“When A Stranger Calls… or Emails.”

Well, I got another email today from what seems to be another law enforcement officer. As you recall, the last one was from a police chief, and is posted on this blog as the article “You’ve Got Mail.”

So, just as before with that article, I ask that any comments on this article be kept civil and for the purpose of discussion and education, not name calling or ad hominem attacks.

Here it is just as I received it, and my response just as I sent it.



 

Dear Eddie:

Just listened to some video where you are encouraging drivers to not provide paperwork when involved in a car stop. I’m not sure how you are interpreting the law, but driving a car is not a right. Before you can drive a car you are required to take a test, get a license and follow VTL requirements. As part of that driving privilege you are also required to provide proof of driving privilege to those sworn to uphold the laws of the community you are driving in. Otherwise none of us would bother getting licenses and paying fees and when we got stopped just say “sorry officer,  I’m not giving you anything including my name and there is nothing you can do” and drive away unimpeded. If we DID get stopped and arrested it would be a false arrest and we’d all be rich. Also, I don’t know about Texas, but in my state a summons in given in lieu of arrest. So if you are stopped for a vehicle infraction and fail to produce identification to prove you have a right to operate your vehicle you will be arrested for the infraction and finger printed to determine your true identity.

I’m not sure if you are one of these sovereign citizens, but it is irresponsible of you to give people misinformation which will lead them into more trouble than they are in. As a former law enforcement officer you should be aware that vehicle stops are one of the most dangerous situations a cop can be in and for you to teach people to raise tension and exacerbate the situation to make a buck selling your classes is irresponsible and unconscionable.

Thank you



 

Hello, and thank you for the email.

Having received many like it over the years, I will try to be brief in my response, which is difficult considering the various levels of disinformation upon which your premise and arguments are founded.

Therefore, while I appreciate hearing your thoughts on this subject, I can only hope that you will follow suit and be willing to listen to mine. Many of which you can read about and try to understand by going to my legal blog and reading the articles that I have written and posted there upon numerous subjects and areas of law. I will provide the web site address at the end of this reply. As an FYI, I usually take emails of this sort and re-post them to my blog as an article so that others may learn from them and see the kind of mindset that is prevalent in the good ‘ol U.S. of A. these days. Also, I do not edit the original email or publish anyone’s email address.

The history of America and the rights of the people are the first hindrances to your arguments, just as it has been to those before you.

The people have always had the right to freely move about the various states without government approval or monitoring of any kind, and they still do. The fact that a particular few that control the laws and government are trying to create the perception that this right never existed notwithstanding.

For example, changes in technology over time don’t make alterations to the rights of the people because of technological advances or regressions.  If you think they do, then please tell me what the inventions are that you think are responsible for rewriting the Bill of Rights and make the people lesser as the rightful heirs of those rights?

In our history, and long antecedent to that, throughout world history, the people have always traveled about by whatever means they could afford to have available to them, whether that be by foot, ship, wagon, horseback, chariot, etc. As technology progressed to “motor cars” the same held true.  The People were absolutely free to purchase and use the newly invented “motor car” for its intended purpose upon the public right-of-way, which was to travel further and faster than they could with a horse or wagon. They couldn’t be required to have a license or anything else, because they were, and still are, a free people.

Now, fast forward to today. The various administrative agencies in every state have worked tirelessly to create legislation that uses terminology and phrasing that makes it appear that these rights no longer exist, or ever did. This is demonstrably false by simply studying the historical record of these facts, which email shows that you have not actually done. You are instead simply parroting what you have been told your whole life with little to no effort on your part to verify and affirm the information and facts for yourself.

As for myself, however, I have done the exact opposite. I have read, researched, studied, and then read and researched and studied some more to reach the conclusions that I have, that we the People are being defrauded and lied to by those that are supposed to serve us and protect our rights. The laws neither actually read nor mean what you and all others like you have been led to believe that they do. This is by design.

Administrative agencies can only remain in place as long as they serve a legitimate purpose.  What better way to ensure your own job security than to alter the laws to make it appear that society cannot function without you and your agency?  How is this possible you are asking? Rather simply. Every department of government in every State of the union has been seized by the National and State Bar Associations. Attorneys, have complete and utter control of the judicial branch of government.  Not a single office of any power within the judicial department of any state government can be held one of the People unless they are a member of these organizations. If you were to give it any honest consideration, you must admit that this is true.

It is also true that these attorneys have major power or majority control in the other departments of government as well. Which makes this all rather easy and convenient, don’t you think? They write the laws, they adjudicate those laws, and they write the policies and procedures for administrative and law enforcement agencies telling them how to enforce them and such.  However, they don’t tell these agencies everything that is in the law, or how to actually understand it if they bother to even read it for themselves.

As a former deputy sheriff, I felt that I had a duty to fully understand the laws I was being commanded and coerced into applying to the People. Especially when my knowledge, understanding, and experience led me to believe that some of those laws were actually violating rights in how they were written and being applied. One such case is the one you raised about the State law requiring people to waive their protected right to remain silent so as to comply with the production of something associated with a privilege that you are actually only assuming that they are engaging in. This is a legal impossibility, as you cannot be compelled to testify or produce any evidence that could be used against you in a court of law or to potentially incriminate you in some way of which you may not even be aware.

The United States Supreme Court ruled long ago that a statute simply cannot require the waiver of any protected right in order to comply with a privilege statute that makes the right conditional in its availability or exercise. If you really think about it, that such a statutory requirement is or could be valid, then the Bill of Rights means absolutely nothing, as the administrative agency need only convince the Legislature to write a law that outlaws the invocation and protection of those rights by any individual or group. In other words, such legislation would be inherently and unavoidably unconstitutional, which it is unless you can prove there exists a knowing and consensual waiver of the protected right, which doesn’t actually exist under the conditions and circumstances that currently apply within the States.

Now, Texas has the same laws here as those you described, which is not unusual considering that almost every State of the union utilizes the very same National Bar Association Standards on the writing and construction of laws, so as to make them more uniform throughout the several States. However, unlike yourself, I have literally spent years studying every aspect of those specific laws and procedures, their history, and the original legislative intent at the time of their creation. My conclusions have come down to the facts and evidence that prove that a massive fraud has been and still is being perpetrated upon the People of Texas, and every other State, by our own government. All of which is being done in the name of revenue.  It is not about public safety at all. It is entirely about generating revenue, monitoring, tracking, and controlling of the entire population.

Again, think about all of the things you are told you are required to do when you have a “license” if you wish to remain “legal.” Things like, keep your personal information, such as name, DOB, and address, current at all times with the administrative agency; comply with all rules and regulations of the administrative agency; transfer your “privilege” from one agency to another if you relocate, and then follow the same procedures there for monitoring and tracking; etc., etc., etc.

Then there is the matter of the statutory schemes themselves, which are worded with the intention of deceiving the reader into thinking and believing one thing, while the actual context and overall statutory scheme itself tells a true researcher and studier of its entirety a totally different story. This too is by design and specific intent.

The statutes you speak of regulate a particular class of profession and occupation, the business of “transportation,” which is the movement of passengers, goods, or property upon the land by a carrier for compensation or hire.  They have absolutely nothing to do with the general public that is simply traveling for their own private business or pleasure upon the public right-of-way. Did it escape you that it is called the RIGHT-of-way for a reason? Could that reason be because the public has always had an absolute right to access and use the public right-of-way for their own personal business and pleasure without State interference or prohibition?

The People have a right to access and use the public right-of-way for their own private business and pleasure, but not as a place of business. THAT is the actual privilege, the business use. THAT is what requires licensing, registration, insurance, inspection, and everything else that you are assuming applies to everyone in a car. It doesn’t.  Business use = privilege.  PRIVATE use = RIGHT of use. You cannot really understand or argue anything at all about the subject of “transportation” until you are willing to examine into and truly understand those distinctions. If you do, then you would be arguing entirely out of an ignorant, un-researched, and unstudied personal belief and opinion, not fact or law. I only use fact and law, rarely opinion, and then, only if the opinion is based upon a single level of logical inference that can be derived from the existing facts and evidence. Is that what you used to construct your original email to me, or did you only use your opinion on what you think the laws and courts have actually said upon this subject?

One thing about your email that I found amusing was this where you wrote, “Otherwise none of us would bother getting licenses and paying fees and when we got stopped just say “sorry officer,  I’m not giving you anything including my name and there is nothing you can do” and drive away unimpeded. If we DID get stopped and arrested it would be a false arrest and we’d all be rich.”[sic]  What amused me was the fact that you stated all of this as if it were actually some sort of problem rather than precisely how it actually ought to be and work. If an officer has no authority to stop you in the first place, then why do you perceive that this is not a perfectly acceptable response and action?  Why should we be forced under threat of violence and punitive sanctions to get a bunch of licenses and pay a bunch of fees to do something that we already and have always had every individual right to do?  Why is it that you either don’t want, won’t accept, or don’t believe, that these rights have existed and are rightfully ours to exercise? Why do you think that the government is the true owner of the roads and not the People? Isn’t government just our elected and appointed caretakers to watch over, protect, and maintain our public property that we all have a right to access and use freely?  If not, then please try and explain to ne why you don’t think so.

There is much more to it than that small smattering of things of course, as this is but one of many links in the chain you must follow to actually begin understanding the deception that is playing out right in front of us. My legal blog will fill in more links of the chain for you, if you take the time and make the effort to read and understand it.

What you think you know about this subject simply isn’t true. You simply believe that it is, and the courts and attorneys work very hard to ensure that your perception and understanding of this remains exactly where it is and where they want it. This is what gives them power over you, me, all of us.  Convince everyone that theirs is the only true reality and then let them enforce it against each other on their own.

I simply haven’t the time or space here to teach all that I know on this subject. Nor do I have any desire to explain to you your misinformation on the alphabet-agency created nomenclature of “sovereign citizen,” which is intended to do nothing more than immediately apply a stigma of credibility to all upon whom it is slathered with a very broad, ill-informed, and uneducated brush. But if it eases your mind, no, I don’t call or consider myself a “sovereign citizen.” I am absolutely no different than you in most respects, though with some obvious differences.  For instance, I no longer accept anything a governmental entity or employ tells me at face value. I research and verify everything. And more often than not, I have proven that agency or employee to be incorrect in almost every respect and point, making them totally incompetent in their job.

All of my information is based entirely upon the law, court opinions, and historical documentation, not just my imagination like so many that are discussing and providing information in subjects like this one these days. What that means is, you can personally verify everything that I put forth for others to consume for education and study. In fact, I plead with people constantly to never simply take my word about anything I say. I implore them to look it all up for themselves and verify it through their own reading and understanding. I would ask that you take the time and effort to do the same.

Therefore, what is more irresponsible and unconscionable in your estimation, a law enforcement officer that actually understands little to nothing about the conflicts and threats to our individual rights that exist between the laws that s/he is enforcing, but who is insisting that they are doing everything right despite that lack of knowledge and understanding; a criminally corrupt court system that refuses to play by its own rules or follow the law as written so as to ensure that this massive fraud upon the American People and all of its associated crimes never becomes known to the public or allows us to hold those responsible for it accountable; having your rights stolen away by legislation that has no authority to take them, but is used as an excuse by the actors to use any level of force that they then deem necessary so as to protect themselves while destroying you, me, our children, or someone else? Is this your idea of responsible and conscionable?

Are you saying that these actions are more desirable and acceptable to you than the information that I put out there that serves to expose this massive fraudulent scam for what it is? Can you please tell me where it is written that our rights are not worth protecting simply because there is some inherent risk or danger in exercising and defending them from a corrupt system of government that would rather you, we, didn’t have them at all? Which seeks to undermine or destroy them further and further with each passing day? Can you please tell me how America came to be independent from England, or how we intend to remain a free and self-governing people, if such actions and ideas, and their associated risks, are just too unacceptable to contemplate or engage in in this modern day era in which we live? What, exactly, does freedom and liberty truly mean to you if you think that that scenario is how it is supposed to be?

I know none of this is something you might want or like to hear, but it is a fact that you are wholly ignorant and unqualified in what you do not know as well as what you think you know on this subject. You have swallowed the story without requiring any actual evidentiary proof and verification whatsoever. Which I totally understand as being rather hard to own up to if confronted and challenged on it, but it’s the truth nonetheless. However, you can make the effort to change that if you wish.

Again, thank you for the email, but you are mistaken in your understanding of the law and the facts of what is a right and what is a privilege.

The legal blog is here:  taooflaw.wordpress.com

The True Power of the People Over Unconstitutional Acts

So, some municipality has ‘enacted’ an ordinance, and is using it to charge you with some sort of ‘crime’ defined therein. But, have you bothered to even ask yourself if they actually have any lawful authority to so such a thing?  If not, why not?  Do you simply assume that they automatically have this authority?  If so, then, obviously, you have never asked yourself just from where exactly they allegedly did or could get it, right?

Well, I am here to tell you, and show you, that they don’t have it, and that they have never had it, despite all their protestations to the contrary.  I have several other articles written on this blog that goes into the details of exactly how and why that is, so I won’t belabor it further with another article that does the same thing. What I am going to do is show you just one of the ways that the People have reserved to themselves the lawful authority to force a municipality’s rogue ‘legislation genie’ back into its bottle and seal it up so it stops interfering in your life and messing with your property.

Below you will find a People’s Petition of Grievances and Remonstrance that will be used against the CITY OF DALLAS for its unlawful creation of an unconstitutional ordinance, and the use of that ordinance against the People of Texas as if it has the force and effect of binding public law, which it absolutely and constitutionally does not. Making the CITY OF DALLAS’ effort to use and enforce the statute an unconstitutional act under color of law that subjects them to tort actions for their treason and violation of fundamental human and individual rights that we the People specifically reserved to ourselves as being inviolable by our government, at any level.

The Title of the petition that should indicate that we need a change in direction of what and to whom we address such petitions. I am of the mind that, since the municipality really has no authority to what it did in the first place, which is to try and make any law binding upon the public, then we shouldn’t be petitioning them for anything. I am thinking of this in the same common sense manner that one wouldn’t try to petition the local thieves guild to do something about all the burglaries and robberies occurring in your neighborhood. We should be going directly to the state legislature and demanding that they protect our rights and property by putting laws into place forbidding this fraud and making municipalities and their employees directly liable for their actions under state law. But we have to REALLY go after the legislators to make it happen, because, right now, they are getting a cut of the stolen property to allow this to continue. THAT is what we need to expose and resolve so that this has a chance to actually work.

The petition was not my idea, but I decided it had merit in what it sought to do and offered to assist in “fleshing it out” with more specific grievances and remonstrances so that signers of the petition, as well as the criminals hiding behind the municipal corporate veil, would have a clear understanding of the specific rights and issues involved here, and the People’s demands and requirements for making it right.

Please, if you live in the Dallas, Texas area, or anywhere in Texas, like San Antonio for example, where similar ordinances have been enacted, then please look for places in your area to sign this petition and exercise your rightful power against unlawful and unconstitutional encroachment and infringement by these criminal municipal corporations who spit on our rights and constitution for their own private interests. Even better, use the attached MS Word document version to start one in your own neighborhood.

Remember, we can all stand and fight together now, while we can and should, or we will all eventually and surely be tried and hanged alone.



PUBLIC NOTICE AND PETITION FOR
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES TO
THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
AGAINST THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OPERATING
AS “CITY OF DALLAS”

Notice, this petition is being instituted, signed, and presented by men and women of the Texas Republic, as sovereign People and free individuals domiciled within the geographical region of the Texas Republic commonly referred to as “Dallas,” as a public demand for redress of grievances relating to and challenging the unlawful and unconstitutional imposition of CITY OF DALLAS ORDINANCE NO. 29595.

The free men and women who have signed this petition are of one mind in that, the CITY OF DALLAS ORDINANCE NO. 29595 is violative of the most basic and fundamental of human rights and needs, is violative of state and federal constitutional provisions and prohibitions upon the limited powers and nature of government, and the knowing and willful violation of rights specifically reserved by the People to themselves to protect against such abuses of the People’s own delegated powers through governmental overreach and unlawful usurpations of powers and authority never delegated and constitutionally forbidden to any political subdivision of the state, or to the state government, by the People of the Texas Republic.

The CITY OF DALLAS may already be liable through individual and class action torts for unlawfully acting under color of law and without lawful authority in knowing and willful violation of both the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (“US Constitution”) and THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS (“Texas Constitution”).

Whereas:   on its face, CITY OF DALLAS ORDINANCE NO. 29595 infringes upon, outlaws, and prohibits the free exercise and enjoyment of the People’s fundamental rights, such as the right to free association and to peaceably assemble, the right to freedom of religion and to engage in the consensual practices and customs thereof, and the right to individual liberty in all of these and the pursuit of happiness associated therewith.

Whereas:   on its face, CITY OF DALLAS ORDINANCE NO. 29595 infringes upon, outlaws, and prohibits the free exercise and enjoyment of the People’s fundamental rights by unlawfully and unconstitutionally converting the free exercise and enjoyment of those rights into a crime with the threat of penalty and punishment via unconstitutional taxation or fines imposed for no other purpose that to punish the act of  caring for and feeding of their fellow man in the form of the poor and/or homeless People who are doing nothing more than trying to survive within the corporate municipal limits of the CITY OF DALLAS.

CITY OF DALLAS ORDINANCE NO. 29595 is a prima facie violation of the following protected individual rights and constitutional prohibitions:

  1. The unconstitutional exercise of prohibited legislative powers specifically delegated to the Legislature of the State of Texas under Article 3, Sec. 1, and the constitutionally mandated process for the creation of any and all binding public law within Secs. 29-39 of said Article, and, therefore, are specifically prohibited to be exercised by municipalities and counties, including, but not limited to, the unlawful and unconstitutional exercise of any and all legislative authority having the intent or false pretense of creating and enacting binding public law in any form for any purpose whatsoever.
  2. The unconstitutional exercise of constitutionally delegated powers and acts specifically prohibited to municipalities as set forth in Article 11, Sec. 5, of the Texas Constitution
  3. The unconstitutional violation of specific rights and protections reserved to the People of Texas under Article 1 of the Texas Constitution’s Bill of Rights, including, but not limited to, the right to challenge and hold void any and all governmental and non-governmental corporate violations of any provisions or prohibitions therein under Article 1, Sec. 29.
  4. The unconstitutional violation of specific rights and protections reserved to the People of Texas by which the state and its political subdivisions are constitutionally prohibited from exercising any power or authority violative of any clause or provision within the Texas Constitution, especially those within the Bill of Rights.
  5. The right to freedom of Religion, as it prohibits the right of the People to minister to the poor and needy as a part of their religious or personal custom and practice.
  6. The right to freedom of association as a natural right, as it prohibits the right of the People to befriend and provide aid and assistance to whomever they may choose for whatever reason they may choose.
  7. The right to peaceably assemble as a natural right, as it prohibits the right of the People to gather together to minster to and provide charitable aid and mutual kinship and comfort to those in need.
  8. The right to the pursuit of happiness as a natural right, as it prohibits the right of the People to enjoy providing mutually voluntary and consensual aid and assistance to those in need as their heart and personal morality may move them to do.
  9. The right to Due Process, as this ordinance is a violation of the right of a free People to life, liberty, property, and all the rights, privileges, and immunities of same, and in some cases, serves as a potential death sentence devoid of any form of due process or human empathy for the plight of others.
  10. The unconstitutional violation of the specific right to local SELF-government, as being a right specifically reserved solely to the PEOPLE of Texas within Article 1, Sec. 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Texas Constitution, in both their natural capacity as sovereign individuals and as a public body assembled, which is not a right or delegated power that is in any way reserved to the creation or operation of municipal corporations, counties, or the State government.

Whereas:   on its face, CITY OF DALLAS ORDINANCE NO. 29595 unconstitutionally infringes upon, outlaws, and prohibits the People of Texas from invoking the blessings of Almighty God by performing His commandments and works.

THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION PREAMBLE

Humbly invoking the blessings of Almighty God, the People of the State of Texas, do ordain and establish this Constitution.

