. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.23 (Vernon 1989).”7 There are also no such details in the Information required to be filed by the prosecuting attorney for the state, because D.A. Hernandez has never filed an Information in this case neither prior to nor after having unlawfully and illegally obtained this secret Indictment from the grand jury in violation of Art. 16.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Baker’s due process right to an examining trial.

The affidavit of warrantless arrest filed by Trooper Weatherby is factually deficient and incapable of providing any probable cause for a warrantless arrest, and it should never have been signed and approved by a magistrate as a valid Affidavit for Warrantless Arrest, and brings into question the judicial competency of J.P. Arredondo for having signed it as it currently reads. And there should be no question that it fails to meet the statutory and due process requisites of a valid complaint in that it alleges no specific facts relating to the alleged offense.

It is neither possible nor plausible that D.A. Hernandez is not aware of these highly obvious legal deficiencies in the Affidavit/Complaint, therefore, the only logical conclusion is that he simply doesn’t care. Perhaps it is because he is so focused on obtaining an indictment and conviction of Baker, in violation of his legal duty under Article 2.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure “[n]ot to convict, but to see that justice is done,” that he is willing to overlook such petty details in his pursuit of ‘justice.’ It may even be, proverbially, to simply get Baker “out of his hair” so as to put a stop to Baker’s efforts of exposing the rampant public corruption in Terrell County Texas. Corruption that couldn’t remain in existence if the sitting D.A. was doing his job, or, unless he was complicit in it.


7Green v. State, 951 SW 2d 3, Tx.Ct.Crim.App (1997).

It cannot be stressed enough that the current cause raises significant questions about how the grand jury came to indict Baker. If the cause was initiated by the grand jury, then what person thereon had personal knowledge that Baker allegedly committed some crime, and by what method does that person avoid the civic duty of filing a proper Complaint before someone authorized to take and verify such a Complaint?

If the grand jury did not come by this knowledge on its own via one of its members, but, rather, by way of the prosecuting attorney, then the prosecutor must be viewed as the actual accuser in the matter. Especially considering that D.A. Hernandez once again failed to properly perform his known legal duty under the law before seeking an indictment (an act that is itself a direct criminal violation of Texas law), which was to prepare a proper information based upon a properly verified and formatted substantive complaint, attach said complaint to the information, and submit both to some proper magistrate in accordance with Article 2.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

However, if such is the case, it creates an untenable conflict with the ends of justice and the rights of Baker. In Peter B. Peterson v. STATE TEXAS (12/20/89), 1989, TX.41854; 781 S.W.2d 933, the court held that a prosecutor cannot be the sole initiator of a criminal prosecution, especially one where s/he would be the prosecutor in the matter, when the court stated:

“An information is a “primary pleading in a criminal action on the part of the State,” Article 27.01, V.A.C.C.P., a written pleading in behalf of the State drawn, filed and presented by a prosecuting attorney charging an accused with an offense that may be prosecuted under the law. Article 21.20, V.A.C.C.P. in order to “protect its citizens from the inherent dangers arising from the concentration of power in any one individual,Kennedy v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 303, 276 S.W.2d 291 (1955) (Opinion on Motion for Rehearing, at 664), the Legislature precluded a prosecutor from presenting an information “until affidavit has been made by some credible person charging the defendant with an offense,” and also mandated, “The affidavit shall be filed with the information.Article 21.22, supra. Such an affidavit is, of course, a complaint within the meaning of Article 15.04, V.A.C.C.P. “In other words, a prosecuting attorney is not authorized to institute prosecutions in the county court upon his independent act or of his own volition.” Kennedy v. State, supra, at 294. One may not be “both the accuser and the prosecutor is misdemeanor cases.” Wells v. State, 516 S.W.2d 663, at 664 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974). Compare Glass v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 598, 288 S.W.2d 522 (1956); Catchings v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 342, 285 S.W.2d 233, at 234 (1955).

If the Indictment alone is to be considered the charging instrument, then where is the jurat required for verification? As none appears on the face of the instrument, the Indictment can only be presumed to serve as a mere presentment by the grand jury consequent to having either been provided with, or having themselves submitted to the prosecuting attorney for the state, a properly filed Complaint. So, whose affirmation is verified on the face of the Indictment?

In State of Texas v. Carroll Pierce the court held:

A valid complaint is a prerequisite to a valid information. Holland v. State, 623 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Tex. Cr. App. 1981). Without a valid complaint, the information is worthless. Williams v. State, 133 Tex. Crim. 39, 107 S.W.2d 996, 977 (Tex. Cr. App. 1937). A jurat is the certificate of the officer before whom the complaint is made stating that it was sworn to and subscribed by the Applicant before the officer. Carpenter v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 99, 218 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tex. Cr. App. 1949). A jurat is essential, for without it, the complaint is fatally defective and will not support an information. Shackelford v. State, 516 S.W.2d 180, (Tex. Cr. App. 1970). The jurat must be dated and signed by the official character. See 22 Tex. Jur. 3d, Criminal Law, Section 2266 at 490. Thus, a complaint not sworn to before any official or person in authority is insufficient to constitute a basis for a valid conviction. Nichols v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 42, 344 S.W.2d 694, (Tex. Cr. App. 1961) (citing Purcell v. State; 317 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Cr. App. 1958)); see also Eldridge v. State, 572 S.W.2d 716, 717, n.1 (Tex. Cr. App. 1978); Wheeler v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 21, 353 S.W.2d 463, (Tex. Cr. App. 1961); Morey v. State, 744 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App. 1988, no pet.). Even where the jurat on the complaint reflects that it was sworn to before a named person but does not show the authority of such person to act, the complaint is void. Johnson v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 257, 226 S.W.2d 644, (Tex. Cr. App. 1950); Smola v. State, 736 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Tex. App. 1987, no pet.). The complaint is also void when the jurat contains no signature but only shows the office such as “County Attorney of Jones County, Texas.” Carter v. State, 398 S.W.2d 290, (Tex. Cr. App. 1966). When a jurat showed that the complaint had been sworn to before “Lavern I. McCann, Hockley County, Texas,” the complaint was insufficient to support the information. Carpenter v. State, 218 S.W.2d at 208-09. In the early case of Neiman v. State, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 360, 16 S.W. 253 (Tex. Ct. App. 1891), the complaint was sworn to before “Wm. Greer J.P.” It was held that the letters “J.P.” could not be inferred to mean Justice of the Peace and an official who had the authority to administer the oath.” (Emphasis added).

When a jurat on a complaint shows that the oath was administered to the Applicant by a party designated as county attorney but who in reality is an assistant county attorney, the complaint is void. Thomas v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 369, 334 S.W.2d 291, 292 (Tex. Cr. App. 1960); see also Aleman v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 265, 284 S.W.2d 719, (Tex. Cr. App. 1956); Stalculp v. State, 99 Tex. Crim. 279, 269 S.W. 1044, 1045 (Tex. Cr. App. 1925). When the assistant or deputy is authorized by law to administer the oath himself, he may not administer it in the name of his principal and may not certify that the principal administered the oath by and through him as an assistant. Goodman v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 279, 212 S.W. 171 (Tex. Cr. App. 1919).” State of Texas v. Carroll Pierce (09/25/91), 1991.TX.41404; 816 S.W.2d 824. (Emphasis added).

If the instrument was prepared and presented to the grand jury by the prosecutor, who then is the actual accuser in the matter, and by what authority did the prosecutor initiate a prosecution solely by presentment of an already prepared Indictment or simply an oral presentation to the grand jury?

To avoid situations where the State stands as both accuser and prosecutor, procedures were put in place directing the grand jury as to how it would proceed through the course of an indictment. In the current cause, these procedures have been abridged in such a fashion so as to deny Baker in his fundamental due process rights, specifically, his right to know and face his accuser, right to an examining trial, and the right to challenge the array of grand jury members prior to their impanelment.

III-B
Retaliatory and Incorrect Charge.