Whereas:   on its face, CITY OF DALLAS ORDINANCE NO. 29595 unconstitutionally infringes upon, outlaws, and prohibits the People of Texas from declaring and acting upon their individually reserved right to local self-government of THEMSELVES, both as individuals and as a community in relation to their private individual and communal actions and activities, just one aspect of which is providing consensual and voluntary care and assistance to the poor and needy. The right of local self-government is specifically reserved to the People of Texas under Article 1, Sec. 1 of the Bill of Rights within the Texas Constitution, not to the corporate municipality, county, or state governments.

ARTICLE 1. BILL OF RIGHTS

That the general, great and essential principles of liberty and free government may be recognized and established, we declare:

Sec. 1. FREEDOM AND SOVEREIGNTY OF STATE.          Texas is a free and independent State, subject only to the Constitution of the United States, and the maintenance of our free institutions and the perpetuity of the Union depend upon the preservation of the right of local self-government, unimpaired to all the States.

Whereas:   on its face, CITY OF DALLAS ORDINANCE NO. 29595 unconstitutionally infringes upon, outlaws, and prohibits the right of the People of Texas to individual and collectively exercise their individual and collective political power in a manner they have deemed necessary and fitting, and denies the People of Texas in their rightful authority and to all benefits and privileges associated therewith, while simultaneously denying the People an independent and sovereign State and a Republican form of government as existing and operating by and for their individual and mutual consent and benefit, rather than for the private interests of the corporate municipality.

ARTICLE 1. BILL OF RIGHTS

Sec. 2. INHERENT POLITICAL POWER; REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT.             All political power is inherent in the People, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit. The faith of the People of Texas stands pledged to the preservation of a republican form of government, and, subject to this limitation only, they have at all times the inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may think expedient.

Whereas:   on its face, CITY OF DALLAS ORDINANCE NO. 29595 unconstitutionally infringes upon and violates multiple provisions and prohibitions of the Texas Constitution by the fraudulent exercise of Legislative authority in order to unlawfully defraud the People by the fraudulent creation of unconstitutionally enacted binding public law that was void ab initio. The power to create binding public law is constitutionally delegated and vested solely within the LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS (“Texas Legislature”) by Article 3, Sec. 1 of the Texas Constitution, and that power may not and cannot be re-delegated to political subdivisions of the state government by mere legislative enactments and statutory schemes.

ARTICLE 3. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Sec.1.   SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. The Legislative power of this State shall be vested in a Senate and House of Representatives, which together shall be styled “The Legislature of the State of Texas.”

Sec.2.   MEMBERSHIP OF SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. The Senate shall consist of thirty-one members. The House of Representatives shall consist of 150 members.

Whereas:   on its face, CITY OF DALLAS ORDINANCE NO. 29595 unconstitutionally infringes upon, outlaws, and prohibits the right of all men as having a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences.

ARTICLE 1. BILL OF RIGHTS

Sec. 6. FREEDOM OF WORSHIP. All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences. No man shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent. No human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of conscience in matters of religion, and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious society or mode of worship. But it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to protect equally every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship.

Whereas:   on its face, CITY OF DALLAS ORDINANCE NO. 29595 unconstitutionally infringes upon, outlaws, and prohibits the natural and indefeasible right of all men to protect themselves and others from unlawful and unnecessary deprivations of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or disfranchisement, without due process of law.

ARTICLE 1. BILL OF RIGHTS

Sec. 19. DEPRIVATION OF LIFE, LIBERTY, ETC.; DUE COURSE OF LAW. No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.

Whereas:   on its face, CITY OF DALLAS ORDINANCE NO. 29595 unconstitutionally infringes upon, outlaws, and prohibits the natural and indefeasible right of all men to freely associate and act for their individual and common good, to be free from all unreasonable searches and seizures, and to petition their servant government for redress of grievances.

ARTICLE 1. BILL OF RIGHTS

Sec. 27. RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY; PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES. The citizens shall have the right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble together for their common good; and apply to those invested with the powers of government for redress of grievances or other purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.

The People’s Declaration of Relief and Redress

WE, the undersigned PEOPLE OF TEXAS, do hereby declare CITY OF DALLAS ORDINANCE NO. 29595 void on its face under the authority of the Bill of Rights in its entirety within Article 1 of the Texas Constitution, and pursuant to Sec. 29 of said Article specifically.

WE, the undersigned PEOPLE OF TEXAS, do further petition and demand that the CITY OF DALLAS MUNICIPAL CORPORATION cease and desist with any and all enforcement of the odious and unconstitutional DALLAS ORDINANCE NO. 29595, dismiss any charges, fines, and fees unconstitutionally perpetrated and taken thereunder, and to further act to immediately and permanently repeal said ordinance, thereby restoring the constitutionally protected rights that the free and sovereign People of Texas specifically reserved to themselves so as to prohibit such infringements and violations through unconstitutional abuses of power and authority as exists in said ordinance.





Petition to the CITY OF DALLAS

“It’s Only a Few Bad Apples…”

As you all should be aware of by now if you listen to the radio show at all, I have been working on a felony “Evading Arrest or Detention” case for the last several weeks. And if you have been listening for the last few years, then you are also aware that many of the facts and arguments I make on certain subjects have never been litigated or argued in the State of Texas Courts in a manner that addresses all of the in pari materia statutes on the particular subject. Which means that there is little to no “case law” relating to the specific argument.

The document that is posted here is a Motion to Quash Indictment that has been filed in the 63rd Judicial District Court in Terrell County Texas. I am posting it here with the full knowledge and consent of the individual that is being accused in the matter. I am also providing the actual MS Word documents for the four pleadings that I wrote for this case in links at the bottom. That way you won’t have to copy the web page and then try to massage it back into a formatted Word document if you find anything in it you might be able to use.

The Motion to Quash is quite long, but it had to be in order to cover all of the unconstitutional and illegal acts being perpetrated by the federal and local public officials in the matter so as to railroad this man into a prison sentence just to finally get rid of him. And if you can read this document and not get pissed off, then you are what is inherently wrong with America today, because it exposes the outright in-your-face corruption of the judicial process and system that runs all the way to the very top criminal court in Texas, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. And there is no one to blame for this sort of corruption but the self-serving attorneys themselves.

I am also going to link in copies of several of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals own case opinions that proves that the Court has been and is actively engaging in and sanctioning statewide criminal violations of Texas law by every lower court and prosecutor in the entire state. And that the sanctioning of these violations is done with the specific intent of denying every individual accused of a crime in their right to substantive and procedural due process. In other words, I believe that I have proven the entire judicial department of the State of Texas to be engaging in organized criminal activity that goes above and beyond even that which we have known or suspected, and they were kind enough to provide the evidence against themselves in their own opinions.

This leaves us having to ask, just when is this bullshit going to be enough to make we the People stand up, charge, convict, and hang every damned attorney and judge in the entire country from the nearest horizontal object strong to hold them aloft until all of their kicking and squirming ceases? Think about the following statements really really hard; is there anything, and I mean anything, that has gone wrong with the course and history of this country, any incident, any disaster, any war, any terrorist governmental attack, unconstitutional law, or violation of individual rights, during its entire existence, that was not conceived, implemented, or justified by some attorney or attorney wanna’be?

Think about that. The founding fathers despised attorneys, even though many of them were attorneys. It was a bunch of Pharisee lawyers that had Jesus condemned to death. Then we had ‘Honest’ Abe Lincoln orchestrating the civil war. The prohibition era and the ‘legal’ alcohol poisoning murders of over 10,000 Americans was overseen by President Woodrow Wilson when the federal government laced all alcohol products with a poisonous recipe of chemicals that included “4 parts methanol (wood alcohol), 2.25 parts pyridine bases, 0.5 parts benzene to 100 parts ethyl alcohol” and, as TIME magazine noted, “Three ordinary drinks of this may cause blindness.” (In case you didn’t guess, the alternative phrasing “drinking that stuff will make you go blind” also isn’t just a figure of speech.). Harry S. Truman oversaw the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and he went to law school to be an attorney, but never completed the degree after he won reelection as presiding county judge, even though he was informed by the state bar that he was already qualified to join the bar due to his prior court experience. Lyndon B. Johnson, the leading contender in the conspiracy to kill then President John F. Kennedy, went to law school, but never finished either — presumably because he could not have possibly passed the [pretend] ethics portion of the education. And that theme continues on through today with the Clintons and Obamas. This ‘profession’ is literally stealing everything from us, one step and piece at a time, and it must be stopped. But only we can do it. And we cannot do it by keeping our heads in the sand in the hope that the attorneys will simply pass us by because we choose to ignore their presence.

Remember, everything that Hitler did to the people of Europe and to our fighting men was ‘legal’ by the terms of the German-attorney made and enacted laws. And attorneys are doing the same things here, they have just set up a way to remove the middleman.

Like I said, the document is long, but it is an attempt to cover every possible exit and loophole that the corrupt individuals within the courts and judicial system might seek to squeeze their rat-like personages through so as to deprive an innocent man of not only his liberty, but also the few remaining months of his life with his family and friends.

So READ this, and don’t just think or wonder about it, DO something. SAY something. SCREAM something, at someone, anyone, everyone, that we are sick and tired of this kind of thing being done not only to us, but in our own name, by a bunch of corrupt self-serving communist-state loving sycophants!!

It is time to choose. Do you want FREEDOM, or freedumb?

 




CAUSE NO(s). 742
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
Plaintiff, §
v. § TERRELL COUNTY, TEXAS
§
Jan Patrick Baker, § 63rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Defendant in Error. § DUNS number: 006848369
§

Respondent’s Special Appearance and
Motion to Quash and Dismiss the Indictment – 2nd Amended

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW Jan Patrick Baker, appearing specially and not generally, in his common law capacity and of common right as one of the People of Texas and Defendant in Error (“Baker”) in the above styled and numbered cause and files this Motion to Quash and Dismiss the Indictment against him, and for cause would show the Court as follows:

I.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT

Baker stands charged by a one (1) count indictment, however, the body of the Indictment instrument alleges no specific offense or class of offense under any specific code, nor any specific details comprising the necessary elements of an offense, therefore, Baker can only guess as to what specific charge and classification is being made against him based solely upon other conflicting documents in his possession and relative to the matter that may or may not have any force of law as to determining or providing him with proper Notice of the specific classification of charge that is actually being made against him. In which case, Baker’s best guess as to what the State is accusing him of is EVADING ARREST OR DETENTION, pursuant to Section 38.04(b)(2)(A), Texas Penal Code, a third (3rd) degree felony. The indictment alleges that “on or about” the 13th day of March, 2015, the Defendant:

[did then and there intentionally flee from Russell Weatherby, a person the defendant knew was a peace officer, to wit: a Texas Department of Public Safety-Highway Patrol Division Trooper attempting to lawfully arrest or detain the said JAN PATRICK BAKER, and JAN PATRICK BAKER did then and there use a vehicle while the said JAN PATRICK BAKER was in flight]. (Emphasis added).

II.
LEGAL OVERVIEW

All citizens accused of any crime have the right to adequate notice of the specific charges under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and article 1, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution.1 These constitutional guarantees require a defendant to be given notice of the “nature and cause” of the accusation against him so that he may prepare a defense, and plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of further prosecutions for the same offense.2 The requirement of notice “with sufficient clarity and detail” is designed to “enable the defendant to anticipate the State’s evidence and prepare a proper defense to it.” 3 “[T] he accused is not required to anticipate any and all variant facts the State might hypothetically seek to establish.” 4


1In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948); Moff v. State, 154 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Garcia v. State, 981 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

2Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-764 (1962); Garcia v. State, 981 S.W.2d at 686 (Meyers, J., concurring); Moore v. State, 473 S.W.3d 523, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).

3Garcia 12. State, 981 S.W.2d at 685 (citing Eastep v. State, 941 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).

4Brasfield v. State, 600 S.W.2d 288, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), overruled on other grounds by Janecka v. State, 739 S.W.2d 813, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Drumm v. State, 560 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure implements and supplements these constitutional requirements and provides guidelines by which to measure the sufficiency of an indictment. For instance, under Article 21.03, “[e]verything should be stated in an indictment which is necessary to be proved.” Article 21.04 requires that the “certainty required in an indictment is such as will enable the accused to plead the judgment that may be given upon it as a bar of any prosecution for the same offense.”5 And Article 21.11 states that “[a]n indictment shall be deemed sufficient which charges the commission of the offense in ordinary and concise language in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is meant, and with that degree of certainty that will give the defendant notice of the particular offense with which he is charged… .”

Under Article 27.08 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, exceptions to the substance of an indictment can be raised where “it does not appear therefrom that an offense against the law was committed by the defendant” and “it contains matter which is a legal defense or bar to the prosecution” (emphasis added). Defects of form can be raised under Article 27.09 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, although a defect of form should not render an indictment insufficient unless it “prejudice[s] the substantial rights of the defendant.” See Article 21.19. Defects of substance and form can result in a dismissal of an indictment or require an amendment of the indictment. See, e.g., Articles 28.07 and 28.09 to 28.11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The issue of “[w]hether an indictment fails to charge an offense at all is an entirely different issue from whether the indictment fails to provide adequate notice.”6


5This statutory requirement of “certainty” is “distinct from, and independent of, the constitutional requirement of adequate notice.” Garcia v. State, 981 S.W.2d at 685 n.3 (citing G. Dix & R. Dawson, Texas Criminal Practice and Procedure § 20.104 (1995); 2 W. Lafave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 19.2(b) at 445-446 (1984).

6Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Olurebi v. State, 870 S.W.2d 58, 62 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

III.
LEGAL GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

Baker objects to the lack of a proper verified criminal complaint, which was required to be filed prior to the prosecutor seeking an indictment.

Baker objects to the lack of a proper Information, which was required to be filed prior to the prosecutor seeking an indictment.

Baker objects to both the form and the substance of the indictment.

Baker believes that, besides being retaliatory and baseless, the Indictment is factually insufficient in that “it does not appear therefrom that an offense against the law was committed by the defendant” and “it contains matter which is a legal defense or bar to the prosecution,” (emphasis added), thus, it fails to allege an offense under Article 27.08 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

III-A.
No Properly Verified and Filed Criminal Complaint
and Information Invalidates the Indictment.

Baker is being made to answer for an infamous crime of which no one has properly accused him of committing. Therefore, the State of Texas is unlawfully and illegally restricting him at his liberty and seeking to prosecute him without authority or jurisdiction.

Baker was charged by indictment only, succeeded solely by a warrant of arrest issued from the Office of the District Court Clerk. However, there is no proper statement of probable cause or verified Complaint in the court record to support the issuance of any warrant or to provide a prosecutor with the necessary authority to create and file the required Information with any court having jurisdiction, much less with a grand jury, and which Information is also missing from the court record. “[i]t is fundamental that the name of the complaining witness is a necessary requisite to a valid indictment or information.EX PARTE BOB LEWIS, 1976.TX.41549; 544 S.W.2d 430, (12/22/76) (emphasis added). Absent a valid Complaint there is no complaining witness against Baker for the purpose of filing an information or seeking an indictment.

The prosecution has stated that the Affidavit for Warrantless Arrest made by Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) Highway Patrol Division Trooper Russell Weatherby (“Trooper Weatherby”) before Justice of the Peace for Precincts 1 & 2, Corina Arredondo (“J.P. Arredondo”) serves as the Complaint in this matter. However, Baker believes that instrument has a severe legal deficiency of form and substance that invalidates it both as a proper probable cause statement for a warrant and as a proper Complaint. The statement of probable cause for the warrant does not list a single substantive fact setting forth any of the required elements in support of the charge being made against Baker. It lists only the statute that was allegedly violated and nothing more, which means the warrant is basically blank and devoid of any factual assertions whatsoever supporting probable cause as well as in the specifics and manner in which it fails to “[s]tate the time and place of the commission of the offense, as definitely as can be done by the affiant” (emphasis added). There are no specific details as to the time and place of the alleged offense stated within the affidavit for warrantless arrest, which is what D.A. Hernandez states is being used as the required Complaint. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 21.03 requires that “As a general rule, any element that must be proved should be stated in an indictment. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.03 (Vernon 1989); Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 338 (Tex Crim.App.1995); Ex parte Elliott, 746 S.W.2d 762, 764 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). This rule applies to an information. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.23 (Vernon 1989).”7 There are also no such details in the Information required to be filed by the prosecuting attorney for the state, because D.A. Hernandez has never filed an Information in this case neither prior to nor after having unlawfully and illegally obtained this secret Indictment from the grand jury in violation of Art. 16.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Baker’s due process right to an examining trial.

The affidavit of warrantless arrest filed by Trooper Weatherby is factually deficient and incapable of providing any probable cause for a warrantless arrest, and it should never have been signed and approved by a magistrate as a valid Affidavit for Warrantless Arrest, and brings into question the judicial competency of J.P. Arredondo for having signed it as it currently reads. And there should be no question that it fails to meet the statutory and due process requisites of a valid complaint in that it alleges no specific facts relating to the alleged offense.

It is neither possible nor plausible that D.A. Hernandez is not aware of these highly obvious legal deficiencies in the Affidavit/Complaint, therefore, the only logical conclusion is that he simply doesn’t care. Perhaps it is because he is so focused on obtaining an indictment and conviction of Baker, in violation of his legal duty under Article 2.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure “[n]ot to convict, but to see that justice is done,” that he is willing to overlook such petty details in his pursuit of ‘justice.’ It may even be, proverbially, to simply get Baker “out of his hair” so as to put a stop to Baker’s efforts of exposing the rampant public corruption in Terrell County Texas. Corruption that couldn’t remain in existence if the sitting D.A. was doing his job, or, unless he was complicit in it.


7Green v. State, 951 SW 2d 3, Tx.Ct.Crim.App (1997).

It cannot be stressed enough that the current cause raises significant questions about how the grand jury came to indict Baker. If the cause was initiated by the grand jury, then what person thereon had personal knowledge that Baker allegedly committed some crime, and by what method does that person avoid the civic duty of filing a proper Complaint before someone authorized to take and verify such a Complaint?

If the grand jury did not come by this knowledge on its own via one of its members, but, rather, by way of the prosecuting attorney, then the prosecutor must be viewed as the actual accuser in the matter. Especially considering that D.A. Hernandez once again failed to properly perform his known legal duty under the law before seeking an indictment (an act that is itself a direct criminal violation of Texas law), which was to prepare a proper information based upon a properly verified and formatted substantive complaint, attach said complaint to the information, and submit both to some proper magistrate in accordance with Article 2.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

However, if such is the case, it creates an untenable conflict with the ends of justice and the rights of Baker. In Peter B. Peterson v. STATE TEXAS (12/20/89), 1989, TX.41854; 781 S.W.2d 933, the court held that a prosecutor cannot be the sole initiator of a criminal prosecution, especially one where s/he would be the prosecutor in the matter, when the court stated:

“An information is a “primary pleading in a criminal action on the part of the State,” Article 27.01, V.A.C.C.P., a written pleading in behalf of the State drawn, filed and presented by a prosecuting attorney charging an accused with an offense that may be prosecuted under the law. Article 21.20, V.A.C.C.P. in order to “protect its citizens from the inherent dangers arising from the concentration of power in any one individual,Kennedy v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 303, 276 S.W.2d 291 (1955) (Opinion on Motion for Rehearing, at 664), the Legislature precluded a prosecutor from presenting an information “until affidavit has been made by some credible person charging the defendant with an offense,” and also mandated, “The affidavit shall be filed with the information.Article 21.22, supra. Such an affidavit is, of course, a complaint within the meaning of Article 15.04, V.A.C.C.P. “In other words, a prosecuting attorney is not authorized to institute prosecutions in the county court upon his independent act or of his own volition.” Kennedy v. State, supra, at 294. One may not be “both the accuser and the prosecutor is misdemeanor cases.” Wells v. State, 516 S.W.2d 663, at 664 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974). Compare Glass v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 598, 288 S.W.2d 522 (1956); Catchings v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 342, 285 S.W.2d 233, at 234 (1955).

If the Indictment alone is to be considered the charging instrument, then where is the jurat required for verification? As none appears on the face of the instrument, the Indictment can only be presumed to serve as a mere presentment by the grand jury consequent to having either been provided with, or having themselves submitted to the prosecuting attorney for the state, a properly filed Complaint. So, whose affirmation is verified on the face of the Indictment?

In State of Texas v. Carroll Pierce the court held:

A valid complaint is a prerequisite to a valid information. Holland v. State, 623 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Tex. Cr. App. 1981). Without a valid complaint, the information is worthless. Williams v. State, 133 Tex. Crim. 39, 107 S.W.2d 996, 977 (Tex. Cr. App. 1937). A jurat is the certificate of the officer before whom the complaint is made stating that it was sworn to and subscribed by the Applicant before the officer. Carpenter v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 99, 218 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tex. Cr. App. 1949). A jurat is essential, for without it, the complaint is fatally defective and will not support an information. Shackelford v. State, 516 S.W.2d 180, (Tex. Cr. App. 1970). The jurat must be dated and signed by the official character. See 22 Tex. Jur. 3d, Criminal Law, Section 2266 at 490. Thus, a complaint not sworn to before any official or person in authority is insufficient to constitute a basis for a valid conviction. Nichols v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 42, 344 S.W.2d 694, (Tex. Cr. App. 1961) (citing Purcell v. State; 317 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Cr. App. 1958)); see also Eldridge v. State, 572 S.W.2d 716, 717, n.1 (Tex. Cr. App. 1978); Wheeler v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 21, 353 S.W.2d 463, (Tex. Cr. App. 1961); Morey v. State, 744 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App. 1988, no pet.). Even where the jurat on the complaint reflects that it was sworn to before a named person but does not show the authority of such person to act, the complaint is void. Johnson v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 257, 226 S.W.2d 644, (Tex. Cr. App. 1950); Smola v. State, 736 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Tex. App. 1987, no pet.). The complaint is also void when the jurat contains no signature but only shows the office such as “County Attorney of Jones County, Texas.” Carter v. State, 398 S.W.2d 290, (Tex. Cr. App. 1966). When a jurat showed that the complaint had been sworn to before “Lavern I. McCann, Hockley County, Texas,” the complaint was insufficient to support the information. Carpenter v. State, 218 S.W.2d at 208-09. In the early case of Neiman v. State, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 360, 16 S.W. 253 (Tex. Ct. App. 1891), the complaint was sworn to before “Wm. Greer J.P.” It was held that the letters “J.P.” could not be inferred to mean Justice of the Peace and an official who had the authority to administer the oath.” (Emphasis added).

When a jurat on a complaint shows that the oath was administered to the Applicant by a party designated as county attorney but who in reality is an assistant county attorney, the complaint is void. Thomas v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 369, 334 S.W.2d 291, 292 (Tex. Cr. App. 1960); see also Aleman v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 265, 284 S.W.2d 719, (Tex. Cr. App. 1956); Stalculp v. State, 99 Tex. Crim. 279, 269 S.W. 1044, 1045 (Tex. Cr. App. 1925). When the assistant or deputy is authorized by law to administer the oath himself, he may not administer it in the name of his principal and may not certify that the principal administered the oath by and through him as an assistant. Goodman v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 279, 212 S.W. 171 (Tex. Cr. App. 1919).” State of Texas v. Carroll Pierce (09/25/91), 1991.TX.41404; 816 S.W.2d 824. (Emphasis added).

If the instrument was prepared and presented to the grand jury by the prosecutor, who then is the actual accuser in the matter, and by what authority did the prosecutor initiate a prosecution solely by presentment of an already prepared Indictment or simply an oral presentation to the grand jury?

To avoid situations where the State stands as both accuser and prosecutor, procedures were put in place directing the grand jury as to how it would proceed through the course of an indictment. In the current cause, these procedures have been abridged in such a fashion so as to deny Baker in his fundamental due process rights, specifically, his right to know and face his accuser, right to an examining trial, and the right to challenge the array of grand jury members prior to their impanelment.

III-B
Retaliatory and Incorrect Charge.

Baker has previously objected to the Indictment due to it being facially invalid in that it alleges specific facts relative to the elements of the alleged offense that are patently incorrect and untrue. However, Baker was misinformed by not only his own attorney, but also by 83rd District Judge Robert Cadena (“Judge Cadena”) and 63rd District Court Judge Enrique Fernandez (“Judge Fernandez”), and local District Attorney Frederico Hernandez (“D.A./ D.A. Hernandez”) (who is also the initiator8 of this criminal allegation and the prosecutor in this matter), that the facts alleged in the Indictment don’t have to be exactly accurate in order to be valid. Baker believes this to be not only intentional misinformation as to the requisite accuracy and validity of the Indictment, but a knowing willful and wrongful effort to undermine his right of due process and “custom tailoring” of the facts that the prosecution must prove at trial. Baker remains steadfast in his objection that the Indictment alleges specific facts that the prosecution is fully aware are untrue and are exculpatory on their face.

On or about April 2, 2015, the contents of the court record were examined. At which time County/ Court Clerk Martha Allen faxed D.A. Hernandez an answer to a communication with the subject “Re: Request for Examining Trial” and stating what was currently filed in the court record.  At that time, five (5) items were in the court record; 1) Order appointing counsel, 2) Notice of withdrawal of appointed counsel, 3) Demand for an examining trial, 4) Demand to produce, 5) PR bond.


8As no criminal complaint appears to have ever been filed before D.A. Hernandez in this matter, coupled with his failure to properly prepare and present an information to the proper court or to the grand jury as required by the provisions of Article 2.03 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prior to his seeking and obtaining an indictment, it must be presumed that he alone is the person making a criminal allegation to the grand jury.

 

On April 13, 2015, Judge Cadena personally signed the order to reassemble the grand jury on May 12, 2015, at 9:00am, the same day as Baker’s previously scheduled examining trial, which was also scheduled for May 12, 2015, at 10:30am, and for which the order was originally signed on April 9, 2015, again, by Judge Cadena himself. Which proves that Judge Cadena was completely aware that Baker’s right to an examining trial was being violated by D.A. Hernandez in total disregard for the laws of Texas, and that Judge Cadena was acting in concert and collusion to aid and abet same. Making it no surprise that the only case heard by the grand jury on May 12, 2015, was Baker’s.

Furthermore, this provides enormously strong prima facie evidence that there was at least some degree of ex parte communication occurring between Judge Cadena and D.A. Hernandez’s office in relation to Baker’s case.

Baker further asserts that a charge under Penal Code Section 38.04 is unlawful and invalid in light of Section 545.421, Texas “Transportation” Code (“ “Transportation” Code ”) as being the more relevant and controlling statute,9 Section 38.04(d), Texas Penal Code, notwithstanding, as all events that led up to the existing allegation against Baker are a direct result of a knowingly willful and wrongful application of the “Transportation” Code to Baker and his private conveyance by the arresting officer in this matter, Trooper Weatherby.

As there is no actual indication that the Texas Legislature intended to supersede or repeal Section 545.421, “Transportation” Code by the later amendment of Section 38.04 of the Texas Penal Code to include Subsection (d), Baker should have been charged with a Class B misdemeanor under Section 545.421 of the “Transportation” Code and not a felony of the 3rd Degree under Section 38.04 of the Penal Code, provided any actual grounds exist for any charges against Baker at all. The provisions of Section 545.421, “Transportation” Code, is not a lesser included offense within Section 38.04, Penal Code,10 it is completely separate from, and almost identical in form and substance to, Section 38.04, Penal Code. However, Section 545.421 charges a substantially lesser penalty for what is a virtually identical offense.


9Section 311.026(b), Texas Government Code, “If the conflict between the general provision and the special or local provision is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later enactment and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.” (Emphasis added).

10Farrakhan v. State, No. PD-1984-06 Tx.Ct.Crim.App (Mar 12, 2008).

Sec. 545.421. FLEEING OR ATTEMPTING TO ELUDE POLICE OFFICER; OFFENSE.

(a) A person commits an offense if the person operates a motor vehicle and wilfully fails or refuses to bring the vehicle to a stop or flees, or attempts to elude, a pursuing police vehicle when given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop.

(b) A signal under this section that is given by a police officer pursuing a vehicle may be by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren. The officer giving the signal must be in uniform and prominently display the officer’s badge of office. The officer’s vehicle must bear the insignia of a law enforcement agency, regardless of whether the vehicle displays an emergency light.

(c) Except as provided by Subsection (d), an offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor.

(d) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor if the person, during the commission of the offense, recklessly engages in conduct that places another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.

(e) A person is presumed to have recklessly engaged in conduct placing another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury under Subsection (d) if the person while intoxicated knowingly operated a motor vehicle during the commission of the offense. In this subsection, “intoxicated” has the meaning assigned by Section 49.01, Penal Code.

(Emphasis added).

The “Transportation” Code version of the offense specifically stipulates “wilfully fails or refuses to bring the vehicle to a stop” within its provisions, a specific act and character of circumstance that is completely omitted from Section 38.04, Penal Code. These specific elements more closely reflect Baker’s self-protective actions with his private conveyance and the proper context of the March 23, 2015, incident with Trooper Weatherby than any of the provisions of Section 38.04, Penal Code.

Furthermore, as it was an alleged “transportation” offense that Trooper Weatherby was using as his alleged authority to perpetrate the crimes of unlawful restraint, false imprisonment, and official misconduct against Baker, without either reasonable suspicion or probable cause, then, it should be axiomatic that the “Transportation” Code specific offense is the only one that State could lawfully and legally apply to any legal “person” who allegedly “wilfully fails or refuses to bring the vehicle to a stop.”

It is also not constitutionally viable that the provisions of Section 38.04(d) would apply as an alternative method of prosecution in this matter, as that would mean that Baker, and others similarly situated, could potentially be charged twice using different levels of charges for virtually the same offense stemming from the same series of events, thus potentially creating a double jeopardy issue.

Furthermore, the very existence of Section 38.04(d), Penal Code, in simultaneous concert with the existence of Section 545.421, “Transportation” Code, creates a serious public notice and due process issue in that anyone charged with “eluding” would have no way of knowing which statue the State could or would try to apply and use to charge them, despite the appearance of a specific category of legal application based upon the subject matter context of the particular code under which the initial law enforcement contact arose, i.e. some Penal Code offense versus some “Transportation” Code offense.

This issue is then further compounded by what certainly appears to be an equal protection and application of the laws issue, where one person can be charged and convicted of a felony while another is charged and convicted of a misdemeanor for what factually and circumstantially amounts to virtually the exact same offense, but having very different levels of punishment.

As such, Baker, and anyone else similarly situated, are not being given sufficient notice of the actual charge being made against them so that s/he can prepare to defend against those allegations, and is being placed in the very real danger of being twice held in jeopardy for the same offense. Swabado v. State, 597 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Amaya v. State, 551 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); U.S. Const amend. X, VI, and XIV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10, § 15 and § 19.

This potentially makes either Section 38.04(d) of the Texas Penal Code, or Section 545.421, of the “Transportation” Code, unconstitutional on its face in light of the existence of the other.

In which case, the issue becomes even further compounded under the “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibitions of Article 1, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution, wherein it states “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.” (Emphasis added).

Baker wonders how is it not cruel and unusual punishment to charge a man with a felony of the 3rd Degree or a Class B misdemeanor, or any crime at all, for acting in what he feels is in the best interest of his personal safety and welfare by seeking a public place where other people may act as witnesses to any and all unlawful and illegal acts that may be perpetrated by those with a presumed authority to harass, injure and kill with virtual impunity simply because they are a government employee?

Therefore, under the circumstances as they exist, Baker believes that he can and should only be indicted and charged under Section 545.421, “Transportation” Code,11 if any valid charge and cause for indictment against Baker legally exists at all.


11Azeez v. State, 248 S.W.3d 182; 2008 Tex.Crim.App.

III-C
Indictment Contains Elements Proving Innocence of the Alleged Offense.

Baker’s understanding of the elements of the allegation for which he has been indicted leads him to believe that there is a required element of the charge itself that proves fatal to the indictment and the criminal allegation in its entirety, and is actually exculpatory in nature, and serves to exonerate Baker of the alleged offense.

The charge for which Baker was indicted under Section 38.04(b)(2)(A) requires the element of a “vehicle” as being the means of “evading.” However, in Section 38.04(c)(1), the term “vehicle,” as used to commit the act of “evading,” is declared by Sec. 38.04(c)(1) to have the same meaning as the term “vehicle” defined under Sec. 541.201 of the “Transportation” Code. Section 38.04(c)(1) reads:

[(c)] In this section:
      (1) "Vehicle" has the meaning assigned by Section 541.201, 
          Transportation Code.

Texas “Transportation” Code Section 541.201(23) defined “vehicle” as:

[(23)] "Vehicle" means a device that can be used to transport or draw
       persons or property on a highway. The term does not include:
       (A) a device exclusively used on stationary rails or tracks; or
       (B) manufactured housing as that term is defined by Chapter 1201, 
           Occupations Code.

Considering the actual subject matter of the “Transportation” Code, and the definition of “vehicle” in Section 541.201(23) of that code, then a “vehicle” must be a device that not only can perform the functions defined within that term, but must also be actively in use for the purpose of “transportation.” And even if the state’s argument is that the term “vehicle” is to be given a general rather than specific meaning so as to make it applicable to any one or more of the specific types of devices listed within the entirety of Section 541.201 rather than only that of “vehicle” under Subitem (23) of that section, that does not change the subject matter context of the definition itself to apply to anything other than those devices being used to engage in “transportation.” Any device listed within Sec. 541.201 is legally a “vehicle” only when “transportation” itself is the business related activity for which it is being used by a “carrier,” “operator,” or “driver.”

This is a clear indication that the only manner of “vehicle” that can support the element of the alleged offense is one that has the same meaning, and therefore, the same legal subject matter purpose and use, as that found for the term “vehicle” in the “Transportation” Code. Thus, a device is only a “commercial/ motor/ vehicle” when it is being used for “transportation” by a “carrier,” “operator,” or “driver.” Which means that it should be perfectly clear that it is not the design or method of propulsion built into a device that makes it a “commercial/ motor/ vehicle” or that serves to make its use upon the public right-of-way an act of “transportation,” but rather, it is the existence of “transportation” that determines whether or not a device is legally a “commercial/ motor/ vehicle.” And this same standard holds true for “carrier,” “operator,” “driver,” or any other legally defined capacities or objects found within the “Transportation” Code. See Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013).

Therefore, the only type of “vehicle” that is statutorily acceptable in proving that element is one that the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt was being used for the purpose of “transportation” at the time of the commission of the alleged offense of “evading with a vehicle.” This means that the term “vehicle” does not simply mean anything with wheels or that moves under anything other than human power provided either with or without an engine, including, but not limited to, Baker’s private conveyance.

As Baker was never engaged in “transportation” as a “carrier,” “operator,” or “driver,” and there exists no substantive evidence that would prove otherwise, and Baker was not using his private conveyance as a “commercial/ motor/ vehicle” to engage in “transportation,” it cannot be lawfully or legally inferred that his private conveyance meets the statutory requirements and meaning of the term “vehicle,” thus, it fails to substantiate the charge against Baker. In fact, it completely disproves the element, thus legally negating the charge against Baker.

 

III-D
Violation of Baker’s Right to an Examining Trial
and to Challenge Grand Jury Array.

Baker was deprived of his due process rights when D.A. Hernandez sought a secret grand jury indictment prior to Baker receiving an examining trial, specifically, his right to know and face his accuser, to have an examining trial, and to challenge the array of grand jury members prior to impanelment.

The Texas Constitution – Article 1 – BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 10 – RIGHTS OF ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury. He shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof. He shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, and shall have the right of being heard by himself or counsel, or both, shall be confronted by the witnesses against him and shall have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, except that when the witness resides out of the State and the offense charged is a violation of any of the anti-trust laws of this State, the defendant and the State shall have the right to produce and have the evidence admitted by deposition, under such rules and laws as the Legislature may hereafter provide; and no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on an indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is by fine or imprisonment, otherwise than in the penitentiary, in cases of impeachment, and in cases arising in the army or navy, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger. (Amended Nov. 5, 1918.) (Emphasis added).

Baker never had any opportunity to head off this whole prosecutorial process through the presentation of exculpatory evidence at a proper examining trial or to challenge the validity of any alleged evidence in the state’s possession.  An examining trial is defined within Article 2.11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure as follows:

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure by Article 2.11. [35] [62] [63] EXAMINING COURT.
When the magistrate sits for the purpose of inquiring into a criminal accusation against any person, this is called an examining court. (Emphasis added).

Baker has been indicted, bound to the court for trial, and yet, no one has made any valid Complaint against him. No credible person has presented any proper Complaint to any magistrate, and no court clerk has ever received any proper Complaint against Baker from the magistrate of an examining court. Neither has any clerk been affected with the legal duty to keep safe said Complaint and other documents resulting from an examining trial and then deliver them up to the next grand jury.

Baker has the right to ask “Who is Baker’s accuser?” And, at this point, D.A. Hernandez seems to think that it is the grand jury rather than himself, as he appears to hold the opinion that the grand jury could somehow act first as Baker’s accuser, and then, act as the presenter of an indictment, and may do both absent a properly formed and verified Complaint and the requisite accompanying Information that D.A. Hernandez is required by law to prepare, sign, and submit in his official capacity with said Complaint attached pursuant Article 21.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. D.A. Hernandez also appears to believe that the grand jury serves as the legal plaything of any governmental prosecutor such as himself, and can be compelled to act solely at his/her behest to “True Bill” an indictment. Apparently, Texas prosecutors now seem to have reached the erroneous conclusion that the need for a valid Complaint and Information prior to indictment and prosecution has somehow and at some point been discredited.

Furthermore, Baker was never afforded the opportunity to challenge the grand jury array prior to their impanelment, because the prosecutor for the state and the judge of the 83rd District Court conspired and colluded to get a grand jury indictment in secret and in direct willful and wrongful violation of Texas law and Baker’s right to make that challenge. In point of fact, Baker was denied access to any and all information as to the composition of the grand jury members until more than a year after the indictment was handed down, and has only recently managed to get the list of names so as to see who was part of the array that indicted him.

In this instance, Baker’s deprivation of the right to challenge the grand jury array resulted in an indictment by a grand jury whose foreman, and at least one other member as currently known, has a previous personal and official confrontational and disagreeable history with Baker. The grand jury foreman, Timothy Scott Mitchell (“T.S. Mitchell”), is Chairman of the appointed five-member board designated as the “Terrell County Underground Water Conservation District,” and was one of the main members responsible for numerous attempts to unlawfully and illegally convert or outright steal the private water rights of the People living there, to which Baker and many others very publicly objected and protested during confrontations at public meetings and personal discussions on the subject.

There is also the issue of many of the people of Terrell County, including, but not limited to Baker, that have also protested the numerous insider contracts and backroom deals to which several “important” persons of wealth and political power residing in or around Terrell County are party. And these potentially unlawful and illegal activities, at least some of which, if not actually all, are known to and ignored by local public officials, including District Judges Fernandez and Cadena, D.A. Hernandez, the Sheriff, and several others.

Another member of the grand jury, Terry Black, is the spouse of USBP Agent ‘Billy’ Black (“Agent Black”), who was the #2 USBP Agent-in-Charge in Terrell County when Baker reported several other USBP agents that were harassing him by repeatedly racing their USBP vehicles back and forth along Baker’s property and fence line for no apparent legitimate purpose, but rather to incite his dogs into a frenzy and panic his livestock. A friend of Baker’s, John Hagan (“Hagan”), reported this behavior to Agent Black while Baker listened in on the three-way conversation, a fact of which Agent Black was unaware when he repeatedly denied that his subordinates were terrorizing Baker’s animals. However, within minutes of Hagan informing Agent Black that Baker was listening at the same time he was watching Agent’s Black’s subordinates outside of his property, Agent Black’s subordinates suddenly ceased their actions and vacated the area.

Baker believes that it was his and other reports from the People of Terrell County alleging that Agent Black and his superior, USBP Agent-in-Charge Earnest Rodriquez (“AiC Rodriquez”), were “turning a blind eye” to this and even more egregious unlawful and illegal behavior by their subordinates, such as the destruction of private property, destruction of livestock fences, and criminal trespass. And Baker has good cause to believe that it was these actions and reports of supervisory and subordinate misconduct that eventually resulted in Agent Black’s reassignment.