Baker has previously objected to the Indictment due to it being facially invalid in that it alleges specific facts relative to the elements of the alleged offense that are patently incorrect and untrue. However, Baker was misinformed by not only his own attorney, but also by 83rd District Judge Robert Cadena (“Judge Cadena”) and 63rd District Court Judge Enrique Fernandez (“Judge Fernandez”), and local District Attorney Frederico Hernandez (“D.A./ D.A. Hernandez”) (who is also the initiator8 of this criminal allegation and the prosecutor in this matter), that the facts alleged in the Indictment don’t have to be exactly accurate in order to be valid. Baker believes this to be not only intentional misinformation as to the requisite accuracy and validity of the Indictment, but a knowing willful and wrongful effort to undermine his right of due process and “custom tailoring” of the facts that the prosecution must prove at trial. Baker remains steadfast in his objection that the Indictment alleges specific facts that the prosecution is fully aware are untrue and are exculpatory on their face.

On or about April 2, 2015, the contents of the court record were examined. At which time County/ Court Clerk Martha Allen faxed D.A. Hernandez an answer to a communication with the subject “Re: Request for Examining Trial” and stating what was currently filed in the court record.  At that time, five (5) items were in the court record; 1) Order appointing counsel, 2) Notice of withdrawal of appointed counsel, 3) Demand for an examining trial, 4) Demand to produce, 5) PR bond.


8As no criminal complaint appears to have ever been filed before D.A. Hernandez in this matter, coupled with his failure to properly prepare and present an information to the proper court or to the grand jury as required by the provisions of Article 2.03 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prior to his seeking and obtaining an indictment, it must be presumed that he alone is the person making a criminal allegation to the grand jury.

 

On April 13, 2015, Judge Cadena personally signed the order to reassemble the grand jury on May 12, 2015, at 9:00am, the same day as Baker’s previously scheduled examining trial, which was also scheduled for May 12, 2015, at 10:30am, and for which the order was originally signed on April 9, 2015, again, by Judge Cadena himself. Which proves that Judge Cadena was completely aware that Baker’s right to an examining trial was being violated by D.A. Hernandez in total disregard for the laws of Texas, and that Judge Cadena was acting in concert and collusion to aid and abet same. Making it no surprise that the only case heard by the grand jury on May 12, 2015, was Baker’s.

Furthermore, this provides enormously strong prima facie evidence that there was at least some degree of ex parte communication occurring between Judge Cadena and D.A. Hernandez’s office in relation to Baker’s case.

Baker further asserts that a charge under Penal Code Section 38.04 is unlawful and invalid in light of Section 545.421, Texas “Transportation” Code (“ “Transportation” Code ”) as being the more relevant and controlling statute,9 Section 38.04(d), Texas Penal Code, notwithstanding, as all events that led up to the existing allegation against Baker are a direct result of a knowingly willful and wrongful application of the “Transportation” Code to Baker and his private conveyance by the arresting officer in this matter, Trooper Weatherby.

As there is no actual indication that the Texas Legislature intended to supersede or repeal Section 545.421, “Transportation” Code by the later amendment of Section 38.04 of the Texas Penal Code to include Subsection (d), Baker should have been charged with a Class B misdemeanor under Section 545.421 of the “Transportation” Code and not a felony of the 3rd Degree under Section 38.04 of the Penal Code, provided any actual grounds exist for any charges against Baker at all. The provisions of Section 545.421, “Transportation” Code, is not a lesser included offense within Section 38.04, Penal Code,10 it is completely separate from, and almost identical in form and substance to, Section 38.04, Penal Code. However, Section 545.421 charges a substantially lesser penalty for what is a virtually identical offense.


9Section 311.026(b), Texas Government Code, “If the conflict between the general provision and the special or local provision is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later enactment and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.” (Emphasis added).

10Farrakhan v. State, No. PD-1984-06 Tx.Ct.Crim.App (Mar 12, 2008).

Sec. 545.421. FLEEING OR ATTEMPTING TO ELUDE POLICE OFFICER; OFFENSE.

(a) A person commits an offense if the person operates a motor vehicle and wilfully fails or refuses to bring the vehicle to a stop or flees, or attempts to elude, a pursuing police vehicle when given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop.

(b) A signal under this section that is given by a police officer pursuing a vehicle may be by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren. The officer giving the signal must be in uniform and prominently display the officer’s badge of office. The officer’s vehicle must bear the insignia of a law enforcement agency, regardless of whether the vehicle displays an emergency light.

(c) Except as provided by Subsection (d), an offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor.

(d) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor if the person, during the commission of the offense, recklessly engages in conduct that places another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.

(e) A person is presumed to have recklessly engaged in conduct placing another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury under Subsection (d) if the person while intoxicated knowingly operated a motor vehicle during the commission of the offense. In this subsection, “intoxicated” has the meaning assigned by Section 49.01, Penal Code.

(Emphasis added).

The “Transportation” Code version of the offense specifically stipulates “wilfully fails or refuses to bring the vehicle to a stop” within its provisions, a specific act and character of circumstance that is completely omitted from Section 38.04, Penal Code. These specific elements more closely reflect Baker’s self-protective actions with his private conveyance and the proper context of the March 23, 2015, incident with Trooper Weatherby than any of the provisions of Section 38.04, Penal Code.

Furthermore, as it was an alleged “transportation” offense that Trooper Weatherby was using as his alleged authority to perpetrate the crimes of unlawful restraint, false imprisonment, and official misconduct against Baker, without either reasonable suspicion or probable cause, then, it should be axiomatic that the “Transportation” Code specific offense is the only one that State could lawfully and legally apply to any legal “person” who allegedly “wilfully fails or refuses to bring the vehicle to a stop.”

It is also not constitutionally viable that the provisions of Section 38.04(d) would apply as an alternative method of prosecution in this matter, as that would mean that Baker, and others similarly situated, could potentially be charged twice using different levels of charges for virtually the same offense stemming from the same series of events, thus potentially creating a double jeopardy issue.

Furthermore, the very existence of Section 38.04(d), Penal Code, in simultaneous concert with the existence of Section 545.421, “Transportation” Code, creates a serious public notice and due process issue in that anyone charged with “eluding” would have no way of knowing which statue the State could or would try to apply and use to charge them, despite the appearance of a specific category of legal application based upon the subject matter context of the particular code under which the initial law enforcement contact arose, i.e. some Penal Code offense versus some “Transportation” Code offense.

This issue is then further compounded by what certainly appears to be an equal protection and application of the laws issue, where one person can be charged and convicted of a felony while another is charged and convicted of a misdemeanor for what factually and circumstantially amounts to virtually the exact same offense, but having very different levels of punishment.

As such, Baker, and anyone else similarly situated, are not being given sufficient notice of the actual charge being made against them so that s/he can prepare to defend against those allegations, and is being placed in the very real danger of being twice held in jeopardy for the same offense. Swabado v. State, 597 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Amaya v. State, 551 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); U.S. Const amend. X, VI, and XIV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10, § 15 and § 19.

This potentially makes either Section 38.04(d) of the Texas Penal Code, or Section 545.421, of the “Transportation” Code, unconstitutional on its face in light of the existence of the other.

In which case, the issue becomes even further compounded under the “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibitions of Article 1, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution, wherein it states “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.” (Emphasis added).

Baker wonders how is it not cruel and unusual punishment to charge a man with a felony of the 3rd Degree or a Class B misdemeanor, or any crime at all, for acting in what he feels is in the best interest of his personal safety and welfare by seeking a public place where other people may act as witnesses to any and all unlawful and illegal acts that may be perpetrated by those with a presumed authority to harass, injure and kill with virtual impunity simply because they are a government employee?

Therefore, under the circumstances as they exist, Baker believes that he can and should only be indicted and charged under Section 545.421, “Transportation” Code,11 if any valid charge and cause for indictment against Baker legally exists at all.


11Azeez v. State, 248 S.W.3d 182; 2008 Tex.Crim.App.

III-C
Indictment Contains Elements Proving Innocence of the Alleged Offense.

Baker’s understanding of the elements of the allegation for which he has been indicted leads him to believe that there is a required element of the charge itself that proves fatal to the indictment and the criminal allegation in its entirety, and is actually exculpatory in nature, and serves to exonerate Baker of the alleged offense.