Later, USBP Agent-in-Charge Thaddeus Cleveland (“AiC Cleveland”) was also involved in a previous attempt by USBP Agent Collier (“Agent Collier”) to perform an illegal “transportation” stop on Baker at a point upon the public right-of-way that is well beyond the vicinity of the Texas border or any border checkpoint, neither of which Baker had been anywhere near. At the time that Agent Collier engaged in the illegal attempt to seize Baker at his liberty without warrant or lawful authority, Baker had called 911 and advised them of the situation, and, instead of pulling over for the illegal stop, traveled to the Sheriff’s office before stopping. It was at that time that AiC Cleveland arrived on-scene and demanded that Baker get out of his van and go into the sheriff’s office, and Baker declined to do so. As they had no lawful authority to make a “transportation” stop on a Texas public right-of-way, both AiC Cleveland, Agent Collier, and approximately twelve other Agents, eventually left, but not without suffering the embarrassment of being told by one of the Sheriff’s deputies that they were acting unlawfully and criminally by what they had done in pursuing Baker with no probable cause and no legal authority.

Furthermore, Agent Black was one of the federal officers that blocked the public right-of-way in order to prevent Baker from reaching a publicly populated area of more relative safety on March 23, 2015, while pointing a loaded weapon at him. Which further leads Baker to believe that Black’s spouse, grand jury member Terry Black, might “have an axe to grind” with him.

Article 19.31(a), items 5 and 6 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure allows a challenge to a grand jury member as follows:

Art. 19.31. CHALLENGE TO JUROR.

(a) A challenge to a particular grand juror may be made orally for any of the following causes:

[5.] That the juror has a bias or prejudice in favor of or against the person accused or suspected of committing an offense that the grand jury is investigating;

6. That from hearsay, or otherwise, there is established in the mind of the juror such a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the person accused or suspected of committing an offense that the grand jury is investigating as would influence the juror’s vote on the presentment of an indictment;

(Emphasis added).

As detailed above, Baker had ample valid legal grounds to disqualify at least two of the grand jury members prior to impanelment, and potentially more. However, Baker could have most likely had the entire jury array disqualified under Article 19.31(a) item 6 due to D.A. Hernandez’s illegal use of hearsay witness testimony to obtain the Indictment, as set forth in specific detail in section III-E of this document.

Article 20.19 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure instructs the grand jury as follows:

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20.19. [391] [442-443] Grand jury shall vote.
After all the testimony
which is accessible to the grand jury shall have been given in respect to any criminal accusation, the vote shall be taken as to the presentment of an indictment, and if nine members concur in finding the bill, the foreman shall make a memorandum of the same with such data as will enable the attorney who represents the State to write the indictment. (Emphasis added).

How can ‘all the testimony’ be ‘accessible to the grand jury’ if the individual being accused is never given a chance to appear and make a rebuttal to the alleged facts being presented against him or her, or introduce mitigating or potentially exculpatory evidence against the allegation(s)?

These rights are essential to individual due process, and are precisely why the legislature very clearly intended that a prosecuting attorney not have the power to seek an indictment in secret. In the instant case, the prosecuting attorney somehow made a presentment to a grand jury without ever having a proper complaint or creating the requisite information. A prosecutor can bring a crime to the knowledge to the grand jury only when a complaint has already been made to a prosecuting attorney by someone other than themselves. Article 21.20, V.A.C.C.P. in order to “protect its citizens from the inherent dangers arising from the concentration of power in any one individual,” Kennedy v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 303, 276 S.W.2d 291 (1955) (Opinion on Motion for Rehearing, at 664), the Legislature precluded a prosecutor from presenting an information “until affidavit has been made by some credible person charging the defendant with an offense,” and also mandated, “The affidavit shall be filed with the information.”

While Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 2.04 and 2.05 authorize the prosecuting attorney to take complaints and issue oaths, nothing in law directs a complaint to a grand jury. All criminal complaints are directed to some magistrate. When a complaint is made before a prosecuting attorney, s/he can take the complaint but, s/he must file the complaint with a magistrate of the county as follows:

Art. 2.05. WHEN COMPLAINT IS MADE.
If the offense be a misdemeanor, the attorney shall forthwith prepare an information based upon such complaint and file the same in the court having jurisdiction; provided, that in counties having no county attorney, misdemeanor cases may be tried upon complaint alone, without an information, provided, however, in counties having one or more criminal district courts an information must be filed in each misdemeanor case. If the offense be a felony, he shall forthwith file the complaint with a magistrate of the county. (Emphasis added).

If a peace officer has knowledge that a crime has been committed, said officer’s course of action is directed by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 2.13, which reads as follows:

Art. 2.13. DUTIES AND POWERS.

(a) It is the duty of every peace officer to preserve the peace within the officer’s jurisdiction. To effect this purpose, the officer shall use all lawful means.

(b) The officer shall:

(1) in every case authorized by the provisions of this Code, interfere without warrant to prevent or suppress crime;

(2) execute all lawful process issued to the officer by any magistrate or court;

(3) give notice to some magistrate of all offenses committed within the officer’s jurisdiction, where the officer has good reason to believe there has been a violation of the penal law; and

(4) arrest offenders without warrant in every case where the officer is authorized by law, in order that they may be taken before the proper magistrate or court and be tried.

(c) It is the duty of every officer to take possession of a child under Article 63.009(g).

(Emphasis added).

When a magistrate is made aware that a crime has been committed, s/he is required to hold an examining court in accordance with his/her duty under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 2.10 and 2.11, which read as follows:

Art. 2.10. DUTY OF MAGISTRATES.

It is the duty of every magistrate to preserve the peace within his jurisdiction by the use of all lawful means; to issue all process intended to aid in preventing and suppressing crime; to cause the arrest of offenders by the use of lawful means in order that they may be brought to punishment.
Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.

Art. 2.11. EXAMINING COURT.

When the magistrate sits for the purpose of inquiring into a criminal accusation against any person, this is called an examining court.
Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.

(Emphasis added).

Once an examining trial has been held under Chapter 16 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and an order has been prepared showing that a determination of probable cause has been made by order pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 16.17, the complaint that initiated the examining trial, the statement of the accused (if any), and all other documents are to be sealed up and sent to the clerk of the court having jurisdiction of the offense in accordance with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.30, which reads as follows:

Art. 17.30. SHALL CERTIFY PROCEEDINGS.The magistrate, before whom an examination has taken place upon a criminal accusation, shall certify to all the proceedings had before him, as well as where he discharges, holds to bail or commits, and transmit them, sealed up, to the court before which the defendant may be tried, writing his name across the seals of the envelope. The voluntary statement of the defendant, the testimony, bail bonds, and every other proceeding in the case, shall be thus delivered to the clerk of the proper court, without delay. (Emphasis added).

The court will take notice that the statutes say nothing about a prosecuting attorney until the stage described in Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.31. The clerks who are authorized to receive these documents are directed by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 17.31 as follows:

Art. 17.31. DUTY OF CLERKS WHO RECEIVE SUCH PROCEEDINGS.
If the proceedings be delivered to a district clerk, he shall keep them safely and deliver the same to the next grand jury. If the proceedings are delivered to a county clerk, he shall without delay deliver them to the district or county attorney of his county. (Emphasis added).

By the above, in every case where a criminal complaint has been made, the complaint is originally directed to some magistrate, who is to hold an examining trial and forward the documents had in the hearing to the proper court.

There are two circumstances where this procedure could potentially be intentionally misinterpreted and bypassed, and they are contained in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20.09, which reads as follows:

Art. 20.09. DUTIES OF GRAND JURY.
The grand jury shall inquire into all offenses liable to indictment of which any member may have knowledge, or of which they shall be informed by the attorney representing the State, or any other credible person. (Emphasis added).

Because of the ambiguity of its language, Article 20.09 potentially could lead to an indictment without a criminal complaint ever having been filed. Were a grand jury to bring an indictment based on the personal knowledge of a grand juror or “some credible person,” it is conceivable that there would be no criminal complaint of record, as the grand jury members might not be aware of and understand the legal importance and necessity of a proper Complaint, making it the legal duty of the prosecuting attorney for the state to inform them of that requirement prior to an indictment. In such a case, however, the indictment could not be recorded in the minutes of the grand jury as contemplated by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20.22(b) which reads as follows:

Art. 20.22. PRESENTMENT ENTERED OF RECORD.
[(b)] If the defendant is not in custody or under bond at the time of the presentment of indictment, the indictment may not be made public and the entry in the record of the court relating to the indictment must be delayed until the capias is served and the defendant is placed in custody or under bond. (Emphasis added).

In order for a magistrate to issue a warrant of arrest and subsequently place an accused individual into custody or on bond as directed by Article 20.22 supra, there must already be a proper Complaint filed with that magistrate upon which to base the warrant as well as for the subsequent commitment order or to release him or her on bond. However, there is no Complaint in this case, just as there is no Information based upon said Complaint in the record.

Furthermore, the provisions of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 19.27 serves to prevent a prosecutor from stacking a grand jury against an accused by granting any person the right to challenge the grand jury array prior to the jury being impaneled, or, if the grand jury is already impaneled, to challenge the array in a Motion to Quash Indictment (see Muniz v. State, 672 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex.Crim.App 1984)):

Art. 19.27. ANY PERSON MAY CHALLENGE.
Before the grand jury has been impaneled, any person may challenge the array of jurors or any person presented as a grand juror. In no other way shall objections to the qualifications and legality of the grand jury be heard. Any person confined in jail in the county shall upon his request be brought into court to make such challenge. (Emphasis added).

Article 19.27 is extremely specific about the fact that the composition of the grand jury cannot be challenged for either qualifications or legality after it has been impaneled. Which makes those opinions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals as discussed herein even more outrageous and egregious, as these opinions state that the right to an examining trial and to challenge the pre-impanelment composition of the grand jury is automatically denied to the accused if the prosecuting attorney for the state can manage to convince a district judge to secretly impanel a grand jury whereby the prosecutor may convince them to issue an indictment, and, thus, simultaneously deny the accused in both the right to an examining trial and to challenge the composition of the grand jury array before it can be impaneled. Especially when, as is the case here, no proper allegation of criminal activity by means of a verified Complaint and Information has ever been filed in the matter.

This is compounded by the fact that the language of Article 19.27 would appear to negate the ability to challenge the jury array and any subsequent indictment by means of a Habeas writ or a motion to quash the indictment, as at least some grounds for doing so will almost certainly pertain to the qualifications or legality of certain members of the grand jury directly.

Therefore, any challenge to the indictment after the fact would, as a matter of law, have to be automatically denied by the courts if the motion made any argument whatsoever that the indictment was improper solely for reasons relating to the legality or qualifications of the grand jury members that made and presented it. Which would mean that the accused individual’s right to due process could be shoved aside by the prosecutor stacking the secret grand jury with persons that have a private bias or vendetta against the accused or that are in any other manner disqualified from sitting upon the grand jury. And there is no recourse written into the law for the accused to obtain remedy for this harm. Nor can Baker locate any statutory authority for the courts to simply provide such alternative remedy without first declaring that provision of Article 19.27 unconstitutional as being a violation of due process.

To further prevent secret grand jury indictments, the Legislature enacted Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 16.01, creating a specific prohibition against the seeking of an indictment prior to giving proper, sufficient and timely notice to an accused individual that s/he may have need to avail him/herself of the other statutory right granted by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 19.27, supra:

Art. 16.01. EXAMINING TRIAL.
When the accused has been brought before a magistrate for an examining trial that officer shall proceed to examine into the truth of the accusation made, allowing the accused, however, sufficient time to procure counsel. In a proper case, the magistrate may appoint counsel to represent an accused in such examining trial only, to be compensated as otherwise provided in this Code. The accused in any felony case shall have the right to an examining trial before indictment in the county having jurisdiction of the offense, whether he be in custody or on bail, at which time the magistrate at the hearing shall determine the amount or sufficiency of bail, if a bailable case. If the accused has been transferred for criminal prosecution after a hearing under Section 54.02, Family Code, the accused may be granted an examining trial at the discretion of the court. (Emphasis added).

In the 1967 case of Trussell v. State, 414 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.Crim.App 1967), without citing a single point of authority or any explanation for doing so, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rendered null and void the statutory right of an accused to an examining trial by nothing less than unlawful judicial fiat and legislating from the bench. The court effectually ruled that a prosecutor may do that which s/he is specifically forbidden by statute to do, and may secretly present to a grand jury the name of a person who has not been afforded the statutorily granted right to an examining trial or to receive proper, sufficient and timely notice of a potential indictment so as to exercise his/her right to challenge both the charging instrument and the composition of the grand jury array prior to the jury being impaneled, or, at the very least, to know the composition of the grand jury if they have already been impaneled so as to make a proper challenge to the array by means of a writ of habeas corpus and to the charging instrument by a motion to quash or set aside. An effort which Article 19.27 of the Code of Criminal Procedure appears to make null and void from inception.

Apparently, the justices comprising the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals at the time decided that they could rely upon United States Supreme Court rulings setting the minimum standards and requirements for federal examining trials, as the means to somehow nullify Texas law and the greater level of protections that the Texas Legislature had directly afforded the People in relation to such proceedings within the state.

Our Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has gone on to hold in the following cases that an examining trial is only available to the accused if the accused requests it, yet, no such language or inference exists in the statute. And it must be recognized that Baker did demand an examining trial, in writing, before any other actions were taken by anyone, including the seeking and obtaining of the secret Indictment. The Court has also held that only those charged with a felony have the right to an examining trial, but this simply cannot be true when examined under the microscope of substantive and procedural due process, as most misdemeanor cases are preceded by a warrantless arrest, which requires a probable cause determination all its own prior and in addition to the probable cause determination relating to the alleged offense(s) in a criminal matter. The rule-of-thumb being that, if the initial warrantless detention or seizure was itself unlawful, then, any evidence or statements discovered thereafter must be considered as “fruit of the poison tree,” and would then be inadmissible for the purpose of any subsequently related criminal allegation(s). Without an examining trial, just where, when, and how does someone accused of a misdemeanor ever receive the opportunity to challenge the facts and evidence against them for the purpose of preserving any appealable error on the record relating to the probable cause determination, or, potentially ending a criminal prosecution before it can ever begin?

Furthermore, as the examining trial is the only opportunity provided for in the criminal process whereby a determination of probable cause can be made by a neutral and detached magistrate, who is also the only person authorized by law to sign an order relating to a finding of probable cause, or for the purpose of signing an order of commitment to jail upon such finding, pursuant Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 16.17 and 16.20 respectively, and as probable cause is a fundamental foundational pillar of both subject matter and in personam jurisdiction, a finding of probable cause at an examining trial can be nothing less than mandatory in order for any court to have the required jurisdiction to proceed in the matter and to protect the due process rights of the accused.

Therefore, as a matter of law, jurisdiction, and due process, it cannot be made the responsibility of the accused to request an examining trial, or that the courts can declare the right to such a trial shall be presumed waived by the accused if no such request is made, but, rather, it is actually a mandatory requirement upon the courts under the laws of Texas to set a date and time for that proceeding to take place and to ensure that it does. The basis for such reasoning is that an examining trial is the only proceeding set forth in Texas law for making a determination of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate relating to both a warrantless arrest and the validity of the allegations against the accused, and, therefore, it simply cannot be voluntarily waived by the accused, as probable cause goes to the two primary pillars supporting the State’s jurisdiction to sit in judgement of a matter, that of subject matter and in personam jurisdiction. The only reasonable and acceptable exception to this requirement would be a case where the accused voluntarily confessed to the crime(s) prior to the conducting of an examining trial, as that would satisfy both the probable cause and jurisdictional requirements without a judicial finding and order.

Further, there is no lawful authority or power vested in a grand jury, especially when being spoon-fed information of alleged criminal activity solely by the prosecuting attorney for the state, and without benefit of mitigating, contradictory, or presentation of exculpatory evidence by the accused or his/her counsel, to make any sort of probable cause determination. Indeed, it must be asked if it is even lawfully possible to qualify the members of a grand jury to make such a determination, as such determinations are lawfully and legally required to be made by a properly sworn neutral and detached judicial magistrate, although, considering the willful and wrongful violations of law being perpetrated by our Texas Courts in violation of the rights of the accused, it appears to be a moot point at this time.

What’s more, it should not even require an argument to undermine and deny any position that would argue that probable cause can be rightfully determined by the prosecuting attorney for the state any more than it would be to argue that they may initiate a criminal complaint of their own volition, regardless of the classification of the allegations involved and most especially when they are prosecuting the matter. ““In other words, a prosecuting attorney is not authorized to institute prosecutions in the county court upon his independent act or of his own volition. Kennedy v. State, supra, at 294. One may not be both the accuser and the prosecutor in misdemeanor cases.Wells v. State, 516 S.W.2d 663, at 664 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974). Compare Glass v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 598, 288 S.W.2d 522 (1956); Catchings v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 342, 285 S.W.2d 233, at 234 (1955). (Emphasis added, internal quotes omitted).

How then does an indictment serve as a lawfully and legally valid determination of probable cause in relation to the validity of both a warrantless arrest and any related allegation(s) of criminal activity that would serve as the means to validly and lawfully displace both the statutory requirement and due process need for a proper examining trial for any alleged criminal offense rather than just felonies alone? It contains no proper jurat requiring that it be signed under penalty of perjury as certifying the truth of the allegations made therein as a sworn criminal statement requires, and it does not require that the person signing it have any competent firsthand knowledge of the facts alleged. It is in every way legally possible insufficient as the basis for stating or making a probable cause determination or as the sole instrument of accusal.

The rulings in Trussell and later court opinions have had the undeniable effect of denying an accused individual in their right to an examining trial as specifically granted by statute, such right being nothing less than a requirement for both procedural and substantive due process rights to mean anything at all. These rulings further serve to chill or deny the accused in the due process right of preserving any appealable error that may be exposed relating to a finding of probable cause, impeachability of witness testimony, or the validity and admissibility of evidence. These rulings also destroy the individual’s right to challenge the grand jury array prior to impanelment. And the most egregious and detrimental effect of all, these rulings have unlawfully created judicial sanction and consent for both the lower courts and prosecutors statewide to engage in criminal violations of state law, specifically, Texas Penal Code Secs. 39.02 and 39.03, which reads as follows:

Sec. 39.02. ABUSE OF OFFICIAL CAPACITY.(a) A public servant commits an offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud another, he intentionally or knowingly:
(1) violates a law relating to the public servant’s office or employment; or
(2) misuses government property, services, personnel, or any other thing of value belonging to the government that has come into the public servant’s custody or possession by virtue of the public servant’s office or employment.
(b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(c) An offense under Subsection (a)(2) is:
(1) a Class C misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is less than $100;
(2) a Class B misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is $100 or more but less than $750;
(3) a Class A misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is $750 or more but less than $2,500;
(4) a state jail felony if the value of the use of the thing misused is $2,500 or more but less than $30,000;
(5) a felony of the third degree if the value of the use of the thing misused is $30,000 or more but less than $150,000;
(6) a felony of the second degree if the value of the use of the thing misused is $150,000 or more but less than $300,000; or
(7) a felony of the first degree if the value of the use of the thing misused is $300,000 or more.
(d) A discount or award given for travel, such as frequent flyer miles, rental car or hotel discounts, or food coupons, are not things of value belonging to the government for purposes of this section due to the administrative difficulty and cost involved in recapturing the discount or award for a governmental entity.
(e) If separate transactions that violate Subsection (a)(2) are conducted pursuant to one scheme or continuing course of conduct, the conduct may be considered as one offense and the value of the use of the things misused in the transactions may be aggregated in determining the classification of the offense.
(f) The value of the use of a thing of value misused under Subsection (a)(2) may not exceed:
(1) the fair market value of the thing at the time of the offense; or
(2) if the fair market value of the thing cannot be ascertained, the cost of replacing the thing within a reasonable time after the offense.