The charge for which Baker was indicted under Section 38.04(b)(2)(A) requires the element of a “vehicle” as being the means of “evading.” However, in Section 38.04(c)(1), the term “vehicle,” as used to commit the act of “evading,” is declared by Sec. 38.04(c)(1) to have the same meaning as the term “vehicle” defined under Sec. 541.201 of the “Transportation” Code. Section 38.04(c)(1) reads:

[(c)] In this section:
      (1) "Vehicle" has the meaning assigned by Section 541.201, 
          Transportation Code.

Texas “Transportation” Code Section 541.201(23) defined “vehicle” as:

[(23)] "Vehicle" means a device that can be used to transport or draw
       persons or property on a highway. The term does not include:
       (A) a device exclusively used on stationary rails or tracks; or
       (B) manufactured housing as that term is defined by Chapter 1201, 
           Occupations Code.

Considering the actual subject matter of the “Transportation” Code, and the definition of “vehicle” in Section 541.201(23) of that code, then a “vehicle” must be a device that not only can perform the functions defined within that term, but must also be actively in use for the purpose of “transportation.” And even if the state’s argument is that the term “vehicle” is to be given a general rather than specific meaning so as to make it applicable to any one or more of the specific types of devices listed within the entirety of Section 541.201 rather than only that of “vehicle” under Subitem (23) of that section, that does not change the subject matter context of the definition itself to apply to anything other than those devices being used to engage in “transportation.” Any device listed within Sec. 541.201 is legally a “vehicle” only when “transportation” itself is the business related activity for which it is being used by a “carrier,” “operator,” or “driver.”

This is a clear indication that the only manner of “vehicle” that can support the element of the alleged offense is one that has the same meaning, and therefore, the same legal subject matter purpose and use, as that found for the term “vehicle” in the “Transportation” Code. Thus, a device is only a “commercial/ motor/ vehicle” when it is being used for “transportation” by a “carrier,” “operator,” or “driver.” Which means that it should be perfectly clear that it is not the design or method of propulsion built into a device that makes it a “commercial/ motor/ vehicle” or that serves to make its use upon the public right-of-way an act of “transportation,” but rather, it is the existence of “transportation” that determines whether or not a device is legally a “commercial/ motor/ vehicle.” And this same standard holds true for “carrier,” “operator,” “driver,” or any other legally defined capacities or objects found within the “Transportation” Code. See Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013).

Therefore, the only type of “vehicle” that is statutorily acceptable in proving that element is one that the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt was being used for the purpose of “transportation” at the time of the commission of the alleged offense of “evading with a vehicle.” This means that the term “vehicle” does not simply mean anything with wheels or that moves under anything other than human power provided either with or without an engine, including, but not limited to, Baker’s private conveyance.

As Baker was never engaged in “transportation” as a “carrier,” “operator,” or “driver,” and there exists no substantive evidence that would prove otherwise, and Baker was not using his private conveyance as a “commercial/ motor/ vehicle” to engage in “transportation,” it cannot be lawfully or legally inferred that his private conveyance meets the statutory requirements and meaning of the term “vehicle,” thus, it fails to substantiate the charge against Baker. In fact, it completely disproves the element, thus legally negating the charge against Baker.

 

III-D
Violation of Baker’s Right to an Examining Trial
and to Challenge Grand Jury Array.

Baker was deprived of his due process rights when D.A. Hernandez sought a secret grand jury indictment prior to Baker receiving an examining trial, specifically, his right to know and face his accuser, to have an examining trial, and to challenge the array of grand jury members prior to impanelment.

The Texas Constitution – Article 1 – BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 10 – RIGHTS OF ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury. He shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof. He shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, and shall have the right of being heard by himself or counsel, or both, shall be confronted by the witnesses against him and shall have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, except that when the witness resides out of the State and the offense charged is a violation of any of the anti-trust laws of this State, the defendant and the State shall have the right to produce and have the evidence admitted by deposition, under such rules and laws as the Legislature may hereafter provide; and no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on an indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is by fine or imprisonment, otherwise than in the penitentiary, in cases of impeachment, and in cases arising in the army or navy, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger. (Amended Nov. 5, 1918.) (Emphasis added).

Baker never had any opportunity to head off this whole prosecutorial process through the presentation of exculpatory evidence at a proper examining trial or to challenge the validity of any alleged evidence in the state’s possession.  An examining trial is defined within Article 2.11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure as follows:

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure by Article 2.11. [35] [62] [63] EXAMINING COURT.
When the magistrate sits for the purpose of inquiring into a criminal accusation against any person, this is called an examining court. (Emphasis added).

Baker has been indicted, bound to the court for trial, and yet, no one has made any valid Complaint against him. No credible person has presented any proper Complaint to any magistrate, and no court clerk has ever received any proper Complaint against Baker from the magistrate of an examining court. Neither has any clerk been affected with the legal duty to keep safe said Complaint and other documents resulting from an examining trial and then deliver them up to the next grand jury.

Baker has the right to ask “Who is Baker’s accuser?” And, at this point, D.A. Hernandez seems to think that it is the grand jury rather than himself, as he appears to hold the opinion that the grand jury could somehow act first as Baker’s accuser, and then, act as the presenter of an indictment, and may do both absent a properly formed and verified Complaint and the requisite accompanying Information that D.A. Hernandez is required by law to prepare, sign, and submit in his official capacity with said Complaint attached pursuant Article 21.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. D.A. Hernandez also appears to believe that the grand jury serves as the legal plaything of any governmental prosecutor such as himself, and can be compelled to act solely at his/her behest to “True Bill” an indictment. Apparently, Texas prosecutors now seem to have reached the erroneous conclusion that the need for a valid Complaint and Information prior to indictment and prosecution has somehow and at some point been discredited.

Furthermore, Baker was never afforded the opportunity to challenge the grand jury array prior to their impanelment, because the prosecutor for the state and the judge of the 83rd District Court conspired and colluded to get a grand jury indictment in secret and in direct willful and wrongful violation of Texas law and Baker’s right to make that challenge. In point of fact, Baker was denied access to any and all information as to the composition of the grand jury members until more than a year after the indictment was handed down, and has only recently managed to get the list of names so as to see who was part of the array that indicted him.

In this instance, Baker’s deprivation of the right to challenge the grand jury array resulted in an indictment by a grand jury whose foreman, and at least one other member as currently known, has a previous personal and official confrontational and disagreeable history with Baker. The grand jury foreman, Timothy Scott Mitchell (“T.S. Mitchell”), is Chairman of the appointed five-member board designated as the “Terrell County Underground Water Conservation District,” and was one of the main members responsible for numerous attempts to unlawfully and illegally convert or outright steal the private water rights of the People living there, to which Baker and many others very publicly objected and protested during confrontations at public meetings and personal discussions on the subject.

There is also the issue of many of the people of Terrell County, including, but not limited to Baker, that have also protested the numerous insider contracts and backroom deals to which several “important” persons of wealth and political power residing in or around Terrell County are party. And these potentially unlawful and illegal activities, at least some of which, if not actually all, are known to and ignored by local public officials, including District Judges Fernandez and Cadena, D.A. Hernandez, the Sheriff, and several others.

Another member of the grand jury, Terry Black, is the spouse of USBP Agent ‘Billy’ Black (“Agent Black”), who was the #2 USBP Agent-in-Charge in Terrell County when Baker reported several other USBP agents that were harassing him by repeatedly racing their USBP vehicles back and forth along Baker’s property and fence line for no apparent legitimate purpose, but rather to incite his dogs into a frenzy and panic his livestock. A friend of Baker’s, John Hagan (“Hagan”), reported this behavior to Agent Black while Baker listened in on the three-way conversation, a fact of which Agent Black was unaware when he repeatedly denied that his subordinates were terrorizing Baker’s animals. However, within minutes of Hagan informing Agent Black that Baker was listening at the same time he was watching Agent’s Black’s subordinates outside of his property, Agent Black’s subordinates suddenly ceased their actions and vacated the area.

Baker believes that it was his and other reports from the People of Terrell County alleging that Agent Black and his superior, USBP Agent-in-Charge Earnest Rodriquez (“AiC Rodriquez”), were “turning a blind eye” to this and even more egregious unlawful and illegal behavior by their subordinates, such as the destruction of private property, destruction of livestock fences, and criminal trespass. And Baker has good cause to believe that it was these actions and reports of supervisory and subordinate misconduct that eventually resulted in Agent Black’s reassignment.