Sec. 39.03. OFFICIAL OPPRESSION.
(a) A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he:
(1) intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, search, seizure, dispossession, assessment, or lien that he knows is unlawful;
(2) intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct is unlawful; or
(3) intentionally subjects another to sexual harassment.
(b) For purposes of this section, a public servant acts under color of his office or employment if he acts or purports to act in an official capacity or takes advantage of such actual or purported capacity.
(c) In this section, “sexual harassment” means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, submission to which is made a term or condition of a person’s exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, either explicitly or implicitly.
(d) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that an offense is a felony of the third degree if the public servant acted with the intent to impair the accuracy of data reported to the Texas Education Agency through the Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS) described by Section 42.006, Education Code, under a law requiring that reporting. (Emphasis added).

The simple elements constituting criminal violations of the above Penal Code statutes make the denial of an examining trial by our prosecutors and courts nothing short of an ongoing criminal conspiracy and criminal enterprise under Title 18 of the United States Code and state law.

In the instant case, it had to be clear to the presiding judge that the Indictment had been presented to the court in violation of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20.22, that the prosecutor had presented a person to a grand jury for indictment that the prosecutor knew full-well had been denied the rights granted by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 16.01 and 19.27. The violation of Articles 20.22 and 19.27 were accomplished by the denial of the right to an examining trial in violation of Art 16.01.

The court opinions on this subject are not only wrong as a matter of law and a complete lack of constitutional authority to make such rulings, but are blatantly criminal in their hubris and utter disregard of an accused individual’s constitutionally and statutorily protected rights, are a violation of the separation of powers clause under Article 2 of the Texas Constitution, are a violation of properly enacted procedural law under the Code of Criminal Procedure, and directly violate the fundamental individual right to due process of law rather than merely the rule of a group of men and women operating through a judicial and prosecutorial collusion and consensus as to how they want it to work.

How is it anything less than an “unreasonable” act of sedition to have judges sitting upon the bench in the highest criminal court in Texas that have unilaterally declared the judicial department to be totally superior to the legislative in determining what legislation it will follow and what legislation it will simply choose to disregard in relation to criminal procedure and the legislatively protected rights of the accused? Is this behavior not the very thing that the courts are presuming to be unlawful and illegal acts by those appearing before them for prosecution and appeal? Where is even the appearance of judicial integrity, competency, fairness, and impartiality in that? Is the argument that the legislature actually has no power to enact laws to dictate certain procedures for the courts to follow or to protect the rights of individuals caught up in the criminal judicial process? If so, then why not simply declare the statute unconstitutional rather than just criminally ignoring it or legislating from the bench to rewrite it in accordance with judicial and prosecutorial perspectives and desires? What the Court of Criminal Appeals has done in these opinions is to declare that the Court itself is not only above the law, but above the legislature as well, and it has the power and authority to sanction and protect knowingly criminal violations of law and other criminal acts perpetrated by the lower courts and state prosecutors against the people of Texas. This is an unconstitutional oligarchy in action, and this oligarchy is committing sedition and treason against us all.

No reasonable person of ordinary prudence can read Article 16.01 and construe it as anything other than a prohibition specifically preventing a prosecutor from seeking an indictment until the accused has been given notice and opportunity for an examining trial where s/he can obtain a proper determination of probable cause for any warrantless search or seizure of his person or property, present exculpatory evidence, question witnesses, and obtain a legal determination as to what evidence will be admissible at trial and on questions of law. This exculpatory evidence would then be available to any subsequently impaneled grand jury under the dictates of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 2.01, which reads as follows:

Art. 2.01. DUTIES OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS.
Each district attorney shall represent the State in all criminal cases in the district courts of his district and in appeals therefrom, except in cases where he has been, before his election, employed adversely. When any criminal proceeding is had before an examining court in his district or before a judge upon habeas corpus, and he is notified of the same, and is at the time within his district, he shall represent the State therein, unless prevented by other official duties. It shall be the primary duty of all prosecuting attorneys, including any special prosecutors, not to convict, but to see that justice is done. They shall not suppress facts or secrete witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused.
Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.
Amended by Acts 1981, 67th Leg., p. 801, ch. 291, Sec. 98, eff. Sept. 1, 1981.

(Emphasis added).

And once it is determined, and notice has been given, that a grand jury is to be impaneled to hear a complaint against the Accused for the purpose of indictment, the Accused could then exercise his or her right to an opportunity to challenge the grand jury array.

Had Baker been allowed access to the full protections and due process rights contained in the constitutions and laws, the full sets of facts and evidence relating to any allegations of criminal conduct by Baker would have been available to the grand jury. And, if such facts and evidence proved exculpatory or as an affirmative defense, then, it is almost certain that no indictment would have ever happened and no criminal prosecution commenced.

The case law makes it clear that everything involving the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals unlawful and illegal denial of an examining trial to an accused individual evolved from Trussell. Trussell and its progeny, Ash v. STATE, 420 S.W.2d 703 (1967), Murphy v. STATE, 24 S.W.2d 231 (1968), Bryant v. STATE, 423 S.W.2d 320 (1968), Ward v. STATE, 427 S.W.2d 876 (1968), Harris v. STATE, 457 S.W.2d 903 (1970), Brown v. STATE, 475 S.W.2d 938 (1971), Whittington v. STATE, 781 S.W.2d 338 (1989), and others, as precedent, are totally worthless, as each and every one of the resulting opinions directly sanctions the willful and wrongful violation of state law and the due process rights of the accused by every court and prosecutor statewide.

III-E
DISTRICT ATTORNEY HERNANDEZ WILLFULLY AND WRONGFULLY
PRESENTED HEARSAY TESTIMONY TO THE GRAND JURY.

In direct violation of the spirit and intent of Article 19.31(a) item 6, D.A. Hernandez allowed one Amanda Herman (“Ms. Herman”) to provide, at best, hearsay testimony, and at worst, suborned perjurious testimony, to the grand jury regarding the alleged facts surrounding the events of March 23, 2015, and the criminal allegations against Baker.

The problem with Ms. Herman’s testimony is that Ms. Herman has no competent firsthand knowledge of any of the related and relevant facts involving Baker, as she was not present at any time or at any of the actual locations during any of the events and incidents that occurred during the entirety of March 23, 2015.

Therefore, how could Ms. Herman have taken an oath to provide factual and truthful answers to any inquiries made by members of the grand jury in relation to facts that might result in an indictment allegedly relating to a crime of which she neither had nor has any personal knowledge?

How is it that D.A. Hernandez can use hearsay testimony to obtain a grand jury indictment while causing Baker to be denied even the semblance of fairness and impartiality, as well as subverting Baker’s right to an examining trial and grand jury challenge that would have potentially made Ms. Herman’s ‘testimony’ irrelevant and inadmissible to even a ‘stacked’ grand jury like this one, or, for that matter, an opportunity to appear before the grand jury himself so as to provide rebuttal facts and evidence refuting Ms. Herman’s statements and alleged facts?


IV.
EXERCISE OF RIGHT TO DEMAND RELIEF.

Due to the conflicting classifications of the alleged offense, and of the facts relative to the different classifications and subject matter of the allegations in the Indictment, Baker is being charged and indicted under the wrong code and statute. And given Trooper Weatherby’s complete lack of probable cause to detain or arrest Baker for any “transportation” related offense whatsoever, including that of allegedly “speeding” at the time and place of initial contact, and in conjunction with the other factual and statutory information of which the court must take judicial notice as provided herein under Rule 201, Texas Rules of Evidence, it is Baker’s assertion that the Indictment does not provide adequate notice of the charges against him such that he can adequately prepare for trial, be protected from being twice held in jeopardy for the same conduct, and to be adequately informed of which law applies to his case, in violation of his rights pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 10, 15 and 19 of the Texas Constitution.

WHEREFORE, Baker moves that the Court quash the Indictment, and, if either instrument actually exists as required by law, to also quash the Complaint and Information against him, and to so provide a written order that each of these instruments be quashed and this case dismissed with prejudice.

Respectfully Submitted,
_____________________________
Jan Patrick Baker, Sui Juris




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Quash Indictment was Faxed to the attorney for the State on October 21, 2016, at Fax Number 830-775-0352

_____________________________
Jan Patrick Baker, Sui Juris





CAUSE NO(s). 742
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
Plaintiff, §
v. § TERRELL COUNTY, TEXAS
§
Jan Patrick Baker, § 63rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Defendant in Error. § DUNS number: 006848369
§

ORDER

On this day came on to be heard Defendant’s Motion to Quash Indictment. The Court, having considered the motion and argument of counsel, it is hereby ordered that

_____ the Indictment is quashed ____ with/ ____ without/ prejudice; and
_____ the Information is quashed ____ with/ ____ without/ prejudice; and
_____ the Complaint is quashed ____ with/ ____ without/ prejudice; and
_____ the case is dismissed ____ with/ ____ without/ prejudice.

SIGNED this _____ day of ______________________, 20_______.

 

_______________________________
JUDGE PRESIDING


Word documents relating to this Motion and the case in general:

motion-to-quash-indictment-published-on-blog

motion-to-disqualify-63rd-district-judge-fernandez

motion-to-disqualify-83rd-district-judge-cadena

notice-of-jennings-reservation

jennings-reservation-information

indictment-pg1

indictment-pg2

dps-affidavit-warrantless-arrest-weatherby

Trial – Undermining the State’s Unsubstantiated Legal Presumptions and Conclusions.

What do you do when you are attempting to cross-examining the officer on the stand about the actual facts and evidence the officer relied upon that allegedly support the legal presumptions and conclusions that s/he made in the field during your initial encounter with them at the “transportation” stop, and the Prosecution objects to your questioning of the witness about such things?

Let’s look at what usually happens at trial in such cases.

Prosecutor:    Officer, what was Mr. Craig doing when you had reason to take notice of him?

Officer:           Mr. Craig was “operating” his “motor vehicle” on I-35 at 70MPH in a zone marked for a maximum speed of 60MPH, which was “not reasonable and prudent” at the time “under the circumstances and conditions then existing.”

In his/her testimony, the officer has testified to five specific and totally erroneous legal determinations and conclusions, i.e. “operating,” “motor vehicle,” “not reasonable and prudent,” “under the circumstances and conditions then existing,” and the belief that the posted speed signs apply to anything other than a commercial motor vehicle under the provisions of Sec. 201.904 of the “Transportation” Code. These unsubstantiated claims by the officer during testimony constitutes the making of legal determinations and conclusions because, 1) these are terms defined by statute with specific legal, contextual, and subject matter meanings, and 2) the officer is not legally qualified or capable of making or testifying to a legal determination of law, and, therefore, cannot legally declare whether or not the statutory definition actually does apply to the Accused under the circumstances and conditions as they are currently known and existing.

However, without fail, when you begin to cross-examine the officer as to how s/he came to make such legal determinations and conclusions, the Prosecutor will usually jump up and begin making a rather interesting objection, considering the circumstances under which it is being made. It will usually go something like this:

Objection! The officer isn’t required to know those things and isn’t competent to testify as to any legal determinations or conclusions that s/he is being asked to make or testify to at this or any other time.”

(Yes, this is literally an objection that I personally witnessed one Prosecutor make almost verbatim in a trial. Most others have usually been fairly similar in their own individual objections).

Now, in volleyball parlance, this is what is known as a “set at the net,” and it is supposed to be the golden opportunity for a member of the team controlling the ball to “set it up” so that another teammate can be the first to get close to the net, jump really high, and spike the ball in the face of the opposing team to score a point. However, the problem with this set up becomes very apparent when the setting team member realizes that they accidentally set the ball too close to the net and within reach of the opposing team’s own high-jumping blocker/spiker who is already at the net, and who now has the opportunity to spike the ball back and gain his/her team control of the serve.

And this is what that spike looks like once the other team has inadvertently set you up on cross-examination with an objection worded fairly similarly to the one above so as to allow you the opportunity to spike it right back in their face:

Judge, I would like to make this point-by-point response to the prosecution’s objection. During this entire trial the witness for the Prosecution has done absolutely nothing but testify to their own arbitrary legal presumptions and conclusions made at the time of the initial encounter, despite the adamant objections of the Accused. And now, the prosecution wants the court to sustain an objection from them in which they claim that not only is the state’s accuser and only witness not required to actually read and understand the laws and statutes at issue before even attempting to make legal presumptions and conclusions claiming  that the Accused allegedly violated them, but also that that same witness is suddenly legally incompetent to testify when asked by the Accused to explain the specific facts and evidence the officer relied upon to reach those legal presumptions and conclusions at the time of the encounter. The very same legal presumptions and conclusions that the witness has already been allowed to testify to on behalf of the State over the strenuous objections of the Accused. Objections that have all been overruled by this very court despite there being no basis in law for doing so.

Therefore, if the court intends to sustain the Prosecution’s objection that the witness lacks legal competency to testify to the specific facts and evidence allegedly supporting those very same legal presumptions and conclusions made by the witness in this matter, then I move the court to declare the witness legally incompetent and unqualified to testify for all purposes, including, but not limited to, those relating to any such legal determinations and conclusions remaining or already testified to thus far, and that his/her entire testimony be stricken from the record.

Now, if the judge actually grants this motion to strike the witness’s testimony, which the law requires under any normal circumstances that involve real justice and due process, then the next step is to demand a dismissal of the case with prejudice, as the State has no substantive facts or evidence that an eyewitnesses could use to testify against you.

Congratulations, you have now spiked the ball so hard in face of the Prosecution that it permanently tattoos “Voit” across their forehead, and your team now controls the serve.

Red Light Camera Citations – Even State Reps Know They Are Bogus

This red light camera enforcement issue goes hand-in-hand with the “administrative surcharges” issue on certain actual traffic citations as BOTH are constitutionally prohibited Bills of Pains and Penalties.

No state legislature, as a matter of constitutional prohibition and mandate, can allow ANY of the contracts with these red light camera companies to remain in force and be paid BECAUSE they were unconstitutional and unconscionable ab initio!

Your legislators, judges and attorneys are blatantly LYING to your face and stealing from you OPENLY in willful defiance of your inherent unalienable RIGHTS! Just how deaf, dumb and ignorant do you intend to remain while your liberty and livelihood is stolen through illegitimate political processes that were NEVER authorized to exist or be used to extort the People of their liberty, lives and property?!?!

It is time to WAKE THE HELL UP!!!

http://thefreethoughtproject.com/state-rep-epic-video-expl…/




What Say You?

Statutory Breakdown of “Speeding” Allegation Elements in Texas

chevrolet-impala-ss-001-HRWhat are the statutory elements required to actually ALLEGE and PROVE a “speeding” offense in Texas? Believe it or not, there are actually 21 individual statutory elements. Yes, that is a two (2) and a one (1). And it is my experience that the STATE knowingly and intentionally avoids providing the required due process Notice of more than two thirds of them in the criminal complaint and other charging instruments.

Which also means that they are denying the Accused in his/her due process right to Notice and defense of those elements, while also making their job as prosecutor unconstitutionally and illegally easier by not having to prove those that they fail or refuse to allege.

This article is intended to teach you how to perform legal analysis and observation in a “connect the dots” fashion.  Read the statutes below and make your own conclusions about the necessary elements as I have listed them. But, while you do so, be sure to ask yourself how both the court and the prosecution can meet their individual burdens of ensuring that the Accused’s right of due process, including the right of proper, sufficient and timely Notice, are properly met under the statutes, as well as how they are not according to how they actually file the complaint.  And I’ll preface that by pointing out this example.

The STATE cannot rely solely upon the elements asserted in Sec. 545.351(a) OR Sec. 545.352 as the basis for the allegation.

The exercise here is for you to figure out and recognize WHY that is and use it to make a defense according to the remaining statutory provisions.

Here are the individual elements that are actually required to be stated in a valid complaint and proven in a Texas “speeding” allegation according to the various interrelated statutes that follow. Consider that a criminal complaint that fails to state each of these elements is insufficient on its face in substance, as it fails to assert the necessary factual elements that would comprise the required legal Notice to the Accused, as well as that of what the state is required to both allege and prove for the allegation. These are direct violations of the right of due process and a total failure of the state to fully meet its burden of Notice and proof.

  • Who (your name),
  • Where (within the geographical boundaries of the city/county of…),
  • When (on April 1, 2016),
  • Did then and there,
  • What (specific regulated subject matter (while engaging in “transportation”)),
  • While [allegedly] acting as an “operator,”
  • Did [allegedly] “drive” (not “operate” like most complaints allege),
  • A[n alleged] “motor vehicle,”
  • Upon a highway of this state,
  • At a[n alleged] speed of xx,
  • Where the posted speed limit was xxx,
  • Which was [allegedly] greater than reasonable and prudent,
  • Under the circumstances and,
  • Conditions then existing,
  • And [allegedly] without regard for actual and potential hazards then existing,
  • Did [allegedly] fail in his duty to exercise due care,
  • By [allegedly] failing to avoid a collision,
  • With another
    1. Person, or
      1. To wit (the injured person’s name),
    2. Vehicle
      1. To wit (the vehicle year, make and model),
  • That was [allegedly]
    1. Traveling on the highway, or
    2. Entering the highway
  • In compliance with law.

At first you will probably see that the breakdown of Secs. 545.351 and 545.352 below look to be like either a bad web page render or is just a series of random and nonsensical breaks in sentence structure. But, if you really look at where and how the breaks in the sentence structure are done, you will see that it is broken down by its statutory parameters of conditions and objects. By breaking a statute down this way, it helps you greatly in clarifying and understanding how it actually reads and what it all means.


TRANSPORTATION CODE

TITLE 7. VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC

SUBTITLE C. RULES OF THE ROAD

CHAPTER 545. OPERATION AND MOVEMENT OF
VEHICLES

SUBCHAPTER
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS

 

Sec. 545.351.  MAXIMUM SPEED REQUIREMENT.

(a)  An
operator
may
not
drive
at
a speed
greater
than
is

reasonable
and
prudent

under
the circumstances
then
existing
.

(b)  An operator:

(1)  may not
drive
a vehicle
at
a speed
greater
than
is
reasonable and
prudent

under
the conditions and
having
regard
for
actual and
potential
hazards

then
existing
;  and

(2)  shall
control
the speed

of
the vehicle
as
necessary
to
avoid
colliding

with
another
person

or
vehicle
that
is
on
or
entering
the highway

in
compliance
with
law
and
the duty
of
each
person

to
use
due care
.

(c)  An operator
shall,
consistent
with
Subsections (a) and
(b),
drive
at
an
appropriate
reduced speed
if:

(1)  the operator
is
approaching and
crossing
an
intersection
or
railroad grade crossing;

(2)  the operator
is
approaching and
going
around
a curve;

(3)  the operator
is
approaching
a hill crest;

(4)  the operator
is
traveling on
a narrow
or
winding roadway;  and

(5)  a special hazard
exists
with
regard
to
traffic,
including
pedestrians,
or
weather
or
highway conditions.


Sec. 545.352.  PRIMA FACIE SPEED LIMITS.

(a)  A speed
in excess
of
the limits
established by
Subsection (b)
or
under another provision
of
this
subchapter
is
prima facie evidence
that
the speed
is
not
reasonable and
prudent and
that
the speed
is
unlawful.

(b)  Unless
a special hazard
exists
that
requires
a slower speed
for
compliance
with
Section 545.351(b),
the following speeds
are
lawful:

(1)  30 miles per hour
in
an urban district
on
a street
other
than
an
alley and
15 miles per hour
in
an
alley;

(2)  except
as
provided by
Subdivision (4),
70 miles per hour
on
a highway
numbered by
this state
or
the United States
outside
an
urban district,
including
a farm-to-market
or
ranch-to-market
road;

(3)  except
as provided by
Subdivision (4),
60 miles per hour
on
a highway
that
is
outside
an
urban district and
not
a highway
numbered by
this state
or
the United States;

(4)   outside an
urban district:

(A)  60 miles per hour
if
the vehicle
is
a school bus
that
has passed
a commercial motor vehicle inspection
under
Section 548.201 and
is
on
a highway
numbered by
the United States
or
this state,
including
a farm-to-market road;
or

(B)  50 miles per hour
if
the vehicle
is
a school bus
that:

(i)  has
not
passed
a commercial motor vehicle inspection
under
Section 548.201;
or

(ii)  is traveling
on
a highway
not
numbered by
the United States
or
this state;

(5)  on
a beach,
15 miles per hour;
or

(6)  on
a county road
adjacent to
a public beach,
15 miles per hour,
if
declared by
the commissioners court
of
the county.