Later, USBP Agent-in-Charge Thaddeus Cleveland (“AiC Cleveland”) was also involved in a previous attempt by USBP Agent Collier (“Agent Collier”) to perform an illegal “transportation” stop on Baker at a point upon the public right-of-way that is well beyond the vicinity of the Texas border or any border checkpoint, neither of which Baker had been anywhere near. At the time that Agent Collier engaged in the illegal attempt to seize Baker at his liberty without warrant or lawful authority, Baker had called 911 and advised them of the situation, and, instead of pulling over for the illegal stop, traveled to the Sheriff’s office before stopping. It was at that time that AiC Cleveland arrived on-scene and demanded that Baker get out of his van and go into the sheriff’s office, and Baker declined to do so. As they had no lawful authority to make a “transportation” stop on a Texas public right-of-way, both AiC Cleveland, Agent Collier, and approximately twelve other Agents, eventually left, but not without suffering the embarrassment of being told by one of the Sheriff’s deputies that they were acting unlawfully and criminally by what they had done in pursuing Baker with no probable cause and no legal authority.

Furthermore, Agent Black was one of the federal officers that blocked the public right-of-way in order to prevent Baker from reaching a publicly populated area of more relative safety on March 23, 2015, while pointing a loaded weapon at him. Which further leads Baker to believe that Black’s spouse, grand jury member Terry Black, might “have an axe to grind” with him.

Article 19.31(a), items 5 and 6 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure allows a challenge to a grand jury member as follows:

Art. 19.31. CHALLENGE TO JUROR.

(a) A challenge to a particular grand juror may be made orally for any of the following causes:

[5.] That the juror has a bias or prejudice in favor of or against the person accused or suspected of committing an offense that the grand jury is investigating;

6. That from hearsay, or otherwise, there is established in the mind of the juror such a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the person accused or suspected of committing an offense that the grand jury is investigating as would influence the juror’s vote on the presentment of an indictment;

(Emphasis added).

As detailed above, Baker had ample valid legal grounds to disqualify at least two of the grand jury members prior to impanelment, and potentially more. However, Baker could have most likely had the entire jury array disqualified under Article 19.31(a) item 6 due to D.A. Hernandez’s illegal use of hearsay witness testimony to obtain the Indictment, as set forth in specific detail in section III-E of this document.

Article 20.19 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure instructs the grand jury as follows:

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20.19. [391] [442-443] Grand jury shall vote.
After all the testimony
which is accessible to the grand jury shall have been given in respect to any criminal accusation, the vote shall be taken as to the presentment of an indictment, and if nine members concur in finding the bill, the foreman shall make a memorandum of the same with such data as will enable the attorney who represents the State to write the indictment. (Emphasis added).

How can ‘all the testimony’ be ‘accessible to the grand jury’ if the individual being accused is never given a chance to appear and make a rebuttal to the alleged facts being presented against him or her, or introduce mitigating or potentially exculpatory evidence against the allegation(s)?

These rights are essential to individual due process, and are precisely why the legislature very clearly intended that a prosecuting attorney not have the power to seek an indictment in secret. In the instant case, the prosecuting attorney somehow made a presentment to a grand jury without ever having a proper complaint or creating the requisite information. A prosecutor can bring a crime to the knowledge to the grand jury only when a complaint has already been made to a prosecuting attorney by someone other than themselves. Article 21.20, V.A.C.C.P. in order to “protect its citizens from the inherent dangers arising from the concentration of power in any one individual,” Kennedy v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 303, 276 S.W.2d 291 (1955) (Opinion on Motion for Rehearing, at 664), the Legislature precluded a prosecutor from presenting an information “until affidavit has been made by some credible person charging the defendant with an offense,” and also mandated, “The affidavit shall be filed with the information.”

While Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 2.04 and 2.05 authorize the prosecuting attorney to take complaints and issue oaths, nothing in law directs a complaint to a grand jury. All criminal complaints are directed to some magistrate. When a complaint is made before a prosecuting attorney, s/he can take the complaint but, s/he must file the complaint with a magistrate of the county as follows:

Art. 2.05. WHEN COMPLAINT IS MADE.
If the offense be a misdemeanor, the attorney shall forthwith prepare an information based upon such complaint and file the same in the court having jurisdiction; provided, that in counties having no county attorney, misdemeanor cases may be tried upon complaint alone, without an information, provided, however, in counties having one or more criminal district courts an information must be filed in each misdemeanor case. If the offense be a felony, he shall forthwith file the complaint with a magistrate of the county. (Emphasis added).

If a peace officer has knowledge that a crime has been committed, said officer’s course of action is directed by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 2.13, which reads as follows:

Art. 2.13. DUTIES AND POWERS.

(a) It is the duty of every peace officer to preserve the peace within the officer’s jurisdiction. To effect this purpose, the officer shall use all lawful means.

(b) The officer shall:

(1) in every case authorized by the provisions of this Code, interfere without warrant to prevent or suppress crime;

(2) execute all lawful process issued to the officer by any magistrate or court;

(3) give notice to some magistrate of all offenses committed within the officer’s jurisdiction, where the officer has good reason to believe there has been a violation of the penal law; and

(4) arrest offenders without warrant in every case where the officer is authorized by law, in order that they may be taken before the proper magistrate or court and be tried.

(c) It is the duty of every officer to take possession of a child under Article 63.009(g).

(Emphasis added).

When a magistrate is made aware that a crime has been committed, s/he is required to hold an examining court in accordance with his/her duty under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 2.10 and 2.11, which read as follows:

Art. 2.10. DUTY OF MAGISTRATES.

It is the duty of every magistrate to preserve the peace within his jurisdiction by the use of all lawful means; to issue all process intended to aid in preventing and suppressing crime; to cause the arrest of offenders by the use of lawful means in order that they may be brought to punishment.
Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.

Art. 2.11. EXAMINING COURT.

When the magistrate sits for the purpose of inquiring into a criminal accusation against any person, this is called an examining court.
Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.

(Emphasis added).

Once an examining trial has been held under Chapter 16 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and an order has been prepared showing that a determination of probable cause has been made by order pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 16.17, the complaint that initiated the examining trial, the statement of the accused (if any), and all other documents are to be sealed up and sent to the clerk of the court having jurisdiction of the offense in accordance with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.30, which reads as follows:

Art. 17.30. SHALL CERTIFY PROCEEDINGS.The magistrate, before whom an examination has taken place upon a criminal accusation, shall certify to all the proceedings had before him, as well as where he discharges, holds to bail or commits, and transmit them, sealed up, to the court before which the defendant may be tried, writing his name across the seals of the envelope. The voluntary statement of the defendant, the testimony, bail bonds, and every other proceeding in the case, shall be thus delivered to the clerk of the proper court, without delay. (Emphasis added).

The court will take notice that the statutes say nothing about a prosecuting attorney until the stage described in Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.31. The clerks who are authorized to receive these documents are directed by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.31 as follows:

Art. 17.31. DUTY OF CLERKS WHO RECEIVE SUCH PROCEEDINGS.
If the proceedings be delivered to a district clerk, he shall keep them safely and deliver the same to the next grand jury. If the proceedings are delivered to a county clerk, he shall without delay deliver them to the district or county attorney of his county. (Emphasis added).

By the above, in every case where a criminal complaint has been made, the complaint is originally directed to some magistrate, who is to hold an examining trial and forward the documents had in the hearing to the proper court.

There are two circumstances where this procedure could potentially be intentionally misinterpreted and bypassed, and they are contained in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20.09, which reads as follows:

Art. 20.09. DUTIES OF GRAND JURY.
The grand jury shall inquire into all offenses liable to indictment of which any member may have knowledge, or of which they shall be informed by the attorney representing the State, or any other credible person. (Emphasis added).