(c)  The speed limits
for
a bus
or
other vehicle
engaged
in
the business
of
transporting passengers
for
compensation
or
hire,
for
a commercial vehicle
used as
a highway post office vehicle
for
highway post office service
in
the transportation
of
United States mail,
for
a light truck, and
for
a school activity bus
are
the same
as
required
for
a passenger car
at
the same time and
location.

(d)  In
this section:

(1)  “Interstate highway”
means
a segment
of
the national system
of
interstate and
defense highways
that
is:

(A)  located
in
this state;

(B)  officially designated by
the Texas Transportation Commission;  and

(C)  approved under
Title 23, United States Code.

(2)  “Light truck”
means
a truck
with
a manufacturer’s
rated carrying capacity
of
not
more
than
2,000 pounds,
including
a pick-up truck,
panel delivery truck, and
carry-all truck.

(3)  “Urban district”
means
the territory
adjacent
to and
including
a highway,
if
the territory
is
improved
with
structures
that
are
used for
business,
industry,
or
dwelling houses and
are
located
at
intervals
of
less than
100 feet
for
a distance
of
at least
one-quarter mile
on
either side
of
the highway.

(e)  An entity
that
establishes
or
alters
a speed limit
under
this
subchapter
shall
establish
the same
speed limit
for
daytime and
nighttime.



Now, using the example above of how to break down a statute in order to understand it better, read these statutes and practice breaking them down in the same manner. Don’t worry about how hard it seems at first, because the more you practice doing it, the easier and more natural it feels and becomes. You will be surprised how much easier it gets.

And you will be even more surprised at how you will translate this practice into virtually everything you read. You will gain insight and understanding in written matter that you never knew you were capable of, and how few other people actually understand the things they are reading because they don’t do it. And that especially applies to attorneys.



TRANSPORTATION
CODE

TITLE
7. VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC

SUBTITLE
B. DRIVER’S LICENSES AND PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION CARDS

CHAPTER
522. COMMERCIAL DRIVER’S LICENSES

SUBCHAPTER A. GENERAL PROVISIONS

 

Sec.
522.003.  DEFINITIONS.  In this chapter:

(3)  “Commercial driver’s license” means
a license issued to an individual that authorizes the individual to drive a
class of commercial motor vehicle.

(4)  “Commercial learner’s permit” means
a permit that restricts the holder to driving a commercial motor vehicle as
provided by Section 522.011(a)(2)(B).

(5)  “Commercial motor vehicle” means a
motor vehicle or combination of motor vehicles used to transport passengers or
property that:

(A)  has a gross combination weight or a gross
combination weight rating of 26,001 or more pounds, including a towed unit with
a gross vehicle weight or a gross vehicle weight rating of more than 10,000 pounds;

(B)  has a gross vehicle weight or a gross vehicle
weight rating of 26,001 or more pounds;

(C)  is designed to transport 16 or more
passengers, including the driver; or

(D)  is transporting hazardous materials and is
required to be placarded under 49 C.F.R. Part 172, Subpart F.

(8)  “Department
means the Department of Public Safety.

(9)  “Disqualify” means to withdraw the
privilege to drive a commercial motor vehicle, including to suspend, cancel, or
revoke that privilege under a state or federal law.

(10)  “Domicile” means the place where a
person has the person’s true, fixed, and permanent home and principal residence
and to which the person intends to return whenever absent.

(11)  “Drive
means to operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle.

(12)  “Driver’s
license
” has the meaning assigned by Section 521.001, except the term does not include a commercial learner’s
permit unless otherwise provided by this chapter.

(13)  “Drug” has the meaning assigned by
Section 481.002, Health and Safety Code.

(14)  “Employer” means a person who owns
or leases a commercial motor vehicle or assigns a person to drive a commercial
motor vehicle.

(15)  “Federal act” means the Commercial
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (49 U.S.C. App. Section 2701 et seq.).

(16)  “Foreign jurisdiction” means a
jurisdiction other than a state.

(17)  “Gross combination weight rating”
means the value specified by the manufacturer as the loaded weight of a
combination or articulated vehicle or, if the manufacturer has not specified a
value, the sum of the gross vehicle weight rating of the power unit and the
total weight of the towed unit or units and any load on a towed unit.

(18)  “Gross vehicle weight rating” means
the value specified by the manufacturer as the loaded weight of a single
vehicle.

(19)  “Hazardous materials” has the
meaning assigned by 49 C.F.R. Section 383.5.

(20)  Repealed by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 941,
Sec. 43, eff. Sept. 1, 2001.

(21)  “Motor
vehicle
” means a vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or
semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used on a highway.  The term does not include a vehicle, machine,
tractor, trailer, or semitrailer operated exclusively on a rail.

(22)  “Non-domiciled commercial driver’s
license” means a commercial driver’s license issued by a state to an
individual who is domiciled in a foreign jurisdiction.

(22-a)  “Non-domiciled commercial learner’s
permit” means a commercial learner’s permit issued by a state to an
individual who is domiciled in a foreign jurisdiction.

(23)  “Out-of-service order” means:

(A)  a temporary prohibition against driving a
commercial motor vehicle issued under Section 522.101, the law of another state, 49 C.F.R. Section 383.5,
386.72, 392.5, 392.9a, 395.13, or 396.9, a law compatible with those federal
regulations, or the North American Standard Out-of-Service Criteria; or

(B)  a declaration by the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration or an authorized enforcement officer of a state or local
jurisdiction that a driver, commercial motor vehicle, or motor carrier
operation is out of service under 49 C.F.R. Section 383.5, 386.72, 392.5,
392.9a, 395.13, or 396.9, a law compatible with those federal regulations, or
the North American Standard Out-of-Service Criteria.

(23-a)  “Person
includes the United States, a state, or a political subdivision of a state.

(24)  “Secretary” means the United States
secretary of transportation.

(24-a)  “Seed cotton module” means
compacted seed cotton in any form.

(25)  “Serious traffic violation” means:

(A)  a conviction arising from the driving of a
motor vehicle, other than a parking, vehicle weight, or vehicle defect
violation, for:

(i)  excessive speeding, involving a single charge
of driving 15 miles per hour or more above the posted speed limit;

(ii)  reckless driving, as defined by state or
local law;

(iii)  a violation of a state or local law related
to motor vehicle traffic control, including a law regulating the operation of
vehicles on highways, arising in connection with a fatal accident;

(iv)  improper or erratic traffic lane change;

(v)  following the vehicle ahead too closely;  or

(vi)  a violation of Sections 522.011 or 522.042;  or

(B)  a violation of Section 522.015.

(26)  “State” means a state of the
United States or the District of Columbia.


Sec. 201.904.  SPEED SIGNS.
The department shall erect and maintain on the highways and roads of this state appropriate signs that show the maximum lawful speed for commercial motor vehicles, truck tractors, truck trailers, truck semitrailers, and motor vehicles engaged in the business of transporting passengers for compensation or hire (buses).


TRANSPORTATION CODE

TITLE 7. VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC

SUBTITLE C. RULES OF THE ROAD

CHAPTER 541. DEFINITIONS

SUBCHAPTER
A. PERSONS AND GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES

 

Sec.
541.001.  PERSONS.  In this subtitle:

(1)  Operator” means, as used in reference to a vehicle, a person who drives or has physical control of a vehicle.

(2)  “Owner” means, as used in reference
to a vehicle, a person who has a property interest in or title to a
vehicle.  The term:

(A)  includes a person entitled to use and possess
a vehicle subject to a security interest;
and

(B)  excludes a lienholder and a lessee whose
lease is not intended as security.

(3)  “Pedestrian” means a person on
foot.

(4)  “Person” means an individual, firm, partnership, association, or corporation.

(5)  “School crossing guard” means a responsible
person who is at least 18 years of age and is designated by a local authority
to direct traffic in a school crossing zone for the protection of children
going to or leaving a school.


Sec. 24.013.  AIRCRAFT FUEL CONTAINERS;  OFFENSE.

(a)  A person commits an offense if the person
operates or intends to operate an aircraft equipped with:

(1)  a fuel container that the person knows does
not conform to federal aviation regulations or that has not been approved by
the Federal Aviation Administration by inspection or special permit;  or

(2)  a pipe, hose, or auxiliary pump that is used
or intended for transferring fuel to the primary fuel system of an aircraft
from a fuel container that the person knows does not conform to federal
aviation regulations or that has not been approved by the Federal Aviation
Administration by inspection or special permit.

(b)  An offense under Subsection (a) is a felony
of the third degree.

(c)  A peace officer may seize an aircraft
equipped with a fuel container that is the subject of an offense under
Subsection (a).

(d)  An aircraft seized under Subsection (c) may
be forfeited to the Department of Public Safety in the same manner as property
subject to forfeiture under Article 18.18, Code of Criminal Procedure.

(e)  An aircraft forfeited under Subsection (d) is
subject to Chapter 2205, Government Code.

(f)  In this section:

(1)  “Federal aviation regulations”
means the following regulations adopted by the Federal Aviation Administration
as those regulations existed on September 1, 1985, except a regulation in
existence on September 1, 1985, that is inconsistent with a regulation adopted
after that date:

(A)  certification procedures for products and
parts, 14 C.F.R. Part 21;

(B)  maintenance, preventive maintenance,
rebuilding, and alteration regulations, 14 C.F.R. Part 43;  and

(C)  general operating and flight rules, 14 C.F.R.
Part 91.

(2)  Operate” means to use, cause to use, or authorize to use an aircraft for air navigation and includes:

(A)  the piloting of an aircraft, with or without
the right of legal control;

(B)  the taxiing of an aircraft before takeoff or
after landing;  and

(C)  the postflight or preflight inspection or
starting of the engine of an aircraft.


Sec.
541.002.  GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES.  In this subtitle:

(1)  “Department” means the Department
of Public Safety acting directly or through its authorized officers and agents.

(2)  “Director” means the public safety
director.

(3)  “Local authority” means:

(A)  a county, municipality, or other local entity
authorized to enact traffic laws under the laws of this state;  or

(B)  a school district created under the laws of
this state only when it is designating school crossing guards for schools
operated by the district.

(4)  “Police officer” means an officer
authorized to direct traffic or arrest persons who violate traffic regulations.

(5)  “State” has the meaning assigned by
Section 311.005, Government Code, and includes a province of Canada.


TRANSPORTATION CODE

TITLE 7. VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC

SUBTITLE J. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

CHAPTER 724. IMPLIED CONSENT

SUBCHAPTER
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS

 

Sec.
724.001.  DEFINITIONS.  In this chapter:

(1)  “Alcohol concentration” has the
meaning assigned by Section 49.01, Penal Code.

(2)  “Arrest” includes the taking into
custody of a child, as defined by Section 51.02, Family Code.

(3)  “Controlled substance” has the
meaning assigned by Section 481.002, Health and Safety Code.

(4)  “Criminal charge” includes a charge
that may result in a proceeding under Title 3, Family Code.

(5)  “Criminal proceeding” includes a
proceeding under Title 3, Family Code.

(6)  “Dangerous drug” has the meaning
assigned by Section 483.001, Health and Safety Code.

(7)  “Department” means the Department
of Public Safety.

(8)  “Drug” has the meaning assigned by
Section 481.002, Health and Safety Code.

(9)  “Intoxicated” has the meaning
assigned by Section 49.01, Penal Code.

(10)  “License” has the meaning assigned
by Section 521.001.

(11)  Operate” means to drive or be in actual control of a motor vehicle or watercraft.

(12)  “Public place” has the meaning
assigned by Section 1.07, Penal Code.


Download DOC FileBreakdown of Elements in a Speeding Charge

Download PDFCriminal Complaint

Texas Legislature – Why Statist Idiots Should NOT Be Elected to Public Office (1)

MEME - Texas Legislature - Sen. Juduth Zaffirini 1920x1080

This letter is a response from one of our many Statist and inept Texas State senators. And like most, she is clueless about individual rights and who can and cannot do what, with what, and when, or to whom. So, I decided to show her what I think would have been a proper redress of her response letter:
=======================================================
=======================================================

Dear Madam,

First, how are the other girls in the local cat-house doing? I ask only out of concern that you might have to return there for your future employment, because your response to me is not only ineptly inaccurate and misinformed, it goes to proving that you certainly aren’t cut out to act as MY representative in MY republican form of government. In fact, it shows precisely why people like you should not be allowed to serve in government at all.

Your response letter paints you as someone that clearly does not understand the concept of individual rights and liberty, while also demonstrating that you don’t even remotely comprehend the standards of a Republican form of government. But it also makes it clear that you are at the very least either a STATIST liberal or the pawn of those who are. Your response is ample evidence that you believe most strongly in the church and religion of the STATE as somehow being the supreme authority and master of the People. And you maintain this mindset even though we created both the government and your position within it. And in that regard, your very existence is completely dependent on our consent, which you have only so long as we choose to remain mostly ignorant and apathetic of just how little all people like you are actually needed or wanted anymore. Which tells me that you are even less than clueless as to your actual place in the political food chain, which is properly at the bottom with the rest of the discarded whale shit.

In your letter, you asserted that “Freedom to travel is a right granted by the United States Constitution.” This statement is unquestionably and demonstrably incorrect and misinformed. If you think not, then please answer me this; just HOW did the founding fathers get around BEFORE the constitutional convention that created the federal constitution? How did they travel from their homes to Philadelphia Pennsylvania BEFORE the constitution existed and allegedly GRANTED a “right to travel?” Did they do it all by FAX and teleconference until they could create the constitution so they could actually travel there and meet in person? Did they use mail that was brought in on horseback? Oh, wait, they couldn’t have done that, that would be traveling, and the constitution didn’t exist yet to grant them that right.

Maybe you would respond to me by saying that they had the Articles of Confederation as their authority granting the right to travel from place to place? Do you think that answer is actually any better in terms of its stupidity considering that the people were traveling about the globe long before either of those documents even existed? And you should know and understand that even today We the People have the same right to locomotion and travel from place to place regardless of the existence of either of these or any other document.  Does this concept of yours regarding “liberty through paperwork” suddenly sound as idiotic to you as your declaratory misstatement of facts did to me? Good. Then you can now see my point as to why I view you as unfit to represent me or any other living being in any capacity that requires decision making authority. Personally, I wouldn’t give you the authority required to scrape used chewing gum off the bottom of tables.

As John F. Kennedy is quoted as saying:

JFK - Opinion Without Thought

And you clearly have very little concern or consideration of thought about vomiting what is certainly nothing more than your unresearched and wholly unsubstantiated and cliched opinions in the face of those for whom you took an oath and are required to serve as well as to keep them fully and accurately informed of the facts and the laws. And you spew your illiteracy openly upon all with a straight face and no readily apparent emotional qualms as to the detrimental affect of your disinformation, which makes you nothing less than a psychopath yearning for an upgrade to sociopath. And just in case those words are also too big for you to comprehend, let me assist you there as well:

psychopath [sahy-kuh-path] noun
1. a person with a psychopathic personality, which manifests as amoral and antisocial behavior, lack of ability to love or establish meaningful personal relationships, extreme egocentricity, failure to learn from experience, etc.
sociopath [soh-see-uh-path, soh-shee-] noun
1. a person with a psychopathic personality whose behavior is antisocial, often criminal, and who lacks a sense of moral responsibility or social conscience.

 

But, let’s get back to the discussion of your overall incompetence.

I know that individual rights and liberty may seem like a new concept to you, but I am appalled by your complete lack of understanding of the fact that the state and federal constitutions DO NOT grant a single right to the People. ALL of the People’s INNUMERABLE (I know, it’s also a big word for you, but it simply means “you can’t count them”) rights are inherent and unalienable. And we may lose them ONLY as punishment for an actual crime committed against other living beings or their property. We the People neither transferred nor surrendered ANY of OUR individual rights to you or any other member of the Texas Legislature in your capacity as one of our governmental actors and public SERVANTS, and this includes, but is not limited to, our right of liberty through locomotion of our own whim and choosing. We gave each of you a very limited delegation of authority to act on OUR behalf in the protection of these inherent fundamental individual rights, not your flawed personal designs, desires, and vision of individual liberty or the equally reprehensible perspective of the corporate state. Especially when it directly conflicts with your first and most high mandate of protecting each and every one of the People’s individual rights and property.

I am also appalled that you totally fail to understand that, in terms of serving in a governmental capacity, it is YOU that have no “rights.” It is YOU that has ONLY delegated privileges in the exercise of your delegated powers, powers that may not be exercised against and to the detriment of the very source of those powers, We the People. And most assuredly not against our private individual lives and property in any adverse way or manner. At least, not outside of having been convicted for committing an actual crime that harmed other people or their property. Furthermore, those delegated powers do NOT provide you with any authority to apply them in any other areas of our collective lives that we did not specifically grant to you. As any delegation of power and authority to handle our PUBLIC business is NOT a simultaneous delegation to meddle and interfere in our private lives and business. Meaning that it is all of you that are the ones acting under PRIVILEGE, because you cannot act without first being so authorized by We the People in exercising ANY of those powers and authority at all. All of the rights we have and exercise as individuals is NOT subject to a majority vote by anyone, as that would make us a democracy and those rights a mere privilege. And you know full well that we are NOT a democracy, we are a Republic. And We the People do not exercise any sort of privilege in our pursuit of life, liberty and happiness. We do it as a matter of RIGHT! And you and your kind have clearly forgotten that irrefutable fact.

The People’s individual rights existed long before ANY political or corporate state or constitution EVER did. They existed long before the Articles of Confederation or even the Magna Carta. These all just happen to be documents that the People of the day created and forced upon you, our public servants in government, at the point of a sword or the barrel of a musket to ensure that you all remembered to recognize that fact. Obviously you, and many others like you, don’t remember like you should, or even understand the eventual consequences of trying to once again make yourselves kings and queens with some imaginary divine and absolute power to rule over and dictate to the rest of us. These limitations upon government’s ability to act were written down so that the group of so-called “elites” who once held power in the former form of kings and queens, of which you apparently consider yourself a member, would know and remember it too. It was written down so that all forms of government, meaning YOU, could never come back later and say “I didn’t know that was wrong of me to do.”

You also have it wrong when you stated “The ability to travel on public roads in Texas, however, is a privilege granted by the State … .” Really? Just WHO the hell do you think actually owns the roads in Texas? Is it the People, who’s money is taken in numerous unconstitutional and illegal taxes to pay for those roads, or is it the corporate “STATE” that thinks it can both forcefully steal our money to pay for them and then continue to charge us for their use forever-after by licensing it back to us for numerous yearly fees and permissions?  Just because you people have knowingly and willfully defrauded the public for more than 70+ years by intentionally misapplying the statutes regulating “transportation,”  which is ENTIRELY a commercial occupation, does NOT mean that it is now a valid measure by which the state may deprive the People of their right to liberty through locomotion! Your blatant statist ignorance is more than apparent in its joining with the mindset held by most of our legislators in that proclaiming “we’ve always done it this way” somehow translates into “its perfectly lawful that we do it this way.”  And that simply isn’t so.

MEME - Grace Hopper - We've Always Done It This Way 1920x1080

The “Transportation” code you speak of was created by SB 971 in 1995, and was codified in several different enactments within Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes prior to that. But even those prior enactments have ALWAYS applied to and regulated only one thing, “TRANSPORTATION.” “Transportation” is an OCCUPATION, i.e. a BUSINESS USE of the highways for private profit or gain or the performance of public duties, and that code regulates only those things that relate to the specific legislatively mandated PRIVILEGED subject matter of “TRANSPORTATION,” not the private travel and use of the highways by the people themselves as a MATTER OF RIGHT!!  Check the caption title of SB 971 as it was written by the 74th Legislature in 1995 for yourself and see that this is true.  Provided that you can actually read the Bill rather than simply spouting off your own uninformed and inept perceptions of reality rather than the actual law that proves you to be either willfully ignorant or a knowing deceiver when it comes to providing informed and accurate answers to the people you claim to represent.

So sorry lady, a term I use loosely in this case, but the United States Supreme Court called and said that they have given their opinion on the matter of the “right to travel/ locomotion” many times already, just as the Texas courts have. And you should already know that the gist of their collective opinions is rather simple, the People have an ABSOLUTE RIGHT to use the roads for their own private business and pleasure WITHOUT permission or consent via licensing, registration or any other federal or STATE regulatory scheme outside of regulating traffic flow, because it is the people that own them and have every right of private use upon them for their own private business or pleasure. For one to engage in “transportation” is, however, an extraordinary use, and THAT is why it is a PRIVILEGE that requires these forms of regulation through licensing and registration of person’s and equipment. But the People’s RIGHTFUL use cannot be constitutionally converted into such a privilege and then licensed back to them for a fee.

Therefore, your assertion that “Travelers on public roads, for example, are subject to stop and arrest for violations of rules of the road listed in the Texas Transportation Code” is ALSO incorrect. Considering the legislature made it VERY clear that the regulated activity encompassed by the recodification, and the acts codified in Vernon’s prior thereto, related solely to the subject matter of “transportation,” then, it is inarguable that ONLY those person’s actively engaged in “transportation,” i.e. COMMERCIAL USE OF THE ROADS FOR PERSONAL/CORPORATE PROFIT OR GAIN THROUGH THE TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS, GOODS, OR PROPERTY, FOR COMPENSATION OR HIRE BY A CARRIER, are subject to the “rules of the road listed in the Texas Transportation Code.” Not only because those are the ONLY actual actions that are involved in acts of “transportation” upon the highways, but also because the People themselves are not so engaged, and therefore, their actions are NOT in any way related to the subject matter of SB 971, which is what created the code itself! And if the People’s actions are NOT related to the subject matter of SB 971, which IS limited specifically to “transportation” as a commercial occupation, then NOTHING in that code, INCLUDING “rules of the road” contained in Subtitle C, can be lawfully or legally applied to the People, their private conveyances, or their actions. Perhaps if you actually UNDERSTOOD the LEGAL meaning of the terms and phrases you so casually throw around as a legislator you might be able to comprehend the actual and legal difference!

And there IS a very big difference in the proper legal application and the current misapplication of the “transportation” code. A difference that is created by the legal semantics of the terms and phrases used therein to describe the activity of “driving” and “operating” rather than “traveling” and “private use.” In most people’s common everyday usage, the meaning of the terms “driving” and “operating” are taken to be synonymous with “traveling/ private use.” However, in terms of the regulatory legal meaning and use when relating to legal definitions limited specifically to the subject matter of “transportation” within the code, “driving” and “operating” both mean “DRIVING OR OPERATING IN AN OCCUPATION OR BUSINESS FOR WHICH ONE IS BEING PAID.” Which means that you provided your answer without first verifying whether a single assertion of alleged fact within it was actually constitutionally and legally correct. You simply assumed, and then stated how you understood and want it all to work. And all without actually knowing or caring to know by verifying the information you were asked to address. But this time your false assumption was limiting to making an ass out of you rather than me. Which goes a long way to proving that you are also a fucking statist libtard idiot that understands nothing about statutory meaning and construction and the UNLIMITED rights of the People in contrast to the VERY LIMITED powers of government. At least, that is the impression I have formulated based upon your inept response for the purposes of THIS discussion on the “right to travel/ locomotion” and the functioning of a proper Republican form of government in general.

Do you actually think that the political body of the state is something other than the People themselves? We the People have EVERY RIGHT to use the roads for our own personal business and pleasure using our own cars and other conveyances. Those conveyances are our private property,  to which we have every right of acquisition, disposal and use, just as we do with any other thing or property that we might lawfully and rightfully purchase and make use of, and just as the very roads themselves are OURS! The roads belong to US, NOT to YOU or the corporate state!! Our individual right of private use is not subject to a vote, the whims of social policy, or any STATE mandated licensing and regulation.

Perhaps you honestly don’t know this, which I doubt, but even the Texas Administrative Code makes it abundantly clear that the sole agency to whom all “transportation” enforcement authority is assigned and delegated by statute, the Department of Public Safety of the State of Texas (“DPS”), is limited in that authority to regulatory programs relating to “commercial and ‘for hire’ traffic.” Those regulatory programs have NEVER applied to the privately traveling general public in any way. And it is not and never has been a “state granted privilege” for We the People to exercise any of these rights. And at the risk of sounding repetitive, the roads are bought and paid for BY US for OUR use, just like our cars and other conveyances. Neither the STATE nor you own them or have ANY lawful authority to REGULATE them in any way involving licensing, registration, inspection, mandatory insurance of any kind, or anything at all having to do with the sale or purchase for private use. WE ARE THE ONES THAT OWN THE ROADS AND OUR PRIVATE CONVEYANCES!! Get it?!?!  You are nothing more than the appointed caretaker of OUR roads and the duty-bound protector of our right to free access and use of our private property upon them unencumbered by governmental interference and intrusion. And part of your duty is to ensure that those roads are maintained in good working order for OUR private personal use, NOT yours, and certainly not that of any BUSINESS alone.

Texas Administrative Code

Next Rule>>
TITLE 37 PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
PART 1 TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
CHAPTER 1 ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION
SUBCHAPTER A OBJECTIVE, MISSION, AND PROGRAM
RULE §1.2 Mission

The mission of the Texas Department of Public Safety is:

(1) to supervise traffic on rural highways;
(2) to supervise and regulate commercial and “for hire” traffic;
(3) to preserve the peace, to investigate crimes, and to arrest criminals;
(4) to administer regulatory programs in driver licensing, motor vehicle inspection, and safety responsibility; and
(5) to execute programs supplementing and supporting the preceding activities.


Source Note: The provisions of this §1.2 adopted to be effective January 1, 1976

Add to that the proof that the regulatory programs run by the DPS relates ONLY to the above stated mission of “regulating commercial and ‘for hire’ traffic” as found within Rules §1.3(b) and §1.4 of the Administrative Code, and you have evidence of a massive fraud being perpetrated by the state and its administrative agencies upon the general public for the purpose of fraudulent and unconstitutional mass taxation outside of constitutional authority and prohibitions.  In other simpler words, conspiracy and collusion to defraud and extort monies from the People.

The corporate “STATE” is both created and paid for by We the People, and is empowered to contract for the purposes of the planning, building and care-taking of OUR roads. The roads belong to the PEOPLE, and using them is NOT a privilege granted to us by ANYONE, least of all our SERVANTS or a legal fiction in the form of a political body called the “STATE!” It is a RIGHT that we have always had and still hold regardless, because WE have paid for those roads with OUR money. We paid for a SERVICE that we rightfully expect to be provided by our public servants, NOT a transfer of rightful ownership or totalitarian control over something that belongs to all of the People as a public resource. The roads are for OUR shared individual use in conducting OUR personal business and pleasure as a matter of RIGHT!! ONLY those that are using the public roads for PRIVATE PROFIT AND GAIN or in a governmental capacity are acting under a privilege. The privilege of using a publicly owned resource for personal/ corporate profit or gain or public service. The rest of us ARE NOT you moron!!

Disrespectfully signed,

YOU’RE FUCKING FIRED!!

Texas – How to Disqualify a Bad Judge

MEME - Liar Liar - Disqualify Judge 001 1920x1080

 

How do you go about getting rid of a bad or corrupt municipal or justice court judge?  It’s not really as hard as you think, at least not in Texas.  However, one thing that you need to be aware of is that, while the rules for disqualifying a municipal judge are laid out in writing and are pretty straightforward in Chapter 29 A-1 of the Texas Government Code, there are apparently no such written rules directly applicable to justice court judges.  But, we are necessarily going to try and use the same rules regardless. How?  By asserting the argument that there must be equal protection and application of the laws in order for us to do so.

I would also highly recommend that you spend some time devoted to reading and understanding Chapter 30 of the Texas Government Code as well. It contains several provisions that I have learned are NOT being complied with by MANY Texas municipal courts of record. And their failure to comply could possibly be grounds to challenge the validity, and thus the entirety of jurisdiction by what can only be construed as an UNLAWFULLY functioning court.

Ask yourself these questions;

  • Do we not have the SAME rights and requirements of due process in BOTH courts under either type of judge?
  • Aren’t they both bound by the same rules of procedure and judicial canons under which they claim to be acting?
  • Don’t they both violate the same rights of the Accused when they act to ignore or deny the proper application of the rules of procedure and evidence, as well as the judicial canons that require them to act fairly, impartially, and in compliance with the law?
  • And when they don’t comply with and follow those rules, don’t you have a RIGHT to seek remedy for the resulting rights violations in order to protect your right to have a fair and impartial proceeding and trial before an impartial and properly behaving judge?

The correct answer to each of these of course, is yes, and that you DO have a right to a fair and impartial judge in every proceeding and at trial. Too bad that you aren’t going to get any of that though!  At least, NOT unless you know HOW to make sure that you at least get the chance to have it.

So, the intent of this article is to show you HOW to do that.  At the bottom of this article there is linked in a complete Motion that you can use and adapt to your own case to seek the disqualification of a badly behaving judge.  BUT, be very aware that any Motion to Disqualify filed in a Texas court is REQUIRED to be signed under penalty of perjury before someone authorized by law to administer oaths.  Which means that you have to sign it in front of a Notary.

Thus, you CANNOT prepare one of these Motions in advance BEFORE going into court each time because the specific facts that each such motion must allege and have written into them supporting your right to a disqualification of a bad judge have not yet occurred, which means that you can write the Motion only AFTER the judge has misbehaved. THIS is why we MUST find a way to record the proceedings if at all possible so we can create a verbatim transcript of everything that transpired in the proceeding and gave rise to the need to disqualify.  Make sure that you do only ONE original copy of this motion (which should ALWAYS be the case for ANY original pleading or affidavit). Then, AFTER it is signed and notarized, you can make all of your extra copies for filing.

I am putting the body of the motion in this article so you can read it without having to download it first.  That way you can see if it fits your particular needs before doing so.  Just remember that the text written in the article is NOT complete as is required by an actual Motion that you would file. There is also the fact that the web SUCKS at keeping the proper document formatting that you use in the actual document.  So download and use the MS Word document instead of copying the text from the article.  Also, take note that the example Motion is an AMENDED Motion, meaning that it was a second filed version that incorporated changes from the first filed version of the pleading.  If you are filing this as your FIRST original pleading, be sure to REMOVE anything referring to the pleading being an amended version.



 

Respondent’s Special Appearance and Motion to Disqualify Judge AMENDED

TO THE HONORABLE 26th DISTRICT COURT JUDGE BILLY RAY STUBBLEFIELD:

COMES NOW EDDIE EUGENE CRAIG, pro se, the Respondent in this matter, who asserts as follows:

Assertion of Rights

Eddie Eugene Craig (Respondent) asserts all his/her unalienable rights, privileges and immunities at Natural Law, Common Law and Maritime Law, and all his/her commercial rights relevant to this state.

Special Appearance

Respondent asserts his/her special appearance, objecting to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue.

Objection to Non-judicial Decision-making

Respondent objects to and does not consent to any assignment or any referral of this case, in any part, to any decision-maker other than a duly elected or properly appointed judicial officer exercising full authority of a municipal court judge and who has an active and current oath of office on file.  Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242 (12 May 2008) (“If the parties consent”) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)).

Objection to use of private law

Respondent objects to the use of unpublished cases.  A cite to “WL” and “Lexis” is a reference to materials not publicly accessible.  For such references even to begin to be meaningful, a full copy of the opinion for each “WL” or “Lexis” reference must be attached.

Respondent Contact information

Contact information for Respondent Respondent is as follows:

Mailing Address:

c/o 1313 Mockingbird Ln.

Austin, Texas [78704]

Phone & Email Information:

Tel.            512-999-9999

Fax :          None

Email  myemail@somemail.com


Plaintiff Contact information

Contact information for Plaintiff City of Rockdale/ The State of Texas is as follows:

Mailing Address Regional Presiding Judge Billy Ray Stubblefield:

26th Judicial District Judge Billy Ray Stubblefield

Williamson County, Texas

P.O. Box 24

Georgetown, TX 78627

Phone & Email Information:

Tel. Phone:            (512) 943-1226

Fax:                                   (512) 943-1188

Mailing Address City of Rockdale Municipal Court:

505 W. Cameron Ave.

P.O. Box 586

Rockdale, TX. 76567

Phone & Email Information:

Tel.            (512) 446-0812

Fax :          (512) 446-6258

Mailing Address City Attorney Michelle Lehmkuhl:

505 W. Cameron Ave.

P.O. Box 586

Rockdale, TX. 76567

Phone & Email Information:

Tel.            (512) 446-2511

Fax :          (512) 446-6258


Table of Contents

Respondent’s Special Appearance and Motion to Disqualify Judge AMENDED.. 1

Assertion of Rights. 1

Special Appearance. 1

Objection to Non-judicial Decision-making. 2

Objection to use of private law.. 2

Respondent Contact information. 2

Plaintiff Contact information. 3

Table of Contents. 4

Table of Authorities. 4

Discussion. 5

Reservation of additional objections. 5

Summary of Respondent’s Arguments. 5

ISSUE:        Is the City of Rockdale Municipal Court bound by the Code of Crim. Proc. in Class C fine-only misdemeanor proceedings?. 7

ISSUE:        Did the court violate Respondent’s right of due process by ignoring specific rights codified in the Code of Crim. Proc.?. 9

ISSUE:        Did the Court violate the laws of this state and Respondent’s right of due process by requiring that a plea be entered before a court clerk rather than a proper judicial officer in a proper judicial proceeding?  13

ISSUE:        Did the Court violate Respondent’s right of due process by failing to follow the requirements of the Code of Crim. Proc. and the Code of Judicial Conduct?. 14

Request for Relief. 16

Verification. 18

Certificate of Service. 18

ORDER.. 19

Table of Authorities

Cases

Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 668 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissent)…………………………. 1

Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 344 (1980) (Powell, J., and Stewart, J., dissent)     1

Ex Parte Greenwood, 165 Tex. Crim. 349; 307 S.W.2d 586; 1957 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 2350 11

Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242 (12 May 2008)………………………………………………………. 2

Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 28 (1985) (dissent)…………………………………………………………. 1

Rules of Criminal Procedure

Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. Art. 1.05 (Thomson/West 2011)…………………………………… 10

Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. ART. 2.03 (Thomson/West 2011)…………………………………… 7

Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. Art. 2.04 (Thomson/West 2011)…………………………………… 10

Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. Art. 2.05 (Thomson/West 2011)…………………………………… 10

Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. Art.1.05 (Thomson/West 2011)………………………………. 12, 14

Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. Art.1.14 (Thomson/West 2011)……………………………………. 14

Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. Art.2.04 (Thomson/West 2011)……………………………………. 14

Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. Art.2.05 (Thomson/West 2011)……………………………………. 14

Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. Art.28.01 (Thomson/West 2011)…………………………….. 11, 12

Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. Art.32.48 (Thomson/West 2011)………………………………….. 11

Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. Art.45.002 (Thomson/West 2011)…………………………. 8, 9, 14

Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. Art.45.018(b) (Thomson/West 2011)……………………….. 12, 14

Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. Art.45.019(f) (Thomson/West 2011)……………………….. 12, 14

Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. Art.45.028 (Thomson/West 2011)………………………………… 10

Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. CHAPTER 45 (Thomson/West 2011)……………………………… 8

 

Statutes

Tex. Const. Art. 1, § 10……………………………………………………………………………………… 12, 14

Tex. Gov. Code Ann. Chapter 29-A (Thomson/West 2011)………………………………….. 5, 7

Tex. Gov. Code Ann. Sec. 29.055(c) (Thomson/West 2011)………………………………………… 6

Tex. Gov. Code Ann. Sec. 29.055(c)(1) (Thomson/West 2011)……………………………………. 6

Tex. Gov. Code Ann. Sec. 29.055(c)(2) (Thomson/West 2011)……………………………………. 6

Tex. Gov. Code Ann. Sec. 311.016(4) (Thomson/West 2011)………………………………… 12, 13

 

Discussion

Reservation of additional objections.

Should a “complaint” ever exist, and should STATE ever satisfy its Due Process burden by serving such “complaint,” Respondent reserves the right to supplement this motion should there be defect, error, or irregularity with such “complaint.”

Summary of Respondent’s Arguments.

Respondent originally filed this Motion to Disqualify presiding Judge Jerry Waggoner (“Judge Waggoner”) of the City of Rockdale Municipal Court (“Court”) on or about November 22, 2012. The original motion was filed pursuant Chapter 29 A-1, Gov. Code, as soon as was practicable after Respondent realized that Judge Waggoner had absolutely no intention of following the law or providing those before his court with even an appearance of fairness and impartiality or the right to fundamental due process. To date Respondent has received no response or other information as to the disposition of the original filing.

Pursuant Chapter 29 A-1, Gov. Code, Judge Waggoner was required to forward the motion to Judge Billy Ray Stubblefield for review in his capacity as regional presiding judge (see Sec. 29.055(c)(1)). From all appearances, Judge Waggoner knowingly, willingly and intentionally ignored this requirement and failed or refused to forward the original motion as required by law.

Furthermore, Judge Waggoner, pursuant Sec. 29.055(c) , Gov. Code, was required to cease and desist all further action (see Sec. 29.055(c)(2)) until such time as a ruling on his disqualification was returned by the regional presiding judge. Judge Waggoner further ignored this requirement of law and proceeded forward in this matter by the issuance of a warrant of arrest for Respondent under the guise of failure to appear for the so-called “trial.”

These acts alone prove that Judge Waggoner has no respect for the laws associated with the duties of his office, the due process rights of Respondent, or promoting even the general appearance of fairness and impartiality, therefore, his actions demand disqualification of a constitutional nature, if not actual divestment of his office and authority.

Respondent reasserts the following original points of authority and argument as the original basis for Respondent’s demand for the complete disqualification of Judge Waggoner and the dismissal of this matter.

Respondent argues that presiding Judge Waggoner is hereby disqualified ab initio pursuant Chapter 29 A-1, Gov. Code, from presiding over any proceedings in Respondent’s matter.

Respondent shows by the facts stated herein that Judge Waggoner, while acting under color of law, knowingly, willingly, and intentionally did violate specific laws relating to the duties of his office, numerous canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Judicial Ethics, and acted with bias and prejudice against Respondent in the preliminary proceedings held in the Court.

Furthermore, Respondent shows by the facts stated herein that Judge Waggoner’s actions under color of law have deprived Respondent of protected fundamental rights, including but not limited to, the right of due process, which deprives the Court of all personal and subject matter jurisdiction over Respondent.

Furthermore, Respondent shall show that Judge Waggoner’s actions under color of law, while absent all lawful jurisdiction, constitute criminal acts for which criminal complaints are to be filed by Respondent with the Milam County grand jury pursuant Art. 2.03, Code of Crim. Proc.

Lastly, Respondent has also filed several judicial conduct complaints (see attached) against Judge Waggoner with the State Judicial Conduct Committee for violations of multiple canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Judicial Ethics.

ISSUE:                 Is the City of Rockdale Municipal Court bound by the Code of Crim. Proc. in Class C fine-only misdemeanor proceedings?

If this were an actual criminal case, then, Respondent expects that Judge Waggoner and City Attorney Michelle Lehmkuhl (“Attorney Lehmkuhl”) would be required to obey the laws as codified in the Code of Crim. Proc. This is especially true considering that, while acting under color of law and in their official capacities, said law governs the duties of their respective offices relating to the prosecution of all alleged “criminal” cases.

If this were an actual “criminal” case, then, both Judge Waggoner and Attorney Lehmkuhl are specifically required and directed to follow the provisions of Chapter 45, Code of Crim. Proc., and other related provisions elsewhere within the Code of Crim. Proc., in all “criminal” cases, which the court record (or lack thereof) clearly shows they have not done, to wit:

Art. 45.002. APPLICATION OF CHAPTER.Criminal proceedings in the justice and municipal courts shall be conducted in accordance with this chapter, including any other rules of procedure specifically made applicable to those proceedings by this chapter.  If this chapter does not provide a rule of procedure governing any aspect of a case, the justice or judge shall apply the other general provisions of this code to the extent necessary to achieve the objectives of this chapter.