Because of the ambiguity of its language, Article 20.09 potentially could lead to an indictment without a criminal complaint ever having been filed. Were a grand jury to bring an indictment based on the personal knowledge of a grand juror or “some credible person,” it is conceivable that there would be no criminal complaint of record, as the grand jury members might not be aware of and understand the legal importance and necessity of a proper Complaint, making it the legal duty of the prosecuting attorney for the state to inform them of that requirement prior to an indictment. In such a case, however, the indictment could not be recorded in the minutes of the grand jury as contemplated by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20.22(b) which reads as follows:

Art. 20.22. PRESENTMENT ENTERED OF RECORD.
[(b)] If the defendant is not in custody or under bond at the time of the presentment of indictment, the indictment may not be made public and the entry in the record of the court relating to the indictment must be delayed until the capias is served and the defendant is placed in custody or under bond. (Emphasis added).

In order for a magistrate to issue a warrant of arrest and subsequently place an accused individual into custody or on bond as directed by Article 20.22 supra, there must already be a proper Complaint filed with that magistrate upon which to base the warrant as well as for the subsequent commitment order or to release him or her on bond. However, there is no Complaint in this case, just as there is no Information based upon said Complaint in the record.

Furthermore, the provisions of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 19.27 serves to prevent a prosecutor from stacking a grand jury against an accused by granting any person the right to challenge the grand jury array prior to the jury being impaneled, or, if the grand jury is already impaneled, to challenge the array in a Motion to Quash Indictment (see Muniz v. State, 672 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex.Crim.App 1984)):

Art. 19.27. ANY PERSON MAY CHALLENGE.
Before the grand jury has been impaneled, any person may challenge the array of jurors or any person presented as a grand juror. In no other way shall objections to the qualifications and legality of the grand jury be heard. Any person confined in jail in the county shall upon his request be brought into court to make such challenge. (Emphasis added).

Article 19.27 is extremely specific about the fact that the composition of the grand jury cannot be challenged for either qualifications or legality after it has been impaneled. Which makes those opinions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals as discussed herein even more outrageous and egregious, as these opinions state that the right to an examining trial and to challenge the pre-impanelment composition of the grand jury is automatically denied to the accused if the prosecuting attorney for the state can manage to convince a district judge to secretly impanel a grand jury whereby the prosecutor may convince them to issue an indictment, and, thus, simultaneously deny the accused in both the right to an examining trial and to challenge the composition of the grand jury array before it can be impaneled. Especially when, as is the case here, no proper allegation of criminal activity by means of a verified Complaint and Information has ever been filed in the matter.

This is compounded by the fact that the language of Article 19.27 would appear to negate the ability to challenge the jury array and any subsequent indictment by means of a Habeas writ or a motion to quash the indictment, as at least some grounds for doing so will almost certainly pertain to the qualifications or legality of certain members of the grand jury directly.

Therefore, any challenge to the indictment after the fact would, as a matter of law, have to be automatically denied by the courts if the motion made any argument whatsoever that the indictment was improper solely for reasons relating to the legality or qualifications of the grand jury members that made and presented it. Which would mean that the accused individual’s right to due process could be shoved aside by the prosecutor stacking the secret grand jury with persons that have a private bias or vendetta against the accused or that are in any other manner disqualified from sitting upon the grand jury. And there is no recourse written into the law for the accused to obtain remedy for this harm. Nor can Baker locate any statutory authority for the courts to simply provide such alternative remedy without first declaring that provision of Article 19.27 unconstitutional as being a violation of due process.

To further prevent secret grand jury indictments, the Legislature enacted Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 16.01, creating a specific prohibition against the seeking of an indictment prior to giving proper, sufficient and timely notice to an accused individual that s/he may have need to avail him/herself of the other statutory right granted by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 19.27, supra:

Art. 16.01. EXAMINING TRIAL.
When the accused has been brought before a magistrate for an examining trial that officer shall proceed to examine into the truth of the accusation made, allowing the accused, however, sufficient time to procure counsel. In a proper case, the magistrate may appoint counsel to represent an accused in such examining trial only, to be compensated as otherwise provided in this Code. The accused in any felony case shall have the right to an examining trial before indictment in the county having jurisdiction of the offense, whether he be in custody or on bail, at which time the magistrate at the hearing shall determine the amount or sufficiency of bail, if a bailable case. If the accused has been transferred for criminal prosecution after a hearing under Section 54.02, Family Code, the accused may be granted an examining trial at the discretion of the court. (Emphasis added).

In the 1967 case of Trussell v. State, 414 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.Crim.App 1967), without citing a single point of authority or any explanation for doing so, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rendered null and void the statutory right of an accused to an examining trial by nothing less than unlawful judicial fiat and legislating from the bench. The court effectually ruled that a prosecutor may do that which s/he is specifically forbidden by statute to do, and may secretly present to a grand jury the name of a person who has not been afforded the statutorily granted right to an examining trial or to receive proper, sufficient and timely notice of a potential indictment so as to exercise his/her right to challenge both the charging instrument and the composition of the grand jury array prior to the jury being impaneled, or, at the very least, to know the composition of the grand jury if they have already been impaneled so as to make a proper challenge to the array by means of a writ of habeas corpus and to the charging instrument by a motion to quash or set aside. An effort which Article 19.27 of the Code of Criminal Procedure appears to make null and void from inception.

Apparently, the justices comprising the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals at the time decided that they could rely upon United States Supreme Court rulings setting the minimum standards and requirements for federal examining trials, as the means to somehow nullify Texas law and the greater level of protections that the Texas Legislature had directly afforded the People in relation to such proceedings within the state.

Our Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has gone on to hold in the following cases that an examining trial is only available to the accused if the accused requests it, yet, no such language or inference exists in the statute. And it must be recognized that Baker did demand an examining trial, in writing, before any other actions were taken by anyone, including the seeking and obtaining of the secret Indictment. The Court has also held that only those charged with a felony have the right to an examining trial, but this simply cannot be true when examined under the microscope of substantive and procedural due process, as most misdemeanor cases are preceded by a warrantless arrest, which requires a probable cause determination all its own prior and in addition to the probable cause determination relating to the alleged offense(s) in a criminal matter. The rule-of-thumb being that, if the initial warrantless detention or seizure was itself unlawful, then, any evidence or statements discovered thereafter must be considered as “fruit of the poison tree,” and would then be inadmissible for the purpose of any subsequently related criminal allegation(s). Without an examining trial, just where, when, and how does someone accused of a misdemeanor ever receive the opportunity to challenge the facts and evidence against them for the purpose of preserving any appealable error on the record relating to the probable cause determination, or, potentially ending a criminal prosecution before it can ever begin?

Furthermore, as the examining trial is the only opportunity provided for in the criminal process whereby a determination of probable cause can be made by a neutral and detached magistrate, who is also the only person authorized by law to sign an order relating to a finding of probable cause, or for the purpose of signing an order of commitment to jail upon such finding, pursuant Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 16.17 and 16.20 respectively, and as probable cause is a fundamental foundational pillar of both subject matter and in personam jurisdiction, a finding of probable cause at an examining trial can be nothing less than mandatory in order for any court to have the required jurisdiction to proceed in the matter and to protect the due process rights of the accused.

Therefore, as a matter of law, jurisdiction, and due process, it cannot be made the responsibility of the accused to request an examining trial, or that the courts can declare the right to such a trial shall be presumed waived by the accused if no such request is made, but, rather, it is actually a mandatory requirement upon the courts under the laws of Texas to set a date and time for that proceeding to take place and to ensure that it does. The basis for such reasoning is that an examining trial is the only proceeding set forth in Texas law for making a determination of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate relating to both a warrantless arrest and the validity of the allegations against the accused, and, therefore, it simply cannot be voluntarily waived by the accused, as probable cause goes to the two primary pillars supporting the State’s jurisdiction to sit in judgement of a matter, that of subject matter and in personam jurisdiction. The only reasonable and acceptable exception to this requirement would be a case where the accused voluntarily confessed to the crime(s) prior to the conducting of an examining trial, as that would satisfy both the probable cause and jurisdictional requirements without a judicial finding and order.

Further, there is no lawful authority or power vested in a grand jury, especially when being spoon-fed information of alleged criminal activity solely by the prosecuting attorney for the state, and without benefit of mitigating, contradictory, or presentation of exculpatory evidence by the accused or his/her counsel, to make any sort of probable cause determination. Indeed, it must be asked if it is even lawfully possible to qualify the members of a grand jury to make such a determination, as such determinations are lawfully and legally required to be made by a properly sworn neutral and detached judicial magistrate, although, considering the willful and wrongful violations of law being perpetrated by our Texas Courts in violation of the rights of the accused, it appears to be a moot point at this time.

What’s more, it should not even require an argument to undermine and deny any position that would argue that probable cause can be rightfully determined by the prosecuting attorney for the state any more than it would be to argue that they may initiate a criminal complaint of their own volition, regardless of the classification of the allegations involved and most especially when they are prosecuting the matter. ““In other words, a prosecuting attorney is not authorized to institute prosecutions in the county court upon his independent act or of his own volition. Kennedy v. State, supra, at 294. One may not be both the accuser and the prosecutor in misdemeanor cases.Wells v. State, 516 S.W.2d 663, at 664 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974). Compare Glass v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 598, 288 S.W.2d 522 (1956); Catchings v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 342, 285 S.W.2d 233, at 234 (1955). (Emphasis added, internal quotes omitted).

How then does an indictment serve as a lawfully and legally valid determination of probable cause in relation to the validity of both a warrantless arrest and any related allegation(s) of criminal activity that would serve as the means to validly and lawfully displace both the statutory requirement and due process need for a proper examining trial for any alleged criminal offense rather than just felonies alone? It contains no proper jurat requiring that it be signed under penalty of perjury as certifying the truth of the allegations made therein as a sworn criminal statement requires, and it does not require that the person signing it have any competent firsthand knowledge of the facts alleged. It is in every way legally possible insufficient as the basis for stating or making a probable cause determination or as the sole instrument of accusal.

The rulings in Trussell and later court opinions have had the undeniable effect of denying an accused individual in their right to an examining trial as specifically granted by statute, such right being nothing less than a requirement for both procedural and substantive due process rights to mean anything at all. These rulings further serve to chill or deny the accused in the due process right of preserving any appealable error that may be exposed relating to a finding of probable cause, impeachability of witness testimony, or the validity and admissibility of evidence. These rulings also destroy the individual’s right to challenge the grand jury array prior to impanelment. And the most egregious and detrimental effect of all, these rulings have unlawfully created judicial sanction and consent for both the lower courts and prosecutors statewide to engage in criminal violations of state law, specifically, Texas Penal Code Secs. 39.02 and 39.03, which reads as follows:

Sec. 39.02. ABUSE OF OFFICIAL CAPACITY.(a) A public servant commits an offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud another, he intentionally or knowingly:
(1) violates a law relating to the public servant’s office or employment; or
(2) misuses government property, services, personnel, or any other thing of value belonging to the government that has come into the public servant’s custody or possession by virtue of the public servant’s office or employment.
(b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(c) An offense under Subsection (a)(2) is:
(1) a Class C misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is less than $100;
(2) a Class B misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is $100 or more but less than $750;
(3) a Class A misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is $750 or more but less than $2,500;
(4) a state jail felony if the value of the use of the thing misused is $2,500 or more but less than $30,000;
(5) a felony of the third degree if the value of the use of the thing misused is $30,000 or more but less than $150,000;
(6) a felony of the second degree if the value of the use of the thing misused is $150,000 or more but less than $300,000; or
(7) a felony of the first degree if the value of the use of the thing misused is $300,000 or more.
(d) A discount or award given for travel, such as frequent flyer miles, rental car or hotel discounts, or food coupons, are not things of value belonging to the government for purposes of this section due to the administrative difficulty and cost involved in recapturing the discount or award for a governmental entity.
(e) If separate transactions that violate Subsection (a)(2) are conducted pursuant to one scheme or continuing course of conduct, the conduct may be considered as one offense and the value of the use of the things misused in the transactions may be aggregated in determining the classification of the offense.
(f) The value of the use of a thing of value misused under Subsection (a)(2) may not exceed:
(1) the fair market value of the thing at the time of the offense; or
(2) if the fair market value of the thing cannot be ascertained, the cost of replacing the thing within a reasonable time after the offense.

Sec. 39.03. OFFICIAL OPPRESSION.
(a) A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he:
(1) intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, search, seizure, dispossession, assessment, or lien that he knows is unlawful;
(2) intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct is unlawful; or
(3) intentionally subjects another to sexual harassment.
(b) For purposes of this section, a public servant acts under color of his office or employment if he acts or purports to act in an official capacity or takes advantage of such actual or purported capacity.
(c) In this section, “sexual harassment” means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, submission to which is made a term or condition of a person’s exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, either explicitly or implicitly.
(d) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that an offense is a felony of the third degree if the public servant acted with the intent to impair the accuracy of data reported to the Texas Education Agency through the Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS) described by Section 42.006, Education Code, under a law requiring that reporting. (Emphasis added).

The simple elements constituting criminal violations of the above Penal Code statutes make the denial of an examining trial by our prosecutors and courts nothing short of an ongoing criminal conspiracy and criminal enterprise under Title 18 of the United States Code and state law.

In the instant case, it had to be clear to the presiding judge that the Indictment had been presented to the court in violation of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20.22, that the prosecutor had presented a person to a grand jury for indictment that the prosecutor knew full-well had been denied the rights granted by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 16.01 and 19.27. The violation of Articles 20.22 and 19.27 were accomplished by the denial of the right to an examining trial in violation of Art 16.01.

The court opinions on this subject are not only wrong as a matter of law and a complete lack of constitutional authority to make such rulings, but are blatantly criminal in their hubris and utter disregard of an accused individual’s constitutionally and statutorily protected rights, are a violation of the separation of powers clause under Article 2 of the Texas Constitution, are a violation of properly enacted procedural law under the Code of Criminal Procedure, and directly violate the fundamental individual right to due process of law rather than merely the rule of a group of men and women operating through a judicial and prosecutorial collusion and consensus as to how they want it to work.

How is it anything less than an “unreasonable” act of sedition to have judges sitting upon the bench in the highest criminal court in Texas that have unilaterally declared the judicial department to be totally superior to the legislative in determining what legislation it will follow and what legislation it will simply choose to disregard in relation to criminal procedure and the legislatively protected rights of the accused? Is this behavior not the very thing that the courts are presuming to be unlawful and illegal acts by those appearing before them for prosecution and appeal? Where is even the appearance of judicial integrity, competency, fairness, and impartiality in that? Is the argument that the legislature actually has no power to enact laws to dictate certain procedures for the courts to follow or to protect the rights of individuals caught up in the criminal judicial process? If so, then why not simply declare the statute unconstitutional rather than just criminally ignoring it or legislating from the bench to rewrite it in accordance with judicial and prosecutorial perspectives and desires? What the Court of Criminal Appeals has done in these opinions is to declare that the Court itself is not only above the law, but above the legislature as well, and it has the power and authority to sanction and protect knowingly criminal violations of law and other criminal acts perpetrated by the lower courts and state prosecutors against the people of Texas. This is an unconstitutional oligarchy in action, and this oligarchy is committing sedition and treason against us all.

No reasonable person of ordinary prudence can read Article 16.01 and construe it as anything other than a prohibition specifically preventing a prosecutor from seeking an indictment until the accused has been given notice and opportunity for an examining trial where s/he can obtain a proper determination of probable cause for any warrantless search or seizure of his person or property, present exculpatory evidence, question witnesses, and obtain a legal determination as to what evidence will be admissible at trial and on questions of law. This exculpatory evidence would then be available to any subsequently impaneled grand jury under the dictates of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 2.01, which reads as follows:

Art. 2.01. DUTIES OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS.
Each district attorney shall represent the State in all criminal cases in the district courts of his district and in appeals therefrom, except in cases where he has been, before his election, employed adversely. When any criminal proceeding is had before an examining court in his district or before a judge upon habeas corpus, and he is notified of the same, and is at the time within his district, he shall represent the State therein, unless prevented by other official duties. It shall be the primary duty of all prosecuting attorneys, including any special prosecutors, not to convict, but to see that justice is done. They shall not suppress facts or secrete witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused.
Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.
Amended by Acts 1981, 67th Leg., p. 801, ch. 291, Sec. 98, eff. Sept. 1, 1981.