(Emphasis added)

Art. 45.002, Code of Crim. Proc., requires and directs that all “Criminal proceedings in the justice and municipal courts shall be conducted in accordance with this chapter, including any other rules of procedure specifically made applicable to those proceedings by this chapter.”

Furthermore, Art. 45.002, Code of Crim. Proc., clearly requires and directs that “If this chapter does not provide a rule of procedure governing any aspect of a case, the justice or judge shall apply the other general provisions of this code to the extent necessary to achieve the objectives of this chapter.”

If this were an actual “criminal” case under the provisions of Art. 45.002, Code of Crim. Proc., then, by the usage of the term “shall,” this article clearly makes mandatory the requirement that municipal and justice courts of this state comply with all the relevant provisions of Chapter 45 in general and specifically Art. 45.002, Code of Crim. Proc.

Therefore, if this were an actual “criminal” proceeding, the court record (or lack thereof) clearly proves that Judge Waggoner, while acting under color of law, knowingly, willingly, and intentionally ignored virtually all procedural due process requirements and rights belonging to Respondent, and Judge Waggoner did so in direct violation of the laws of this state and of the United States.

Therefore, Judge Waggoner and Attorney Lehmkuhl have officially declared the Code of Crim. Proc. irrelevant to these and all other criminal proceedings held in the City of Rockdale Municipal Court, both by their respective actions and failure to perform even a single item of any article therein in accordance with the plain and common language of the codes provisions during all proceedings thus far.

Thus, Respondent has good cause to believe that these facts substantiate his/her assertion and conclusion that this is not and cannot be a “criminal” proceeding, and, therefore, can only be a non-case, i.e. it is civil, and, therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction, as does Judge Waggoner.

Therefore, by acting without jurisdiction outside of all constitutional and lawful authority, and in violation of Respondent’s fundamental protected rights, Judge Waggoner is criminally liable for his/her actions and disqualified for all purposes.

ISSUE:                 Did the court violate Respondent’s right of due process by ignoring specific rights codified in the Code of Crim. Proc.?

As addressed in Respondent’s Special Appearance and Motion to Dismiss, Respondent, by law, is entitled to proper notice, i.e. service, of a written copy of both a criminal complaint and proper charging instrument, i.e. an “information,” “not later than the day before the date of any proceeding in the prosecution…” under the provisions of Arts. 1.05, 2.04, 2.05, and 45.018(b), Code of Crim. Proc., to wit:

Code of Criminal ProcedureArt. 1.05. RIGHTS OF ACCUSED.  In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.  He shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof.  He shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself.  He shall have the right of being heard by himself, or counsel, or both;  shall be confronted with the witnesses against him, and shall have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.  No person shall be held to answer for a felony unless on indictment of a grand jury.

Art. 2.04. [28] [34] [35] Shall draw complaints

Upon complaint being made before a district or county attorney that an offense has been committed in his district or county, he shall reduce the complaint to writing and cause the same to be signed and sworn to by the complainant, and it shall be duly attested by said attorney.

Art. 2.04 (emphasis added).

Art. 2.05. [29] [35] [36] When complaint is made

If the offense be a misdemeanor, the attorney shall forthwith prepare an information based upon such complaint and file the same in the court having jurisdiction; provided, that in counties having no county attorney, misdemeanor cases may be tried upon complaint alone, without an information, provided, however, in counties having one or more criminal district courts an information must be filed in each misdemeanor case. …

Art. 2.05 (Thomson/West 2005) (emphasis added).

Art. 45.018. COMPLAINT.

(a)  For purposes of this chapter, a complaint is a sworn allegation charging the accused with the commission of an offense.

(b) A defendant is entitled to notice of a complaint against the defendant not later than the day before the date of any proceeding in the prosecution of the defendant under the complaint.  The defendant may waive the right to notice granted by this subsection.

(Emphasis added)

Respondent filed his/her Special Appearance and Motion to Dismiss with the trial Court in a timely manner, long before his/her commanded appearance for a sham “pretrial” proceeding in which the only objective of the court and the prosecution was to coerce Respondent into either making a deal or entering a plea. Neither of these are proper purposes for commanding a pre-trial appearance before the court according to the statutes of this state codified in Art. 28.01, Code of Crim. Proc.

Without so much as reading them, Judge Waggoner dismissed Respondent’s points of law and argument relating to there being no complaint and proper charging instrument filed in the court record, and no proper, sufficient and timely notice of either instrument being served upon Respondent. Judge Waggoner refused to even acknowledging the due process violations created by proceeding in the knowing absence of a sworn complaint. As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has themselves set the filing of a complaint[1] as the minimum bar to investing municipal and justice courts with jurisdiction of a Class C misdemeanor cause, which Respondent believes is a constitutionally and statutorily incorrect ruling, how is it even remotely lawful for the court and the prosecutor to proceed against Respondent knowing full well that jurisdiction has never been conveyed by the filing of a proper complaint?

As no proper complaint was ever filed into the court at the time numerous pre-trial proceedings were initiated and conducted by the prosecutor and himself, Judge Waggoner, acting absent all jurisdiction in the matter, issued numerous instruments simulating legal process in violation of Sec. 32.48, Penal Code, and conducted several judicial proceedings prior to jurisdiction allegedly being obtained by the filing of a criminal complaint.

Furthermore, Judge Waggoner acted in concert and collusion with the prosecutor to deny Respondent in a fair, impartial, and speedy trial by allowing prosecutorial proceedings to commence without such a complaint having been filed, thus preventing the speedy trial “clock” from ever being started in the case. The result being that Respondent’s right to a speedy trial is directly harmed by being preliminarily processed for prosecution without benefit and protection of any passage of time being charged against the State for failure to timely commence the trial on the merits.

Additionally, it is statutorily impossible for Respondent to comply with the requirements of Art. 45.019(f), Code of Crim. Proc., by challenging the complaint until a complaint has been filed and served upon Respondent, which was never done. When a complaint is neither filed nor served upon the accused until the day of trial, it is not only statutorily impossible to challenge the complaints form and substance pursuant Art. 45.019(f), Code of Crim. Proc., it also makes it statutorily impossible for Respondent to comply with Art. 28.01, Code of Crim. Proc., by filing a Motion to Set Aside or “Quash” the complaint no less than seven days prior to any pre-trial proceeding.

To date, the requirements of Art. 45.018(b), Code of Crim. Proc., have not been complied with, thus, violating Respondent’s protected right of notice as denoted by the use of the phrase “is entitled to” pursuant Sec. 311.016(4), Gov. Code, and as recognized and protected by Art. 1.05, Code of Crim. Proc., and [Tex. Const. Art. 1, § 10], to wit:

Texas ConstitutionArt. 1, Sec. 10.  RIGHTS OF ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS.  In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.  He shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof.  He shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, and shall have the right of being heard by himself or counsel, or both, shall be confronted by the witnesses against him and shall have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, except that when the witness resides out of the State and the offense charged is a violation of any of the anti-trust laws of this State, the defendant and the State shall have the right to produce and have the evidence admitted by deposition, under such rules and laws as the Legislature may hereafter provide; and no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on an indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is by fine or imprisonment, otherwise than in the penitentiary, in cases of impeachment, and in cases arising in the army or navy, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger. Government Code

Sec. 311.016. “MAY,” “SHALL,” “MUST,” ETC.  The following constructions apply unless the context in which the word or phrase appears necessarily requires a different construction or unless a different construction is expressly provided by statute:

(1)  “May” creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power.

(2)  “Shall” imposes a duty.

(3)  “Must” creates or recognizes a condition precedent.

(4)  “Is entitled tocreates or recognizes a right.

(5)  “May not” imposes a prohibition and is synonymous with “shall not.”

(6)  “Is not entitled to” negates a right.

(7)  “Is not required to” negates a duty or condition precedent.

(Emphasis added)

By right and law Respondent is entitled to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the court at any time and in personam jurisdiction prior to any general appearance, and to have the response to such challenges addressed by actual points of law and evidence submitted into the record of the court. Neither the court nor the prosecution has ever met this requirement. In fact, the jurisdictional challenges posed by Respondent were simply ignored by Judge Waggoner and Attorney Lehmkuhl, while both were acting under color of law, with Judge Waggoner again proceeding sua sponte to simply declare by fiat that the court had jurisdiction, despite no legal evidence of that fact being submitted into the record by either the prosecution or the court.

ISSUE:                 Did the Court violate the laws of this state and Respondent’s right of due process by requiring that a plea be entered before a court clerk rather than a proper judicial officer in a proper judicial proceeding?

Under color of what law and authority does Judge Waggoner and Attorney Lehmkuhl act to ignore and deny the laws of this state by allegedly authorizing a mere clerk of the court, Wrenie Wheeless (Wheeless), to impersonate a judicial officer by conducting judicial proceedings for the purpose of taking and entering a plea upon the official record of the court?

ISSUE:                 Did the Court violate Respondent’s right of due process by failing to follow the requirements of the Code of Crim. Proc. and the Code of Judicial Conduct?

Respondent has procedural due process rights protected by the requirements of Arts. 1.05, 2.04, 2.05, 1.14, 45.002, 45.018(b), and 45.019(f), Code of Crim. Proc., and [Tex. Const. Art. 1, § 10]. If this were an actual “criminal” case, then, by failing to comply with these provisions of law relating to the duties of his office regarding “criminal” prosecutions, Judge Waggoner, while acting under color of law, knowingly, willingly and intentionally violated the due process rights of Respondent, thus creating the impression of bias and partiality on behalf of the prosecution.

Furthermore, Judge Waggoner, while acting under color of law, knowingly, willingly and intentionally spoke to Respondent in a condescending, belittling, and contemptuous tone and manner before other peoples currently present in the court on September 13, 2012, thus creating the impression of bias and partiality on behalf of the prosecution.

Furthermore, Judge Waggoner, while acting under color of law, knowingly, willingly and intentionally failed to act without bias and partiality by acting sua sponte on behalf of the prosecution to deny out-of-hand several written motions challenging jurisdiction of the court and other related matters of law that were never rebutted or challenged by the prosecution, and did so without holding a proper pretrial hearing of the motions for the purpose of oral argument by Respondent.

Furthermore, Judge Waggoner, while acting under color of law, knowingly, willingly and intentionally failed to act without bias and partiality by soliciting and accepting advise from Attorney Lehmkuhl to deny Respondent’s motions, despite Lehmkuhl admitting that, even though she was the prosecutor assigned to the case, she had never read them. In so doing, Judge Waggoner, while acting under color of law, and by colluding and conspiring with Attorney Lehmkuhl to deny Respondent’s due process rights under color of law, violated numerous canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:

CANON 1 – Upholding the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary.

CANON 2 – Avoiding Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety In All of the Judge’s Activities.

  1. A judge shall comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
  2. A judge shall not allow any relationship to influence judicial conduct or judgment A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others; nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. A judge shall not testify voluntarily as a character witness.

CANON 3 – Performing the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently

CANON 3A – Judicial Duties in General.  The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all the judge’s other activities. Judicial duties include all the duties of the judge’s office prescribed by law.

CANON 3B – Adjudicative Responsibilities.

(2)     A judge should be faithful to the law and shall maintain professional competence in it. A judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.

(4)     A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of staff, court officials and others subject to the judge’s direction and control.

(5)     A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice.

(6)     A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall not knowingly permit staff, court officials and others subject to the judge’s direction and control to do so.

 

CANON 6 – Compliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct

CANON 6C – Justices of the Peace and Municipal Court Judges.

(2)     A justice of the peace or a municipal court judge, except as authorized by law, shall not directly or indirectly initiate, permit, nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning the merits of a pending judicial proceeding.

CANON 8 – Construction and Terminology of the Code

CANON 8B – Terminology.

(1)     “Shall” or “shall not” denotes binding obligations the violation of which can result in disciplinary action.

(8)     “Law” denotes court rules as well as statutes, constitutional provisions and decisional law.

Request for Relief

Therefore, Respondent requests that regional presiding judge Billy Ray Stubblefield grant his/her special appearance and enter a finding and order declaring that Judge Waggoner is disqualified for all purposes from presiding over any proceedings involving Respondent in the instant matter.

Furthermore, Respondent requests that regional presiding judge Billy Ray Stubblefield direct the Court to dismiss the false charge of failure to appear and recall the subsequent warrant of arrest issued by Judge Waggoner in direct violation of the laws of this state.

Furthermore, Respondent requests that regional presiding judge Billy Ray Stubblefield direct the Court to dismiss this case with prejudice for lack of subject matter and in personam jurisdiction.

[1] Ex Parte Greenwood, 165 Tex. Crim. 349; 307 S.W.2d 586; 1957 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 2350

05.0699E EC – MTDR – Disqualify or Recuse Judge (AMENDED)

State Constitutions vs Ordinances – WHO has the legitimate power to make binding public law in your republic?

Okay,
 
I received an interesting email from someone in South Carolina (S.C.) that brought up the following issues with the judge’s bench book as used in their courts. Here is what he asked about:
 
==============================
 
I read your piece about city ordinances.
This is from the SC Summary Court Judge’s Benchbook:
 
“The uniform traffic ticket, established under the provisions of Section 56-7-10, may be used by law enforcement officers to arrest a person for an offense committed in the presence of a law enforcement officer if the punishment is within the jurisdiction of magistrate’s court and municipal court.” (S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-15). The uniform traffic ticket may also be used by law enforcement to cite individuals for violations of county or municipal ordinance violations. (1990 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 90- 48). County and municipal uniform ordinance summons were established under the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-80, which provides as follows: (A) Counties and municipalities are authorized to adopt by ordinance and use an ordinance summons as provided herein for the enforcement of county and municipal ordinances. Upon adoption of the ordinance summons, any county or municipal law enforcement officer or code enforcement officer is authorized to use an ordinance summons. Any county or municipality adopting the ordinance summons is responsible for the printing, distributing, monitoring, and auditing of the ordinance summons to be used by that entity. (B) The uniform ordinance summons may not be used to perform a custodial arrest. No county or municipal ordinance which regulates the use of motor vehicles on the public roads of this State may be enforced using an ordinance summons.”
 
(B) is especially interesting to me, since if an officer is detaining you for any reason, that is a custodial arrest. Isn’t it?
 
Thanks for your time and efforts.”
 
==============================
 
This was my initial reply back to him:
 
Is there something that you wish for me to see here that would lead me to think that S.C. is somehow different in the area of ordinances? I’m just trying to figure out what it is you wanted me to see in it that would make me think otherwise?
 
==============================
 
His reply was:
 
So what you’re saying, and I’m just asking, is that this piece from the judge’s benchbook is bullshit? That it doesn’t matter what it says?
Trying to get clear on this. That’s all.
 
==============================
 
And this is my response by which I hope to make things more clear to him, and to all of you, that might run into something similar in your own state.
 
========
 
No, it reads precisely as it SHOULD when being used for “persons” involved in a relationship with the corporate entity that created the policy in question, and to which such comments can lawfully claim that ordinances apply.
 
Did you compare your legislative article of the South Carolina Constitution with the claims made in that statute? Because I did, and the constitutional sections read exactly as I expected them to read, that ONLY the legislature of S.C. has law-making power.
 
 
 
Now, if some OTHER provision of that constitution delegates such power to municipalities and counties, then WHERE and for WHAT PURPOSE does it do that? Because, if it DOES do that, then the following isn’t going to hold true, but if it DOESN’T, then the following facts are irrefutable.
 
The legislature CANNOT redelegate a delegated power, and you will find TONS of case law on that subject saying exactly that. So, it doesn’t matter if the state legislature attempted to enact legislation to make it APPEAR that these ordinances are ‘public law,’ as long as you and others know to challenge the assertion by pointing out WHY they CANNOT actually BE ‘public law’ under the S.C. state constitution.
 
So, since that means that ordinances CANNOT be treated as actual ‘PUBLIC LAW’ without first being in direct violation of the state constitution and the powers delegated therein, what then are they?
 
The short answer is that they are MUNICIPAL/COUNTY CORPORATE POLICY, and corporate policy is binding ONLY upon the following:
 
1) the corporate entity itself that created the policy,
2) those that are directly employed by the corporate entity, or
3) those that are employed as contractors with that corporate entity, or
4) those that knowingly and willfully CONSENT to being bound by the entity’s policies.
 
If the municipality/county CANNOT constitutionally create binding ‘public law,’ then how else would ordinances have any lawful authority over or application to members of the public and NOT be in direct violation of the state constitution if it is not through voluntary consent?
 
If you will search for it on your legislative web site, I am more than certain that a search for statutes that contain a STATUTORY definition of the term “law” will produce several hits.
 
On the Texas legislative web site for example, you would first click on the “SEARCH” menu at the top, leave the “What Code” section blank, and in the search field type (WITH the double quotes but NOT the period) “law means.” Then, repeat this, but type in the search field “law includes.”
 
There will be at least one or two results from these two searches that include ordinances, school board policies, agency regulations, and numerous other NON-LEGISLATIVELY CREATED policies as part of the definition of ‘law’ as it relates to “this state.”
 
In Texas you will actually get 17, only about four of which contain a definition like this one:
 
30) “Law” means the constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States, a written opinion of a court of record, a municipal ordinance, an order of a county commissioners court, or a rule authorized by and lawfully adopted under a statute.
 
 
 
The problem there is, the legislature CANNOT do by subversive statutory decree what it is completely forbidden to do directly. Especially by using a mere definition of terminology to circumvent the constitutional limitation upon who can make binding public law.
 
Which means that, in court, we should be demanding to know the following:
 
“Judge, I have a right to proper notice of and to understand the nature and cause, do I not? So, are you stating that the charges against me relate to some alleged offense under an ACTUAL PUBLIC LAW specifically enacted by the S.C. Legislature, or, am I being charging with some alleged offense written only into some ordinance, regulation, rule, or policy that is considered to be ‘law’ only because it has been unconstitutionally defined as ‘law’ within some statutory definition of that term, but which ordinance, regulation, rule, or policy was NOT enacted by the legislature as is constitutionally required in order to actually BE binding public law?”
 
It really shouldn’t be a mind-blowing effort to reason out this is not only unconstitutional and illegal, because it IS fraud, but that any attempt to move forward as if the action is valid would itself be an act of official oppression, official misconduct, and outright treason and sedition as a subversion of the respective state constitution.
 
Therefore, the only logical and state constitutionally sound conclusion that one can make about ANY statute or ordinance that relies upon a definition of this sort, is that ANY statute using that definition CANNOT be directly applicable to the PUBLIC, but is applicable ONLY to those “persons” as I previously described and enumerated above.
==============================
Remember folks, we DIDN’T authorize ANY of this ordinance and private rule and regulation making bullshit by our public servants.  Especially over us, our private property, or any other part of our private lives.  It was USURPED (ILLEGALLY STOLEN/TAKEN), by the attorneys through ‘legal’ subterfuge and seditious and treasonous acts resulting from their takeover of EVERY department of government. Creating an unconstitutional aristocracy for themselves right here in America.
We the People collectively and individually have every RIGHT to fight back and say no, and to enforce that refusal with force of arms if need be. Both our state and federal constitutions reserved that right to the PEOPLE, not just the ‘states’ as they would have you believe, and THAT is precisely what the 2nd Amendment was put in place to ensure that we COULD do when and if it ever became necessary.
Well, that time is here, that time is now.  The constitutions won’t defend themselves, and the crooks certainly aren’t going to start abiding by them now, as is evidenced by the daily violation of their principles and protections by those most subject to obeying them.  They openly and unapologetically abuse us, steal from us, and openly murder us on the streets and in our homes.  WHEN will it be enough to push you over the edge to where you are willing to get out of your damned armchair and stand with each other to demand, resist, and ensure through forceful resistance if needed, that this will NOT be allowed to go on or ever be put in place again?  When did we Americans allow ourselves to become such moral and slothful cowards?
Please take the time to read my much more in-depth article in the issue of ordinances by clicking here.