(Emphasis added).

And once it is determined, and notice has been given, that a grand jury is to be impaneled to hear a complaint against the Accused for the purpose of indictment, the Accused could then exercise his or her right to an opportunity to challenge the grand jury array.

Had Baker been allowed access to the full protections and due process rights contained in the constitutions and laws, the full sets of facts and evidence relating to any allegations of criminal conduct by Baker would have been available to the grand jury. And, if such facts and evidence proved exculpatory or as an affirmative defense, then, it is almost certain that no indictment would have ever happened and no criminal prosecution commenced.

The case law makes it clear that everything involving the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals unlawful and illegal denial of an examining trial to an accused individual evolved from Trussell. Trussell and its progeny, Ash v. STATE, 420 S.W.2d 703 (1967), Murphy v. STATE, 24 S.W.2d 231 (1968), Bryant v. STATE, 423 S.W.2d 320 (1968), Ward v. STATE, 427 S.W.2d 876 (1968), Harris v. STATE, 457 S.W.2d 903 (1970), Brown v. STATE, 475 S.W.2d 938 (1971), Whittington v. STATE, 781 S.W.2d 338 (1989), and others, as precedent, are totally worthless, as each and every one of the resulting opinions directly sanctions the willful and wrongful violation of state law and the due process rights of the accused by every court and prosecutor statewide.

III-E
DISTRICT ATTORNEY HERNANDEZ WILLFULLY AND WRONGFULLY
PRESENTED HEARSAY TESTIMONY TO THE GRAND JURY.

In direct violation of the spirit and intent of Article 19.31(a) item 6, D.A. Hernandez allowed one Amanda Herman (“Ms. Herman”) to provide, at best, hearsay testimony, and at worst, suborned perjurious testimony, to the grand jury regarding the alleged facts surrounding the events of March 23, 2015, and the criminal allegations against Baker.

The problem with Ms. Herman’s testimony is that Ms. Herman has no competent firsthand knowledge of any of the related and relevant facts involving Baker, as she was not present at any time or at any of the actual locations during any of the events and incidents that occurred during the entirety of March 23, 2015.

Therefore, how could Ms. Herman have taken an oath to provide factual and truthful answers to any inquiries made by members of the grand jury in relation to facts that might result in an indictment allegedly relating to a crime of which she neither had nor has any personal knowledge?

How is it that D.A. Hernandez can use hearsay testimony to obtain a grand jury indictment while causing Baker to be denied even the semblance of fairness and impartiality, as well as subverting Baker’s right to an examining trial and grand jury challenge that would have potentially made Ms. Herman’s ‘testimony’ irrelevant and inadmissible to even a ‘stacked’ grand jury like this one, or, for that matter, an opportunity to appear before the grand jury himself so as to provide rebuttal facts and evidence refuting Ms. Herman’s statements and alleged facts?


IV.
EXERCISE OF RIGHT TO DEMAND RELIEF.

Due to the conflicting classifications of the alleged offense, and of the facts relative to the different classifications and subject matter of the allegations in the Indictment, Baker is being charged and indicted under the wrong code and statute. And given Trooper Weatherby’s complete lack of probable cause to detain or arrest Baker for any “transportation” related offense whatsoever, including that of allegedly “speeding” at the time and place of initial contact, and in conjunction with the other factual and statutory information of which the court must take judicial notice as provided herein under Rule 201, Texas Rules of Evidence, it is Baker’s assertion that the Indictment does not provide adequate notice of the charges against him such that he can adequately prepare for trial, be protected from being twice held in jeopardy for the same conduct, and to be adequately informed of which law applies to his case, in violation of his rights pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 10, 15 and 19 of the Texas Constitution.

WHEREFORE, Baker moves that the Court quash the Indictment, and, if either instrument actually exists as required by law, to also quash the Complaint and Information against him, and to so provide a written order that each of these instruments be quashed and this case dismissed with prejudice.

Respectfully Submitted,
_____________________________
Jan Patrick Baker, Sui Juris




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Quash Indictment was Faxed to the attorney for the State on October 21, 2016, at Fax Number 830-775-0352

_____________________________
Jan Patrick Baker, Sui Juris





CAUSE NO(s). 742
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
Plaintiff, §
v. § TERRELL COUNTY, TEXAS
§
Jan Patrick Baker, § 63rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Defendant in Error. § DUNS number: 006848369
§

ORDER

On this day came on to be heard Defendant’s Motion to Quash Indictment. The Court, having considered the motion and argument of counsel, it is hereby ordered that

_____ the Indictment is quashed ____ with/ ____ without/ prejudice; and
_____ the Information is quashed ____ with/ ____ without/ prejudice; and
_____ the Complaint is quashed ____ with/ ____ without/ prejudice; and
_____ the case is dismissed ____ with/ ____ without/ prejudice.

SIGNED this _____ day of ______________________, 20_______.

 

_______________________________
JUDGE PRESIDING


Word documents relating to this Motion and the case in general:

motion-to-quash-indictment-published-on-blog

motion-to-disqualify-63rd-district-judge-fernandez

motion-to-disqualify-83rd-district-judge-cadena

notice-of-jennings-reservation

jennings-reservation-information

indictment-pg1

indictment-pg2

dps-affidavit-warrantless-arrest-weatherby

Trial – Undermining the State’s Unsubstantiated Legal Presumptions and Conclusions.

What do you do when you are attempting to cross-examining the officer on the stand about the actual facts and evidence the officer relied upon that allegedly support the legal presumptions and conclusions that s/he made in the field during your initial encounter with them at the “transportation” stop, and the Prosecution objects to your questioning of the witness about such things?

Let’s look at what usually happens at trial in such cases.

Prosecutor:    Officer, what was Mr. Craig doing when you had reason to take notice of him?

Officer:           Mr. Craig was “operating” his “motor vehicle” on I-35 at 70MPH in a zone marked for a maximum speed of 60MPH, which was “not reasonable and prudent” at the time “under the circumstances and conditions then existing.”

In his/her testimony, the officer has testified to five specific and totally erroneous legal determinations and conclusions, i.e. “operating,” “motor vehicle,” “not reasonable and prudent,” “under the circumstances and conditions then existing,” and the belief that the posted speed signs apply to anything other than a commercial motor vehicle under the provisions of Sec. 201.904 of the “Transportation” Code. These unsubstantiated claims by the officer during testimony constitutes the making of legal determinations and conclusions because, 1) these are terms defined by statute with specific legal, contextual, and subject matter meanings, and 2) the officer is not legally qualified or capable of making or testifying to a legal determination of law, and, therefore, cannot legally declare whether or not the statutory definition actually does apply to the Accused under the circumstances and conditions as they are currently known and existing.

However, without fail, when you begin to cross-examine the officer as to how s/he came to make such legal determinations and conclusions, the Prosecutor will usually jump up and begin making a rather interesting objection, considering the circumstances under which it is being made. It will usually go something like this:

Objection! The officer isn’t required to know those things and isn’t competent to testify as to any legal determinations or conclusions that s/he is being asked to make or testify to at this or any other time.”

(Yes, this is literally an objection that I personally witnessed one Prosecutor make almost verbatim in a trial. Most others have usually been fairly similar in their own individual objections).

Now, in volleyball parlance, this is what is known as a “set at the net,” and it is supposed to be the golden opportunity for a member of the team controlling the ball to “set it up” so that another teammate can be the first to get close to the net, jump really high, and spike the ball in the face of the opposing team to score a point. However, the problem with this set up becomes very apparent when the setting team member realizes that they accidentally set the ball too close to the net and within reach of the opposing team’s own high-jumping blocker/spiker who is already at the net, and who now has the opportunity to spike the ball back and gain his/her team control of the serve.

And this is what that spike looks like once the other team has inadvertently set you up on cross-examination with an objection worded fairly similarly to the one above so as to allow you the opportunity to spike it right back in their face:

Judge, I would like to make this point-by-point response to the prosecution’s objection. During this entire trial the witness for the Prosecution has done absolutely nothing but testify to their own arbitrary legal presumptions and conclusions made at the time of the initial encounter, despite the adamant objections of the Accused. And now, the prosecution wants the court to sustain an objection from them in which they claim that not only is the state’s accuser and only witness not required to actually read and understand the laws and statutes at issue before even attempting to make legal presumptions and conclusions claiming  that the Accused allegedly violated them, but also that that same witness is suddenly legally incompetent to testify when asked by the Accused to explain the specific facts and evidence the officer relied upon to reach those legal presumptions and conclusions at the time of the encounter. The very same legal presumptions and conclusions that the witness has already been allowed to testify to on behalf of the State over the strenuous objections of the Accused. Objections that have all been overruled by this very court despite there being no basis in law for doing so.

Therefore, if the court intends to sustain the Prosecution’s objection that the witness lacks legal competency to testify to the specific facts and evidence allegedly supporting those very same legal presumptions and conclusions made by the witness in this matter, then I move the court to declare the witness legally incompetent and unqualified to testify for all purposes, including, but not limited to, those relating to any such legal determinations and conclusions remaining or already testified to thus far, and that his/her entire testimony be stricken from the record.

Now, if the judge actually grants this motion to strike the witness’s testimony, which the law requires under any normal circumstances that involve real justice and due process, then the next step is to demand a dismissal of the case with prejudice, as the State has no substantive facts or evidence that an eyewitnesses could use to testify against you.

Congratulations, you have now spiked the ball so hard in face of the Prosecution that it permanently tattoos “Voit” across their forehead, and your team now controls the serve.

Motions – Challenging Jurisdiction

Okay, let’s talk for a brief minute about Motions to Dismiss that challenge both subject matter and in personam (personal) jurisdiction and WHY you want to file BOTH in separate individual pleadings. This was a discussion I had with someone earlier today about this subject, and it’s important to note the distinctions being made in the arguments within each pleading.

Q:  Can or should a motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction read the same (or roughly the same) as a motion to dismiss for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction?

A:  They will have similarities to the facts of the arguments, but different focuses.

Q:  For example, would in personam focus more on the officer’s authority to stop you in the first place removing the authority from the court to hear the case?

A:  It works in BOTH.

A Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Would go Something like this:

It is an uncontested fact that the arresting officer, Officer Ima Dickhead (“Officer Dickhead“), conducted no investigation into discovering any facts or evidence that would prove Respondent was engaged in “transportation” at any time prior to or during the alleged regulatory offense.


It is an uncontested fact that Officer Dickhead‘s entire basis for making such an allegation is based entirely upon his/her own unsubstantiated personal presumptions of law rather than actual facts or evidence.


It is an uncontested fact that Officer Dickhead has no lawful authority to seize and arrest Respondent without warrant for an alleged “transportation” offense if the officer lacked any articulable facts and evidence supporting probable cause to believe that Respondent was actively engaged in “transportation.


It is an uncontested fact that, absent any facts and evidence that Respondent was engaging in “transportation,” Officer Dickhead lacked not only articulable probable cause to make a warrantless seizure and arrest of Respondent, but also any and all subject matter jurisdiction over Respondent relating to enforcement of regulatory statutes relevant to same.


It is an uncontested fact that, if Officer Dickhead never believed that Respondent was actively engaged in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense, thus Officer Dickhead never intended to perform any investigation that would result in the discovery of any admissible facts and evidence that would prove Respondent was so engaged, then it cannot by rightfully said that Officer Dickhead was acting on any specific articulable facts or evidence supporting probable cause, but was acting instead upon an entirely unlawful and unsubstantiated legal presumption that the existing facts and evidence did not support.


It is an uncontested fact that, given the current state of tensions in this nation and this state relating to law enforcement officers brutally assaulting, injuring, and murdering individuals that are doing nothing more than asserting and exercising their fundamental and constitutionally protected rights to not be subjected to false arrests, abuses of police power, and injurious physical assaults and death at the hands of out-of-control law enforcement personnel, Officer Dickhead‘s demonstrably faulty and unsubstantiated legal presumption and callous disregard of the facts and the law created an unacceptable level of danger to the life, person, rights and property of Respondent as well as that of the general public to a degree that is shocking to the conscience.


As Officer Dickhead lacked any actual articulable facts and evidence that Respondent was actually engaged in “transportation” at the time of the warrantless seizure and arrest of Respondent, and never made any attempt whatsoever to investigate into this necessary and mandatory element of subject matter jurisdiction relating to the alleged offense, there was no legal basis creating a foundation for articulable probable cause that would serve to support Officer Dickhead‘s warrantless seizure and arrest. Therefore, the warrantless seizure and arrest of Respondent by Officer Dickhead was completely unlawful and illegal and was not based upon any probable cause supporting subject matter jurisdiction.


A Motion to Dismiss for Lack of In Personam Jurisdiction Would go Something like this:



It is an uncontested fact that the arresting officer, Officer Ima Dickhead (“Officer Dickhead”), conducted no investigation into discovering any facts or evidence that would prove Respondent was engaged in “transportation” at any time prior to or during the alleged regulatory offense.


It is an uncontested fact that Officer Dickhead‘s entire basis for making such an allegation is based entirely upon his/her own unsubstantiated personal presumptions of law rather than actual facts or evidence.


It is an uncontested fact that Officer Dickhead has no lawful authority to seize and arrest Respondent without warrant for an alleged “transportation” offense if the officer lacked any articulable facts and evidence supporting probable cause to believe that Respondent was actively engaged in “transportation.”


It is an uncontested fact that, absent any facts and evidence that Respondent was engaging in “transportation,” Officer Dickhead lacked not only articulable probable cause to make a warrantless seizure and arrest of Respondent, but also any and all in personam jurisdiction over Respondent relating to enforcement of regulatory statutes relevant to same.


It is an uncontested fact that, if Officer Dickhead never believed that Respondent was actively engaged in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense, thus Officer Dickhead never intended to perform any investigation that would result in the discovery of any admissible facts and evidence that would prove Respondent was so engaged, then it cannot by rightfully said that Officer Dickhead was acting on any specific articulable facts or evidence supporting probable cause, but was acting instead upon an entirely unlawful and unsubstantiated legal presumption that the existing facts and evidence did not support.


It is an uncontested fact that, given the current state of tensions in this nation and this state relating to law enforcement officers brutally assaulting, injuring, and murdering individuals that are doing nothing more than asserting and exercising their fundamental and constitutionally protected rights to not be subjected to false arrests, abuses of police power, and injurious physical assaults and death at the hands of out-of-control law enforcement personnel, Officer Dickhead‘s demonstrably faulty and unsubstantiated legal presumption and callous disregard of the facts and the law created an unacceptable level of danger to the life, person, rights and property of Respondent as well as that of the general public to a degree that is shocking to the conscience.


As Officer Dickhead lacked any actual articulable facts and evidence that Respondent was actually engaged in “transportation” at the time of the warrantless seizure and arrest of Respondent, and never made any attempt whatsoever to investigate into this necessary and mandatory element of in personam jurisdiction relating to the alleged offense, there was no legal basis creating a foundation for articulable probable cause that would serve to support Officer Dickhead‘s warrantless seizure and arrest. Therefore, the warrantless seizure and arrest of Respondent by Officer Dickhead was completely unlawful and illegal and was not based upon any probable cause supporting in personam jurisdiction.




What you have to understand is, that although the facts that lead up to both challenges are essentially the same, the focus of the challenge can and would be different between a challenge to subject matter versus in personam jurisdiction. These same points of argument would serve just as well in a “Motion to Suppress” considering that, since the facts show that probable cause never existed, then the officer conducted an illegal search and seizure of the person, the conveyance, and the personal information relating to both.

Furthermore, in order for any of this information to remain admissible, the state must first PROVE that the warrantless arrest was valid by proving that probable cause DID exist, AND that the officer properly complied with Art. 38.22, Code of Criminal Procedure. The problem for the state, however, is that the officer NEVER attempted to obtain any such evidence AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSE. And failing to do so would make ANYTHING they try to use thereafter, like a driving record or other official record relating to licensing, registration, inspection, financial responsibility, etc., etc., INADMISSIBLE because it is NOT relevant to the original stop and arrest and certainly not a direct result of the officer’s actions at the original stop.